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FOREWORD TO THE INAUGURAL ISSUE 
 
The Journal of Commonwealth Criminal Law is published by the 
Association of Commonwealth Criminal Lawyers, which was 
established in October, 2010.   The Commonwealth of Nations is the 
world‟s oldest political association of sovereign states, comprising 54 
countries, with about two billion inhabitants, representing nearly one-
third of the world‟s population.   It stretches from Australia to 
Zambia, from India to St Lucia, and represents a wide range of 
cultures, beliefs and nationalities.   Its origins are to be found in a 
shared history, similar judicial and parliamentary systems, and the 
common use of the English language.   Its core values, as reaffirmed 
by the Commonwealth Heads of Government in Trinidad and 
Tobago in November, 2009, are international peace and security, 
democracy, human rights, tolerance, respect and understanding, the 
separation of powers, the rule of law, freedom of expression, 
development, gender equality, access to health and education, good 
governance and civil society. 
The legal systems of the great majority of Commonwealth 
countries are founded in the common law.   In the field of criminal 
practice, this means that the procedures adopted are informed by 
certain key common law precepts, such as the presumption of 
innocence, the adversarial process and the privilege against self-
incrimination.   The substantive criminal law of almost all 
Commonwealth countries may now largely be found in the local 
legislation, but some is still based on the common law.   The 
legislation in the majority of Commonwealth countries has its roots in 
one or other of three codes drafted in the nineteenth century.   The 
first two, those of Thomas Babington Macaulay and James Fitzjames 
Stephen, started out as attempts to codify the law of England and 
Wales.   The third, that of Samuel Griffith was never intended as a 
code for England and Wales, but it drew on English law as well as 
other sources, such as the Italian Penal Code.   Whilst none of these 
codes was ever adopted in England and Wales, one or other was 
adopted throughout the Commonwealth.   Thus, today, the Macauley 
Code remains the basis of the criminal law in India, Pakistan, Sri 
Lanka, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Singapore and elsewhere;  the Griffith 
Code provides the substantive criminal law of the states of 
Queensland and Western Australia as well as of countries as far away 
as Nigeria and Jamaica;  and the Stephen Code found favour in 
Canada and New Zealand among other countries.   Both the 
procedural and substantive criminal law of almost all the nations of 
the Commonwealth have, therefore, common roots and principles 
and share many fundamental concepts. 
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The Association of Commonwealth Criminal Lawyers exists to 
promote, throughout the Commonwealth:  (i) traditional principles of 
common law criminal justice, namely the rule of law, an independent 
judiciary and legal profession, the right to a fair trial by an 
independent and impartial tribunal, in public and within a reasonable 
time, the adversarial process, humane and consistent sentencing 
practice reflective of the gravity of the offence, and well-drafted 
criminal legislation;  (ii) the protection of fundamental rights and 
freedoms through the common law;  (iii) awareness of invasive, 
oppressive, or overly restrictive laws, and of human rights abuses, in 
particular those perpetrated through or in spite of the criminal law;  
and (iv) education in the law and in common law principles. 
The Journal of Commonwealth Criminal Law is one of the key 
means by which the Association intends to promote its objects.   For 
far too long, there has been no publication dealing specifically and 
exclusively with developments in common law criminal justice.   The 
suspicion must be that this had something to do with a sense of 
superiority among the legal profession and the judiciary in the United 
Kingdom, quite possibly associated with the fact that, at one time or 
another, the ultimate court of appeal for virtually all countries now 
members of the Commonwealth was the Judicial Committee of the 
Privy Council in London, whose personnel were almost identical to 
the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords.   For many years, it 
would be standard for Commonwealth courts, even of countries such 
as Canada and Australia, to consult English authority, and yet it 
would be almost unheard of for the courts of England and Wales to 
consult the authorities of the Commonwealth.   Things have changed, 
however, and in no small measure due to the attitude of Lord 
Bingham, who, during his tenure as senior Law Lord in the House of 
Lords, made it clear that he expected counsel to be in a position to 
inform the court as to how the matter in issue in the particular appeal 
was dealt with in the Commonwealth.   What was once a one-way 
street now has traffic moving in both directions.   This journal is 
intended to further this movement by encouraging dialogue between 
all the countries of the Commonwealth with no precedence being 
accorded to the jurisprudence of any one country, it now being 
beyond argument that the quality of the output of several of the 
senior courts of the Commonwealth is at least the equal of that of the 
Supreme Court of the United Kingdom.    
As the contents of the inaugural issue amply demonstrate, there is 
an enormous range of topics which can benefit from comparative 
study;  and this barely scratches the surface.   The ambit of the 
journal‟s coverage extends from the investigation of crime, through 
preparation for trial, to trial itself, including the full range of evidence 
issues and mode of trial issues, the substantive criminal law, 
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sentencing, appeals and the investigation and treatment of possible 
miscarriages of justice.   The inaugural issue is fortunate to benefit 
from contributions from both the President and the Vice-president of 
the Association of Commonwealth Criminal Lawyers, two of the 
most distinguished lawyers in the common law world in the last 50 
years.   They have set a standard that it will be difficult to emulate, 
but it is the commitment of the editorial board to be 
uncompromising in its promotion of the values of the Association, 
and in its pursuit of excellence in practice. 
 
J.R. 
May 15, 2011 
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PUBLIC DUTIES AND CRIMINAL OMISSIONS:   
SOME UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS 
ANDREW ASHWORTH Q.C. * 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This article explores four unresolved questions on offences of omission in 
common law jurisdictions.   How are the categories of duty-situations 
usually determined?   What forms of duty-situation have Commonwealth 
legislatures found it necessary to add, and why?   Should a “duty of easy 
rescue” be recognized?   Where a duty is imposed, what conduct should be 
demanded of the citizen?   These questions are discussed in the light of 
Commonwealth laws and of rule-of-law principles. 
 
 
Criminal law textbooks across the many Commonwealth jurisdictions 
recognise that liability for omissions in criminal law is exceptional.   
Most offences penalize the doing of acts, and most of the language of 
the textbooks and of the laws themselves proceeds on the basis of a 
criminal act.   On the other hand, there are some offences of 
omission in all systems of criminal law, and they depend on the 
recognition of a public duty to act in certain situations.   The purpose 
of this article is to explore four of the many unresolved questions 
relating to liability for criminal omissions in common law systems.   
What are the limits to recognition of duty situations at common law?   
What forms of duty situation have legislatures found it necessary to 
add to the common law, and for what reasons?   To what extent have 
the arguments in favour of a duty of “easy rescue” been welcomed in 
Commonwealth jurisdictions?   And, what conduct is required in 
cases where a duty to act is imposed? 
There are several other unresolved questions in relation to liability 
for criminal omissions – for example, what fault requirement is 
appropriate?  how does the doctrine of causation apply?  what 
defences should be open to people who find themselves in a duty 
situation? – but those must wait for another day.   For the present, 
our examination of the four chosen questions must be preceded by a 
short history of omissions liability at common law, and an 
explanation of the reasons why legislative reform has not been 
undertaken in England and Wales. 
  
 
 
* Vinerian Professor of English Law, University of Oxford;  President of the 
Association of Commonwealth Criminal Lawyers.   I am grateful to Professor Kate 
Warner for comments on a draft, and to Nicole Urban for research assistance. 
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I.   A SHORT HISTORY OF OMISSIONS LIABILITY AT COMMON LAW 
The common law approach to offences of omission is that they 
should not be general, and that they should give rise to criminal 
liability only if there is a recognized duty to act in that situation. Thus 
an omission should lead to liability for homicide, for example, only 
where a distinct duty to act was neglected.   This was explained and 
defended in the nineteenth century in these terms: 
“It is, indeed, most highly desirable that men should not 
merely abstain from doing harm to their neighbours, but 
should render active services to their neighbours.   In general, 
however, the penal law must content itself with keeping men 
from doing positive harm, and must leave to public opinion, 
and to the teachers of morality and religion, the office of 
furnishing men with motives for doing positive good.   It is 
evident that to attempt to punish men by law for not 
rendering to others all the service which it is their duty to 
render to others would be preposterous.   We must grant 
immunity to the vast majority of those omissions which a 
benevolent morality would pronounce reprehensible, and 
must content ourselves with punishing such omissions only 
when they are distinguished from the rest by some 
circumstance which marks them out as particularly fit objects 
of penal legislation.”1 
This was Lord Macaulay‟s summary of the spirit and rationale of 
the common law stance on omissions in the mid-nineteenth century, 
when considering the drafting of a criminal code for India.   It 
suggests that positive duties to act are matters for morality, and that 
only when it is possible to point to a strong and specific responsibility 
should the criminal law be invoked. Behind the adjective 
“preposterous” lay a belief that it was not appropriate for the criminal 
law to intervene except in strong cases, lesser cases being left to 
conscience and social expectation.  
Macaulay was evidently troubled also by the difficulty of 
determining the boundaries of any general duty of “rescue” or 
beneficence that might be imposed.   His conclusion was that the 
criminal law could not be thus extended – 
“… without disturbing the whole order of society.   It is true 
that the man who, having an abundance of wealth, suffers a 
fellow creature to die of hunger at his feet is a bad man, a 
worse man, probably, than many of those for whom we have 
provided very severe punishment.   But we are unable to see 
where, if we make such a man legally punishable, we can draw 
 
 
1 Macaulay, Speeches and Poems with Report and Notes on the Indian Penal Code (New York, 
Hurd & Houghton 1867), vol. 2, 408. 
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the line.   If the rich man who refuses to save a beggar‟s life at 
the cost of a little copper is a murderer, is the poor man just 
one degree above beggary also to be a murderer if he omits to 
invite the beggar to partake his hard-earned rice?”2 
Although this is presented as an intractable problem of line-drawing, 
it is one that appears to have caused few problems in those systems 
of criminal law that contain a positive duty to assist citizens in peril.   
Macaulay‟s particular concern here relates to convicting such a person 
of murder, i.e. of an offence of commission by omission, but that 
loads the dice somewhat.   He does not discuss the wider (and lesser) 
alternative of creating a general offence of failure to assist a person in 
peril, the so-called “duty of easy rescue” that is a feature of many 
European legal systems.   We will return later to this distinction 
between the two approaches to criminalization.3 
It now remains to complete the set of nineteenth-century 
rationalisations by quoting Sir James Fitzjames Stephen‟s exposition 
of the common law: 
“A number of people who stand around a shallow pond in 
which a child is drowning, and let it drown without taking the 
trouble to ascertain the depth of the pond, are no doubt 
shameful cowards, but they can hardly be said to have killed 
the child.”4 
This particular passage relies on “ordinary language” reasoning – by 
arguing that the adults do not “kill” the child, as a sufficient reason 
for the conclusion – and this is not the most stable foundation for an 
argument about the proper limits of the criminal law.   But the 
context is one in which Stephen appears to think that no further 
justification is called for, so obvious is it that liability for homicide by 
omission should only be imposed where the law has recognized a 
specific duty to act.   This approach influenced his draft Criminal Code 
of 1878, and also the Griffith code for Queensland of 1901 and its 
progeny.5 
The question of liability for criminal omissions was then not 
debated in official circles in England and Wales until the 1980s, when 
work began on a criminal code.   The Law Commission‟s report, 
which contained a draft criminal code (never enacted), repeated the 
traditional common law view: 
“Criminal liability for failing to act is exceptional.   Parliament 
sometimes makes it an offence to fail to do something (as 
 
 
2 ibid., 407. 
3 See part 4, post. 
4 Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England (London 1885), vol. 3, 10. 
5 For general discussion of the evolution of Commonwealth codes, see R.S. O‟Regan, 
New Essays on the Australian Criminal Codes (Sydney 1988), Ch. VIII. 
4 Journal of Commonwealth Criminal Law [2011] 
 
with wilful neglect of a child, the failure of a motorist to 
exchange particulars after an accident, or the failure of a 
company to make an annual return).   Most other instances of 
liability for omissions depend upon judicial construction of 
statutory language as referring to omissions as well as to acts, 
or upon common law (that is, judicial) recognition, in limited 
and rather ill-defined circumstances, of a duty to prevent a 
particular kind of harm (notably certain harms to the person) 
or to prevent the commission of an offence.”6 
The problem that confronted the Law Commission was that it was 
and is uncertain which offences can be committed by omission and 
which not:  this has always been regarded as a matter for judicial 
interpretation.   The Law Commission did not feel able to make a list 
of all the offences to which a general provision on omissions liability 
could be applied.   So it decided to do nothing. It recommended that 
a criminal code for England and Wales should not contain a 
provision on omissions:7  questions of liability for omissions “must 
remain a matter of construction and, so far as duties to act are 
concerned, of common law.”8   Its subsequent report on the law of 
manslaughter was much more critical of the uncertain state of the law 
relating to omissions, but concluded nevertheless that the common 
law was best left undisturbed pending a thorough and specific re-
examination of omissions liability.9   A decade and a half later, no 
such review has taken place. 
 As a result, (i) whether a particular offence under English law can 
be committed by omission is a question of interpretation for the 
judiciary;  and (ii) whether, in a particular situation, there is a positive 
duty to act is a question for the judiciary, developing the common 
law;  and (iii) there has been no examination of the arguments for and 
against a general duty of easy rescue on what we may call “the 
European model.” The draft criminal code of 1989 has never been 
presented to Parliament, but neither has there been any general 
discussion of omissions liability since that time. 
From this brief history it appears that there is no agreed doctrinal 
foundation for this aspect of the common law.   Lord Macaulay relied 
 
 
6 Law Commission, A Criminal Code for England and Wales (Law Commission No. 177, 
1989) vol. 2, 186-187;  this had also been the stance taken by the Criminal Law 
Revision Committee, 14th Report, Offences Against the Person (Cmnd 7844, 1980), paras 
252-256. 
7 This recommendation departed from the proposals of the team of academic lawyers 
who had drafted the first version of the criminal code a few years earlier, clause 20(2) 
of which gives a list of duty-situations:  Law Commission, Codification of the Criminal 
Law:  a Report to the Law Commission (Law Commission No. 143, 1985). 
8 Law Commission (n.6), 187. 
9 Law Commission, Legislating the Criminal Code:  Involuntary Manslaughter (Law 
Commission No. 237, 1996), para. 5.44. 
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on what he regarded as an appropriate division of functions between 
the criminal law and morality, and also on practical problems of line-
drawing.   Stephen relied on ordinary language, although he probably 
accepted Macaulay‟s first reason too.   Underlying the common law 
position seems to be an argument based on the values of autonomy 
and liberty.10   In principle, respecting the autonomy of each citizen 
means maximising their opportunities to live life as they wish, and to 
achieve their own goals.   Criminal offences which prohibit certain 
conduct narrow down these options, and reduce the range of 
opportunities by ruling out murder, fraud, damage, theft and other 
ways of unfairly gaining preference for one‟s own goals.   But those 
criminal offences amount to only a small restriction on liberty in a 
civilized society, since most people will rarely be tempted thus to 
infringe the rights of others.   Criminal liability for omissions, on the 
other hand, generates positive duties to act, requiring the citizen to 
give priority to helping another person who is in peril rather than 
pursuing his or her own goals.   The more of these offences of 
omission that are created, the greater the incursion into individual 
freedom of action, an incursion that is further increased if the ambit 
of the duties and offences of omission is plagued by uncertainty (a 
point appreciated by the English Law Commission).11   Thus, in order 
to maximise respect for individual autonomy and liberty, criminal 
liability for omissions should be confined to strong and clear 
situations. 
Even if some such course of reasoning would justify the common 
law‟s position on criminal omissions, it is incomplete.   Nothing has 
been said about the kinds of situation in which omissions liability 
would, exceptionally, be appropriate – what characteristics such 
situations must have, and what justifications support the making of an 
exception.   As soon as those questions are confronted, it is obvious 
that there is a rival set of normative propositions based on social co-
operation and community rather than on individual autonomy and 
liberty, where responsibility for others may be founded on several 
possible personal ties, and where values such as the right to life may 
be recognized as more powerful than the right to liberty in some 
circumstances.   These propositions will be discussed further as the 
article develops.   The important point at this stage is that the 
position on criminal omissions taken by the common law or any 
other system can be placed at various points along a spectrum 
running from extreme individualism (where no positive duties are 
 
 
10 See further A. Ashworth, „The Scope of Criminal Liability for Omissions‟ (1989) 
105 L.Q.R. 424, pp. 424-430;  A.P. Simester, „Why Omissions are Special‟, (1995) 1 
Legal Theory 311. 
11 Law Commission (n.9), para. 3.16. 
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recognized) to what might be termed full communitarianism (where 
personal liberty is always subordinated to social responsibilities).   If 
we say, crudely and provisionally, that the common law is closer to 
extreme individualism, that still leaves considerable scope for us to 
define its precise position, to look at variations among 
Commonwealth countries, and to assess the reasons for the 
differences. 
 
II.   DUTY SITUATIONS RECOGNISED AT COMMON LAW 
The first question to be determined is whether a particular offence 
can be committed by omission, and this is still regarded as a matter 
for the judiciary.   If the crime is a common law offence (like murder 
and manslaughter, in English law), the court must apply or develop 
the common law.12   If the crime is a statutory offence, the court must 
decide whether the offence is capable of being committed by 
omission or not.   The English Law Commission was correct in 
stating that these decisions have been taken on an offence-by-offence 
basis, without any appearance of an overall strategy.   One might have 
thought that the task of a Law Commission should have been to 
discuss such a strategy and to create one or more presumptions in 
order to guide judicial interpretation.   But, as we have seen, this did 
not happen. 
Once a court has decided that a particular offence can be 
committed by omission, it must next decide whether there is a “duty-
situation” that applies to the facts of the case, thereby recognizing 
that the person has an obligation to take positive action.   The list of 
duty-situations has been expanded by the courts over the years, and 
five categories may be described in broad terms:13 
(i) Relationship Duties:  a parent has a duty towards her or his 
child, and one spouse towards the other, but there is great 
uncertainty about the obligations arising from other family 
relationships and from membership of the same household. 
(ii) Duties arising from Assumption of Responsibility:  a person 
has a duty if he or she makes a contract or a less formal 
agreement to supply another person with food or care.   
 
 
12 Subject, of course, to the principle of legality (see text accompanying n.29 below).   
For a recent example, see R v. Clark [2003] EWCA Crim 991, [2003] R.T.R. 411, 
where the Court of Appeal declined to extend the common law offence of perverting 
the course of justice to cases of omission. 
13 For the relevant English law, see A.P. Simester, J.R. Spencer, G.R. Sullivan and 
G.J. Virgo, Simester and Sullivan‟s Criminal Law:  Theory and Doctrine (4th edn, Hart, 
2010), 71;  and David Ormerod, Smith and Hogan Criminal Law (12th edn, Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 61;  for a general discussion of Anglo-American and German 
categories of duty, see G.P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (Boston, Little Brown 
1978), 611-625. 
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There is uncertainty about the circumstances in which such a 
duty can be implied when a person simply helps another 
person on one or more occasions. 
(iii) Duties arising from Ownership or Control of Property:  the 
owner of a house or car has been held to have a duty to stop 
another person committing an offence in that house or car 
when the owner is present, or at least a duty to tell the person 
to stop. 
(iv) Duties arising from Prior Dangerous Act:  a person who 
unintentionally causes a dangerous situation has a duty to try 
to prevent that situation from getting worse or from causing 
harm or further harm.14 
(v) Duties arising from Control of a Dangerous Article:  a 
person who knowingly has control of a dangerous article has 
a duty to ensure that it is dealt with safely.15 
Each of these categories has a penumbra of uncertainty, because 
the judges have developed the law in the course of deciding individual 
cases. Some jurisdictions have placed some or all of the common law 
categories in legislation,16 whereas others continue with the case-law.   
It would be possible now to discuss many of the judicial decisions 
that have shaped the law, but it will be sufficient to take just three 
examples of the difficulties that remain. 
One of the best-known cases is R. v. Stone and Dobinson.17   Stone‟s 
sister came to stay in the house occupied by Stone and Dobinson.   
She suffered from anorexia nervosa, she ate very little and she 
became weaker.   Stone and Dobinson made efforts to contact her 
doctor, without success;  Dobinson offered her food from time to 
time, and Dobinson and a neighbour washed the sister on one 
occasion (by which stage she was lying in her own excrement);  one 
month later she was found dead.   Stone and Dobinson were charged 
with manslaughter, on the basis that they had an obligation to care for 
her and had caused her death by gross negligence.   The Court of 
 
 
14 To the extent that the situation was caused culpably, the duty is surely stronger:  
see L. Alexander, „Criminal Liability for Omissions:  an Inventory of Issues‟ in S. 
Shute and A.P. Simester (eds), Criminal Law Theory:  Doctrines of the General Part 
(Oxford University Press 2002), 129. 
15 This fifth category is not included in the English textbooks, but finds a place in 
some Commonwealth jurisdictions:  see e.g. Criminal Code Act 1899 (Queensland) 
s.289;  Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tasmania) s.150;  and Crimes Act 1961 (New Zealand), 
s.156, all based on the draft criminal code of 1878;  for South Africa see J. Burchell, 
Principles of Criminal Law (3rd edn, Lansdowne 2005) 190-191. 
16 E.g. Criminal Code Act 1995 (Queensland), Pt 7.   It is noticeable that the categories 
set out in the German Criminal Code resemble those at common law quite closely:  see 
the discussion by M. Bohlander, Principles of German Criminal Law (Oxford, Hart 
2009), 40-45. 
17 [1977] Q.B. 354 (Court of Appeal). 
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Appeal gave three reasons for holding that there was a duty in this 
case: 
“she [the sister] was a blood relation of the appellant Stone;  
she was occupying a room in his house;  the appellant 
Dobinson had undertaken the duty of trying to wash her, and 
of taking such food to her as she required.” 
Each of these reasons is contestable.   The first suggests that any 
blood relationship is a sufficient reason for finding an obligation, 
whereas there are other decisions that cast doubt on this.18   Stronger 
arguments are surely needed in order to support a duty towards an 
adult sister. The second reason is even wider, in that it suggests that if 
anyone occupies a room in one‟s house, that creates an obligation of 
care.   Further exploration of the circumstances of the occupation, 
and its length, are surely required before this becomes a robust 
reason.19   The third reason is formulated in such a way as to produce 
the desired answer:  when Lane L.J. stated (wrongly) that Dobinson 
has “undertaken the duty of trying to wash” the sister, what he meant 
was that on one occasion she had done so.   She did not do so for 
reasons of duty.   The court appears to be saying that, once a person 
has tried to assist another, that creates an obligation to continue 
helping that person – a very different doctrine, which has the 
corollary that a person who shows no kindness at all bears no duty. 
None of these reasons is convincing, and the court‟s arguments are so 
unsatisfactory that even a cumulation of these three reasons fails to 
provide a justification. 
Similar issues arose in the New South Wales case of R v. Taktak.20   
T, a drug addict, arranged for a young woman who was also an addict 
to attend a party at a friend‟s house and to act as a prostitute.   In the 
early hours of the morning the friend contacted him and asked him to 
collect the young woman from the party. When he did, he found that 
she was unconscious through taking drugs.   T took her to his home 
and made various efforts to revive her.   In the morning he called for 
 
 
18 E.g. R. v. Smith (1826) 2 C. & P. 449 (no duty to maintain adult brother who was 
mentally handicapped) and R. v. Sheppard (1862) L. & C. 147 (no duty towards 
daughter of 18, even though age of majority was then 21);  R v. Chattaway (1922) 17 
Cr.App.R. 7 (Court of Criminal Appeal) (duty towards daughter aged 25);  see 
generally P.R. Glazebrook, „Criminal Omissions:  the Duty Requirement in Offences 
against the Person‟ (1960) 76 L.Q.R. 386. 
19 Contrast the decisions in R v. Khan and Khan [1998] EWCA Crim 971, [1998] Crim. 
L.R. 830 (girl supplied with heroin subsequently collapsed in K‟s flat, trial judge had 
failed to consider whether this gave rise to duty to summon medical assistance, 
question left open), and People v. Beardsley (1907) 113 N.W. 1128 (American decision 
suggesting no duty where weekend guest took an overdose, and defendant simply 
moved her to a neighbouring flat). 
20 (1988) 34 A. Crim. R. 334. 
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medical assistance, but she had died. The Court of Appeal of New 
South Wales held that a duty of care had arisen because T assumed 
the care of a helpless person, with the consequence that he had 
“secluded” the person and thereby removed the possibility of others 
helping her.   In the event the court quashed T‟s conviction, being 
unsure that T‟s delay in calling for medical assistance amounted to a 
gross breach of his duty of care.   The importance of this decision is 
that it gives a plausible reason for holding that a person who 
voluntarily takes on the care of another acquires a duty by doing so:  
the notion of “seclusion” – removing the helpless person and thus 
rendering it far less likely that anyone else will give assistance – may 
be applied in many such cases.  
Whereas those two cases contained elements of categories (i), (ii) 
and (iii) above, the case of R. v. Evans21 was held to fall into category 
(iv) only.   Evans had supplied her half-sister with heroin.   Her half-
sister took the heroin and then became ill.   Evans tried to care for 
her during the evening and overnight, but in the morning the half-
sister was dead from heroin poisoning.   The trial judge directed the 
jury that the blood relationship of half-sister was not sufficient to 
create a duty, and that the help Evans had tried to give was not 
sufficient for an assumption of responsibility (category (ii)).   The 
Court of Appeal upheld the conviction of Evans for manslaughter on 
the basis of category (iv), that she had created a dangerous situation 
by supplying the heroin to her half-sister and, when she became 
aware of the adverse effects on her half-sister‟s health, had not taken 
effective steps to remedy the situation.   This can be regarded as an 
unprincipled extension of category (iv), because the half-sister‟s 
taking of the heroin was an intervening voluntary act which, on 
normal principles, would break the causal chain between the supply 
of the drug by Evans and the later illness of her half-sister.  
Not only did the Court of Appeal extend category (iv), but they 
created further doubt about the significance of the judgment in Stone 
and Dobinson for the scope of category (ii).   Here the judge directed 
the jury that Evans had not assumed responsibility by her efforts to 
care for her half-sister during the evening and night. Is that 
inconsistent with the reasoning in Stone and Dobinson?   The Court of 
Appeal here sought a middle ground: 
“We would merely record that the judge‟s direction that a 
duty to act did not arise from a voluntary assumption of 
[responsibility] by the appellant may have been appropriate in 
this case, but it would not be of universal application where, 
 
 
21 [2009] EWCA Crim 650, [2009] 1 W.L.R. 1999, on which see Glenys Williams, 
„Gross Negligence Manslaughter and Duty of Care in “Drugs” Cases‟ [2009] Crim. 
L.R. 631. 
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for example, a voluntary assumption of [responsibility] by the 
defendant had led the victim, or others, to become dependent 
on him to act.” 
The final words of this sentence seem to echo the “seclusion” 
principle in Taktak, and that principle is close to the notion of 
reliance that seems to underlie the duty-situations in category (ii).   
The reliance here is not so much actual reliance as reasonable 
reliance:  given the situation, and what the defendant had done, was it 
reasonable for others (including the person in peril) to rely on the 
defendant for assistance?   Much depends on the facts;  but, where 
present, this element of reliance creates a firmer moral foundation for 
imposing a duty on the basis of voluntary assistance. Applied to the 
facts of Stone and Dobinson, it would probably not have indicated an 
assumption of responsibility by Dobinson, since the act of washing 
Stone‟s sister cannot be said to have “secluded” her, as she was 
already in the house. However, the “seclusion” rationale might apply 
to Stone‟s act of allowing his sister to stay at the house:  by not 
turning her away, he accepted her into an environment where she was 
unlikely to be helped by others. 
The discussions in and around the three appellate decisions 
demonstrate that there is deep uncertainty in both the principles to be 
applied and the effect of applying them.   Much more could be 
written about these and other cases, and about the various common 
law categories.   It is sufficient to state here that the foundation for (i) 
the relationship duty of parent to child is clear, and might apply no 
less to parent and mentally disordered adult;  but that there is no clear 
principle relating to responsibilities for adult relatives, particularly for 
elderly parents.22   One approach is to delineate the scope of the duty 
by referring to members of the same household,23 although the term 
“household” calls out for further definition.24   As for (ii) duties 
arising from assumption of responsibility, there needs to be scrutiny 
of the arguments for regarding contracts and other agreements as 
sufficient bases for duty, unless there is an explicit undertaking to 
protect another‟s safety;  and there remains deep uncertainty about 
the duties of someone who voluntarily helps another.   Should it 
always be sufficient if someone allows another to stay in a house or 
apartment?   When should it raise a duty if someone tries to help 
another?   The seclusion principle has been proposed, but it is not yet 
 
 
22 See Alexander (n.14), 139-140, and F. McAuley and J.P. McCutcheon, Criminal 
Liability (Dublin, Round Hall Sweet & Maxwell 2000), 192-193. 
23 See the proposals of the English criminal code team, Law Commission (n.7), 
cl.20(2)(a)(ii), and of the Model Criminal Code Officers‟ Committee, Non-Fatal 
Offences against the Person (Canberra 1998), para. 5.1.7. 
24 A form of definition has been enacted in England:  see Domestic Violence, Crime and 
Victims Act 2004, s.5(4), discussed post, text at n.50. 
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widely accepted and it is contingent in its application to particular 
facts.   Little has been said here about (iii), but it is controversial 
whether the mere presence of an owner or controller of property 
should be sufficient to ground a duty to prevent the commission of 
an offence.25   As for (iv) and (v), those categories depend on the 
causal responsibility of the defendant for creating the situation, even 
unwittingly.   Authorship and presence are thought sufficient, in 
combination, to justify the imposition of a duty to take steps to 
remove the danger. 
The ruminations in the previous paragraph point to a significant 
defect in the common law approach to omissions. According to the 
principle of legality or the “rule of law”, legal norms, and especially 
those of the criminal law, must be clear, stable, and not retrospective 
in their operation. The law‟s primary function is to guide people‟s 
conduct, and in this context Lon Fuller, in his catalogue of “eight 
ways to fail to make a law”,26 emphasised the fundamental 
importance of publicizing laws and making them available to citizens.   
In similar vein, John Gardner has argued that “those of us about to 
commit a criminal wrong should be put on stark notice that that is 
what we are about to do.”27   He goes on to argue, developing Hart, 
that it is through the ideal of the rule of law that “the mental element 
in crime is connected with individual freedom:” 
“According to the ideal of the rule of law, the law must be 
such that those subject to it can reliably be guided by it, either 
to avoid violating it or to build the legal consequences of 
having violated it into their thinking about what future actions 
may be open to them.   People must be able to find out what 
the law is and to factor it into their practical deliberations.   
The law must avoid taking people by surprise, ambushing 
them, putting them into conflict with its requirements in such 
a way as to defeat their expectations and frustrate their 
plans.”28 
In the light of these widely respected standards, there are two 
major problems with the common law approach to omissions.   First, 
the list of duty-situations remains open for judicial development, so 
 
 
25 For discussion, see Ashworth (n.10), 445-447;  B. McSherry and B. Naylor, 
Australian Criminal Laws:  Critical Perspectives (Melbourne, Oxford University Press 
2004), pp. 442-444. 
26 L.L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (rev. edn, Yale University Press 1969), ch. II;  and 
see also the discussion by J. Waldron, „The Concept and the Rule of Law‟ (2008) 43 
Georgia L .R. 1, at 7. 
27 J. Gardner, „Wrongs and Faults‟, in A.P. Simester (ed.), Appraising Strict Liability 
(Oxford University Press 2005), 69-70. 
28 J. Gardner, „Introduction‟, in H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (Oxford 
University Press 2008), xxxvi. 
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that individuals often cannot know whether their failure to intervene 
in a given situation will lead to liability for the serious offence of 
manslaughter. It is regarded as a fundamental principle that criminal 
legislation should not be retroactive, and that fair warning should be 
given, yet the judicial recognition of new duty-situations in these 
serious cases would seem to violate this.29   In this vein the Law 
Commission of New Zealand has recommended that “in the interests 
of certainty and transparency” duties that are not set out in legislation 
should not be recognised: 
“It is a cornerstone of the rule of law that people should only 
be held criminally liable for conduct that was criminal at the 
time that it occurred, so that, if they were inclined to do so, 
they would be able to ascertain whether it is prohibited.   This 
is not possible in relation to the common law duties discerned 
by the courts from time to time;  bluntly put, it invites the 
courts to “make it up as they go along” according to the 
circumstances of the individual case.”30 
Although this may seem a counsel of perfection, it is a necessary 
implication of taking the rule of law and its values seriously. Even if 
the five categories of duty are set out in legislation, it will be necessary 
for the courts to interpret them when applying them to the facts of 
particular cases. They may still take individuals by surprise.31   
However, in principle the New Zealand Law Commission‟s 
recommendation is to be preferred to the “hands-off” approach of 
the English Law Commission,32 particularly if combined with an 
explicit restraint on the judicial creation of new categories or 
extensions of existing categories. 
The second major problem is that there may be nothing to put the 
individual on notice of the duty-situation, not least because there may 
be a widespread belief that there are few legal duties to care for one‟s 
fellow human beings.33   The parable of the good Samaritan is an 
 
 
29 Recognition of new duty-situations in cases such as R v. Wacker [2002] EWCA 
Crim 1944, [2003] Q.B. 1207, and R v. Willoughby [2004] EWCA Crim 3365, [2005] 1 
W.L.R. 1880, is far more problematic than the English Court of Appeal admitted. 
30 Law Commission of New Zealand, Review of Part 8 of the Crimes Act 1961:  Crimes 
against the Person (Report No. 111, 2009), para. 4.17.   It has also been argued in the 
Canadian context that the creation of new duty-situations by the courts would “come 
precariously close to creating common law crimes contrary to section 9 of the 
Criminal Code”:  K. Roach, Criminal Law (4th edn, Toronto, Irwin Law 2009), p. 109. 
31 See the powerful arguments of Glanville Williams, „What should the Code do 
about omissions?‟ (1987) 7 Legal Studies 92, 94-95. 
32 See the text at n.6, 8 and 9 ante. 
33 Surveys suggest that the position is more nuanced:  e.g. P.H. Robinson and J.M. 
Darley, Justice, Liability and Blame:  Community Views and the Criminal Law (Boulder, 
Westview Press 1995), 42-50;  and B. Mitchell, „Public Perceptions of Homicide and 
Criminal Justice‟ (1998) 48 B.J. Crim. 453. 
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indication of what it may be morally right to do, but, we are told, not 
of the common law.   This is quite a well-known difference of 
orientation between the common law and continental European 
criminal law.   Thus the problem for the individual is that the 
existence of duty-situations is exceptional, since English law‟s general 
stance is not to impose legal duties to care for others, and that even 
where the courts have considered whether to impose a duty the 
boundaries often remain uncertain, as we noted particularly in 
categories (i) and (ii) above. The English Law Commission decided 
that the relevant law was too uncertain to re-state in codified form,34 a 
position that Glanville Williams had earlier criticized pithily: 
“If the top lawyers in a Government committee find the law 
hard to state clearly, what hope have the Stones and 
Dobinsons of this world of ascertaining their legal position, in 
advance of prosecution, when they find themselves landed 
with a hunger-striking relative?”35 
Unless governments make a concerted effort to communicate duty-
situations to citizens, it is  doubtful whether the criminal law on 
omissions conforms to the principle of legality.36  
 
III.   DUTY-SITUATIONS RECOGNIZED IN STATUTE:   
OFFENCES OF OMISSION 
In most jurisdictions it is normal for the legislature to create a 
number of offences of omission.   Before exploring some features of 
statutory offences, it is important to note that there are some specific 
offences of omission at common law.   One is the offence of 
misconduct in a public office, which can be committed by omission, 
as when a police officer stands by and fails to intervene when an 
offence is being committed (usually, a physical attack).37   There is 
 
 
34 Law Commission (n.9), para. 5.43. 
35 G. Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law (2nd edn, London, Stevens & Sons 1983), p. 
266. 
36 This was conceded by the Law Commission (n.9), para. 3.16.   For the common 
law application of this standard, see Lord Bingham in R. v. Rimmington and Goldstein 
[2005] UKHL 63, [2006] 1 A.C. 459.   In the U.K., the European Convention on 
Human Rights reinforces this requirement:  see B. Emmerson, A. Ashworth and A. 
Macdonald (eds), Human Rights and Criminal Justice (2nd edn, London, Sweet & 
Maxwell 2007), ch. 10. 
37 A modern application of this ancient offence may be found in R. v. Dytham [1979] 
Q.B. 722 (Court of Appeal), where a police officer in uniform saw a man being 
beaten outside a night-club but took no steps to intervene or to summon assistance, 
and simply drove away. 
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also common law authority, for example, for an offence of failing to 
assist a constable when called upon to do so.38   
Many systems of criminal law contain considerable numbers of 
offences of omission of a regulatory kind.   For example, the law of 
New South Wales contains many environmental offences that 
penalise omissions;39  South African law has offences creating a whole 
range of reporting duties relating to money laundering, financial 
movements, corruption and of course road traffic accidents.40   Such 
offences are now typical of most jurisdictions, and no purpose would 
be served simply by any further listing. But we should recognise that 
many systems of criminal law contain other offences which are not 
defined so as to make clear whether they may be committed by 
omission or not.   Terms such as “act”, “cause” and “assist” may 
require judicial interpretation, and to that extent the citizen‟s duties 
are unclear until the courts have spoken.41 
Many Commonwealth jurisdictions have endeavoured to place in 
legislation the categories of duty-situations that will ground liability 
for homicide and perhaps other offences.   Thus, Chapter 26 of the 
Nigerian Criminal Code Act 1990 sets out various “Duties in relation to 
the Preservation of Human Life”, including the duty to provide 
necessaries to dependants, the duty to take care in medical 
procedures, the duty to take care of dangerous things, etc.   The duty 
to provide necessaries is a feature of several criminal codes, but its 
scope varies. Section 151 of the Crimes Act 1961 in New Zealand 
imposes a duty to supply the necessaries of life to a vulnerable person 
in one‟s charge who is “unable by reason of detention, age, sickness, 
insanity or any other course to withdraw himself from such charge 
and unable to provide himself with the necessaries of life.”42   This 
follows similar provisions in the Queensland, Western Australia and 
Tasmania codes,43 which also have provisions imposing duties to care 
for children.44   Section 215 of the Criminal Code of Canada creates an 
 
 
38 R v. Brown (1841) Car. & M. 314.   See also s. 176 of the Indian Penal Code 1860, 
creating an offence of failure to assist a public servant when called upon to do so, 
and (among others) s.129(b) of the Canadian Criminal Code 1985. 
39 Brown, Farrier, Neal and Weisbrot‟s Criminal Laws (4th edn, Sydney, Federation 
Press 2006), para. 4.3.1. 
40 Burchell (n.15), 195. 
41 See further Williams (n.35), 95-97. 
42 Law Commission of New Zealand (n.30), paras 37-38, proposing an extension of 
s.151, on which see part 4 below.   See also Model Criminal Code Officers‟ 
Committee (n.23), cl. 5.1.7, duty to provide the necessities of life where D has 
assumed responsibility for someone unable to provide for himself or herself. 
43 Queensland Code s.285, Western Australia Code s.262, Tasmanian Code s.144;  see also 
the application of sections 150 and 152 of the Tasmanian Code in Tasmania v. Nelligan 
(2005) 15 Tas. R. 142. 
44 See, e.g., the references in McSherry and Naylor (n.25), 124. 
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offence in a parent, spouse or guardian who fails to provide the 
necessaries of life for a child, spouse or charge. English law has the 
offence of wilful neglect of a child,45 as has Ugandan law.46   These 
specific provisions are as important for what they exclude as for what 
they include, since it is a feature of codified criminal laws that courts 
should not extend the categories of duty beyond what is contained in 
the particular code.   However, at a normative level they leave a 
number of issues for debate:  what should be the limits of public 
duties to care for others, reinforced by the criminal law? 
That question has aroused particular interest in two situations in 
recent years – deaths in custody and domestic violence.   The 
responsibility of police and prison officers for the care of people in 
their charge was recognised in England and Wales in typical common 
law fashion when the courts found a duty towards arrestees and those 
in custody,47 and it seems that the South African courts had reached a 
similar conclusion.48   In South Australia the amended offence of 
criminal neglect might apply to some cases of this kind,49 but it is not 
clear how many jurisdictions explicitly recognise such a duty. 
However, new offences of omission have been enacted or 
recommended to deal with some issues of domestic violence in some 
jurisdictions.   In England and Wales section 5 of the Domestic 
Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 created the offence of causing or 
allowing the death of a child or vulnerable adult.50   A person can only 
be convicted of this offence if he or she is a “member of the same 
household” as, and had “frequent contact” with, the vulnerable 
person.   If that member of the household “was, or ought to have 
been, aware” of the risk of serious physical harm being caused to a 
child or vulnerable adult in that household by another member of the 
household, and failed to take reasonable steps to protect the 
vulnerable person, and the vulnerable person was killed, he or she 
may be found guilty of this offence and sentenced to up to 14 years‟ 
imprisonment.   Some may view this as a “duty of easy rescue” 
offence within the limited confines of the home;  others may regard it 
as, in effect, an offence of complicity in homicide by omission.   It is 
clearly an offence that imposes a duty to act, in circumstances where 
 
 
45 Children and Young Persons Act 1933, section 1. 
46 Ugandan Penal Code 1950, ss.156 and 157, and Children Statute 1996, s.6:  see L. 
Tibatemwa-Ekirikubinza, Homicides and Non-Fatal Assaults in Uganda (Kampala, 
Fountain 2005), 10-11. 
47 R. v. West London Coroner, ex p. Gray [1988] Q.B. 467. 
48 Burchell (n.15), 194. 
49 This would depend on the interpretation of “vulnerable adult” (see n.51 post);  for 
an expansive interpretation, see the English decision in Khan, n.51. 
50 For analysis, see J. Herring, „Mum‟s Not the Word:  an Analysis of Section 5, 
Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004‟, in C. Clarkson and S. Cunningham 
(eds), Criminal Liability for Non-Aggressive Death (Aldershot, Ashgate 2008). 
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the child or vulnerable adult is in serious peril, but where they may be 
family pressures not to intervene.51   South Australia has a similar 
provision,52 and among the jurisdictions considering such an offence is 
New Zealand, where the Law Commission has proposed its adoption.53 
 
IV.   THE CASE FOR A GENERAL DUTY TO RENDER ASSISTANCE 
Many continental European legal systems impose a “duty of easy 
rescue”, in the form of an offence of failing to render assistance to 
someone in peril.   Like the common law offence of misconduct in a 
public office, this type of offence punishes the omission itself, rather 
than making it a ground for conviction of a more serious offence 
such as manslaughter. We now consider to what extent 
Commonwealth systems of criminal law have moved towards a “duty 
of easy rescue” offence, and to what extent they should do so. 
South African law includes an offence based on breach of the duty 
of a driver involved in an accident to stop, to ascertain the nature and 
extent of injuries sustained by any person or any damage, and to 
render assistance.54   The terms of that duty go beyond the more 
familiar duty to stop after the accident and to report it, and require 
positive assistance.   Rather more limited, but still imposing a positive 
duty, is section 286 of the Queensland Criminal Code (which imposes a 
parental duty to protect children from physical harm).   It has been 
recommended that section 151 of the New Zealand Crimes Act should 
be broadened so as to impose a duty on a parent to take reasonable 
steps to protect his or her child from injury.   These provisions may 
alternatively be seen as versions of the homicide offence of “failure to 
protect”, discussed in part 3 above. 
The law of Northern Territory in Australia goes further, and 
provides that “any person who, being able to provide rescue, 
resuscitation, medical treatment, first aid or succour of any kind to a 
person urgently in need of it and whose life may be endangered if it is 
not provided, callously fails to do so is guilty of a crime and is liable 
 
 
51 See the case of R. v. Khan and ors [2009] EWCA Crim. 2, [2009] 1 W.L.R. 2036, 
where the husband was beating his newly-arrived wife frequently, his sisters and 
brother-in-law were aware of this and did not intervene, and eventually he beat her to 
death;  he was convicted of murder, and the others were convicted of this offence for 
failing to take any steps to protect the wife from her husband‟s violence.   Cf. 
somewhat similar common law developments in South Africa, described by Burchell 
(n.15), 192-193. 
52 The offence was created in 2005 as s.14 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935;  
it covers liability for causing serious harm, as well as death, by failure to take steps to 
protect a child or vulnerable adult. 
53 Law Commission of New Zealand (n.30), paras 29-32. 
54 Burchell (n.15), 194, citing s.61 of the National Road Traffic Act 1996. 
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to imprisonment for 7 years.”55   This is similar in terms to European 
“duty of easy rescue” provisions, although they tend to place more 
emphasis on the person‟s capacity to assist without danger to herself 
or himself (see part 5 below).56   Three decades ago the Law Reform 
Commission of Canada examined the case for such a general offence 
and, recommending its introduction into Canadian law, stated that 
“where one person‟s life can only be preserved at the cost of 
another‟s small inconvenience, the community conscience would be 
shocked at a refusal to shoulder the inconvenience.”57   The 
Commission noted that such an offence is not a homicide offence, 
and is committed irrespective of whether the person in peril suffers 
death or serious injury.   What such an offence does is to signal the 
need for citizens to offer some minimal assistance to persons in 
extremis, insofar as it lies within their power to do so without 
endangering themselves. 
There seem to be three principles that combine to make a strong 
argument for recognition of a public duty of this kind:  (a) the 
principle of urgency;  (b) the priority of life;  and (c) the principle of 
physical presence and capacity.   These principles, which interact in 
practice, may be set out briefly here: 
(a) The Principle of Urgency:  the case for recognizing a positive 
duty to act is at its strongest when there are circumstances of 
urgency or emergency.   When action needs to be taken 
immediately, in order to preserve something of fundamental 
value, there is a clear argument for departing from the 
normal legal ordering.    
(b) The Priority of Life:  the survival of each individual is a supreme 
value, as recognised by Article 6 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Thus, combining (b) 
with (a), where urgent action is needed in order to preserve 
life, there is a strong argument for recognizing a duty to act.   
The same argument could be applied to the preservation of 
other human rights, such as the right not to be subjected to 
inhuman or degrading treatment or the right to liberty and 
security of person, but the strongest case is surely the survival 
of the rights-bearing subject – the right to life. 
(c) The Principle of Physical Presence and Capacity:  where principles 
(a) and (b) already apply, the duty to act should fall on the 
person who is physically present and has the capacity to 
 
 
55 Criminal Code Act 1983 (Northern Territory), s.155, applied in Salmon v. Chute and 
Dredge (1994) 70 A.Crim.R. 536. 
56 For a translation of the German provision, see M. Bohlander, The German Criminal 
Code (Oxford, Hart 2008), 200, translation of s.323c. 
57 Law Reform Commission of Canada, Omissions, Negligence and Endangering (Working 
Paper 46, 1985), 19. 
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render some assistance.   No duty could properly be cast on a 
person who is not physically present, except in cases where 
that person was already subject to a duty to safeguard another 
(e.g. a parent who ought to have been present, caring for his 
or her young child).   The effect of physical presence is to 
connect the person who happens to be able to render 
assistance with the predicament of the other person whose 
life is in danger and who urgently needs that assistance. 
These arguments are in conflict with the reasoning of Lord 
Macaulay, set out in Part I above.   His view was that this is properly 
the province of morality and social obligation, and that enacting a 
“duty of easy rescue” offence risks criminalizing people in some 
completely inappropriate cases.   On the latter point, it must be said 
that this has not been the experience of the continental European 
codes;58  on the other hand, Macaulay‟s principal concern was with a 
context in which starvation and begging were common, which is very 
different from the context of the European codes.    
It may be noted that Bentham‟s proposal that there should be a 
general duty to rescue seems to have been founded on some version 
of the three principles articulated above, although unusually Bentham 
did not articulate the reasoning behind his advocacy of extending the 
criminal law, and merely asked a rhetorical question: 
“In cases where the person is in danger, why should it not be 
made the duty of every man to save another from mischief, 
when it can be done without prejudicing himself, as well as to 
abstain from bringing it on him?”59 
In the final analysis, the case for enacting a “duty of easy rescue” 
offence rests on one‟s conceptions of the proper functions of the 
criminal law.   Do the three principles set out above demonstrate that, 
despite Macaulay‟s misgivings, the ultimate importance of human life 
should be signalled and supported by a widely publicised provision of 
this kind? 
 
V.   WHAT THE DUTY REQUIRES 
Another question requiring resolution is this:  granted that a duty-
situation exists, and granted that the duty-bearing person is aware of 
 
 
58 See A. Ashworth and E. Steiner, „Criminal Omissions and Public Duties:  the 
French Experience‟ (1990) 10 Legal Studies 153.  
59 J. Bentham, Principles of Morals and Legislation (London 1789), Ch. XVII, para. 19;  
see also the footnote to this paragraph, where Bentham gives three examples of 
factual situations in which the duty would apply. 
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the facts that give rise to that duty,60 what positive act or acts are 
required from the person who has the duty?   This question gains 
importance from the principle of legality:  the law ought to give fair 
warning and guidance to the person who has the duty, as to what the 
duty requires. 
In English law this question is little discussed.   It seems to be 
assumed that the duty is to achieve the result of saving life (categories 
(i) and (ii)), or preventing the commission of an offence (category 
(iii)), or preventing any further harm from occurring (category (iv)).   
However, that cannot be right.   The obligation can only be to make 
efforts to bring about that result:  at the most demanding, the duty 
could be to take all possible steps to avoid the undesired 
consequence, and that would probably be considered appropriate in 
categories (i) and (ii) where there is some kind of relationship, natural 
or assumed, between the two persons.   The German Penal Code 
provision, for example, requires the person to do what “is possible 
without substantial danger to himself or without violation of other 
important duties.”61   This raises questions of opportunity and of 
capacity.   Thus even if there is in principle the opportunity to take 
action, e.g. by jumping into water in an effort to save the other, there 
is no duty to do this if it would place the rescuer in “substantial 
danger” personally:  that is a reference to the conditions prevailing at 
the time, and to the capacity of the rescuer (it would be different if 
the person present was an infirm octogenarian or a fit person of 30 
who has trained as a lifeguard).62   In many situations it should be 
sufficient to call the emergency services, but then even that may 
sometimes be outside the person‟s capacity.   One of the worst 
features of the English decision in Stone and Dobinson, discussed 
above,63 was that the Court of Appeal failed to take account of the 
limited intelligence and limited social skills of the two defendants.   
They did not know how to use a telephone, and were generally less 
able than normal citizens to organise their own lives, let alone those 
of others.   Capacity should be a precondition of criminal liability for 
 
 
60 See Harding v. Price [1948] 1 K.B. 695;  the inquiry here overlaps with the question 
of fault requirements, and the relevance of degrees of awareness is discussed by 
Alexander (n.14), 124-127. 
61 See n.56 ante.   The Northern Territory provision (n.55 and text) says little about 
opportunity and capacity, although the words “able” and “callously” could be 
construed so as to achieve the same effect. 
62 The English criminal code team‟s proposal – not adopted by the Law Commission 
– included the requirement that the person should do that which “in all the 
circumstances, including his age and other relevant personal characteristics, he could 
reasonably be expected to do”:  Law Commission (n.7), cl.20.  
63 See n.17 ante, and accompanying text. 
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omissions,64 and it should relate to the capabilities of the particular 
person(s) physically present.   Account should also be taken of the 
effect of the situation on the person physically present:  he or she 
may be in a state of shock or other emotional turmoil, and this ought 
surely to be taken into account when assessing capacity to act.   It 
would be wrong to impose criminal liability for failing to do acts that 
cannot reasonably be expected of the individual in that situation.65 
Finally, we should return to rule-of-law principles.   Are the duties 
imposed by a general duty of rescue likely to be sufficiently clear and 
certain?   Phrasing those duties in terms of what can be expected 
under the circumstances, without substantial danger to the rescuer, 
would give some guidance to the person physically present, but not a 
great deal.66   This is also a problem with rights such as self-defence, 
where the parameters of reasonableness are (in some jurisdictions) the 
only guidance for citizens.   One improvement, also applicable to 
omissions cases, is for the law to set out some principles, even if they 
are non-exhaustive principles capable of being overridden in 
(unspecified) extreme circumstances.   For example, the law could 
state that the primary duty is to call the emergency services, and that 
the secondary duty is to make reasonable efforts (without exposure to 
substantial danger) to render direct assistance to the person in peril.   
This may require a doctor or nurse to use their training to deal with 
someone injured in an accident, for example, whereas an untrained 
person might only be expected to give moral support or give basic 
practical help.   How far the law can sensibly go in spelling out the 
nature of the duties is difficult to say.   The important point is that 
respect for the rule of law requires some effort to be made to guide 
citizens in what might be expected of them in these extreme 
circumstances. 
 
VI.   QUESTIONS STILL UNRESOLVED 
The conclusion to which the explorations in this article lead is that 
the law on criminal omissions is in a deeply unsatisfactory state in 
many common law jurisdictions.   Its theoretical foundations are 
disputed, its limits are contested, and its contents are often afflicted 
with such uncertainty as to be inconsistent with “rule of law” values.   
On the general issue, Lord Macaulay‟s view that omissions liability is 
 
 
64 For discussion, see A. Smart, „Responsibility for Failing to do the Impossible‟ 
(1987) 103 L.Q.R. 532.   See s.4.2(4) of the Commonwealth Criminal Code Act 1995 
(Australia):  “an omission to perform an act is only voluntary if the act omitted is one 
which the person is capable of performing”. 
65 McAuley and McCutcheon (n.22), 197-198;  those authors also make the point that 
the duty can be negatived if the person in peril makes it clear that he or she wishes 
not to be rescued;  ibid., 199-200. 
66 Alexander (n.14), 130. 
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not the proper province of the criminal law still prevails, although he 
recognized some exceptions and various common law jurisdictions 
have added to that list in recent years. Five core duty-situations are 
widely agreed;  yet, once the surface is scratched, it is apparent that 
the rationale for each of the categories is contested, and that there 
remains unresolved debate about the proper ambit of each duty.   In 
some jurisdictions, like England and Wales, many of the duty-
situations have been and are still created at common law by the 
courts, and the categories are subject to judicial development in a way 
that can operate retrospectively on individuals.   In other jurisdictions 
where the duty-situations are set out in legislation, there is still some 
scope for judicial interpretation.   Even when it is clear that a duty-
situation arises, it is often not clear what the individual is expected to 
do:  this aspect of omissions liability seems to have been little 
explored by law reform agencies or courts, leading to insufficiently 
clear prescriptions about public duties. All of this suggests that the 
rule of law is not properly respected in cases of omissions liability, 
and indeed that states are not discharging their obligation to set out 
the criminal law in a reasonably clear and accessible form.67  
Manifest as the failure to fulfil “rule of law” requirements is, that 
is essentially a deficiency in the form of the criminal law.   There is still 
a battle to be fought, and unresolved questions to be answered, in 
relation to two issues of substance.   First, should Lord Macaulay‟s 
position still represent the common law, or are there strong enough 
arguments for extending omissions liability?   It was suggested above 
that the principle of urgency, the priority of life, and the principle of 
physical presence and capacity are sufficiently persuasive to warrant 
an overdue re-appraisal of the common law‟s stance on omissions 
and criminal liability.   Secondly, and relatedly, what should be the 
nature of such omissions liability?   It is often assumed that, if wider 
or more general duties were recognized, they would automatically 
become duties that would provide grounds for manslaughter 
convictions.   But that is not a necessary step:  in many continental 
European systems, the offence of failure to assist a person in peril is a 
separate crime, usually with a much lower maximum penalty than 
manslaughter.68   Both these issues of substance, and the issues of 
form discussed above, ought to attract more attention from law 
reform agencies across the Commonwealth.   The common law 
approach to criminal omissions is unsatisfactory both in theory and in 
practice:  the time for reflecting and evolving is overdue. 
 
 
67 On which see A. Ashworth, „Ignorance of the Criminal Law, and Duties to Avoid 
it‟ (2011) 74 M.L.R. 1. 
68 See n.56, ante, on the German penal code;  for a similar view, see Williams (n.35), 
108. 
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ABSTRACT 
This article describes the influence of the British Empire on the 
intercontinental spread of the criminal offences involving adult, private, 
consensual same-sex activity.   It describes the origins of the crimes in 
Judeo-Christian scriptures and early English common law and statutory 
offences.   The nineteenth century moves for criminal law codification in 
Europe succeeded in abolishing such offences.   They were not a feature of 
other European empires.  However, although codification of the criminal 
law failed in England, five template codes exported the sodomy and other 
like offences to every land ruled by Britain.   In 41 of the 54 
Commonwealth countries, the offences remain in force.   The article 
describes how they were (often reluctantly) repealed by legislation between 
1967 and 1997 in the older dominions.  Repeal in newer 
Commonwealth countries has been slow or non-existent.   The author 
describes new developments that give hope for progress, including the  
Naz Foundation case in India (2009) and the recent moves in the 
United Nations and elsewhere to foster legislative and judicial removal of 
this unlovely legacy of Empire. 
 
 
THE PAST 
It all goes back to the Bible.   At least it was in the Old Testament 
Book of Leviticus, amongst “divers laws and ordinances”, that a 
proscription on sexual activity involving members of the same sex 
first relevantly appeared: 
“If a man … lie with mankind, as he lieth with a woman, both 
of them have committed an abomination:  they shall surely be 
put to death;  their blood shall be upon you.”1 
The prohibition appears amongst a number in ancient Israel, dealing 
with sexual irregularities.   Thus, committing adultery with another 
man‟s wife [strangely, not with a husband or a bachelor] attracted the 
penalty of death.   A man who lies with his daughter-in-law shall be 
put to death with his victim, seemingly however innocent she might 
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1 Leviticus, 20, 13. 
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be.2   The penalty is stepped up for a man who takes a wife and her 
mother.   They, inferentially all of them, are to be “burnt with fire” so 
that “there be no wickedness among you”.3   A man that lies with a 
beast is to be put to death.   As well as the poor animal.4   Somewhat 
inconsistently, there is a specific offence of a woman connecting with 
a beast.5   The punishment and the offences portray an early, 
primitive, patriarchal society where the powerful force of sexuality 
was perceived as a danger and potentially an unclean threat that 
needed to be held in the closest check. 
According to those who have studied these things,6 the early 
history of England incorporated into its common law, an offence of 
“sodomy” in the context of the provision of protection against those 
who endangered the Christian principles on which the kingdom was 
founded.   In medieval times, the notion of a separation between the 
church and the state had not yet developed.   The church had its own 
courts to try and punish ecclesiastical offences, being those that were 
perceived as endangering social purity, defiling the kingdom and 
disturbing the racial or religious order of things.7    
A survey of the English laws, produced in Latin in 1290 during the 
reign of Edward I,8 mentions sodomy, so described because the crime 
was attributed to the men of Sodom who thereby attracted the wrath 
of the Lord and the destruction of their city.9   In another description 
of the early English criminal laws, written a little later in Norman 
French, the punishment of burning alive was recorded for “sorcerers, 
sorceresses, renegades, sodomists and heretics publicly convicted”.10  
Sodomy was perceived as an offence against God‟s will, which 
thereby attracted society‟s sternest punishments.    
Initially, it seems, the offence was not limited to sexual acts 
between men.   It could include any sexual conduct deemed irregular 
and extend to sexual intercourse with Turks and “Saracens”, as with 
 
 
2 ibid., 20, 12. 
3 ibid., 20, 14. 
4 ibid., 20, 15. 
5 ibid., 20, 16. 
6 An excellent review of the legal developments collected in this article appears in:  
Human Rights Watch, This Alien Legacy:  The Origins of “Sodomy” Laws in British 
Colonialism, New York, December, 2008;  and D. Saunders, „377 – And the Unnatural 
Afterlife of British Colonialism‟ (unpublished, 5th Asian Law Institute Conference, 
National University of Singapore, May 22, 2008). 
7 Human Rights Watch (n.6), 13. 
8 See a survey of English law produced in the Court of Edward I in 1290:  Fleta, Seu 
Commentarius Juris Angicani (ed. and tr. H.G. Richardson and G.O. Sayles, London, 
Quaritch 1955).   See also Human Rights Watch (n.6), 13. 
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Jews and Jewesses.11   Although the ideas were traceable to the  
Old Testament, and Jewish rabbinical law, the offences were 
reinforced by a Christian instruction that associated the sexual act 
with shame and excused it only as it fulfilled a procreative function.12   
Sodomy was a form of pollution.   The history of the eleventh and 
twelfth centuries in England and in Europe included many instances 
of repression targeted at polluters, such as Jews, lepers, heretics, 
witches, prostitutes and sodomites.13 
In the sixteenth century, following the severance by Henry VIII of 
the link between the English church and Rome, the common law 
crimes were revised so as to provide for the trial of previously 
ecclesiastical crimes in the secular courts.   A statute of 1533, 
provided for the crime of sodomy, under the description of the 
“detestable and abominable Vice of Buggery committed with 
mankind or beast”.   The offence was punishable by death.   
Although this statute was repealed in the reign of Mary I (so as to 
restore the jurisdiction of the church over such matters), it was re-
enacted by Parliament in the reign of Elizabeth I in 1563.14   The 
statutory offence, so expressed, survived in England in substance 
until 1861.   The last recorded execution for “buggery” in England 
took place in 1836.15 
The great text writers of the English law denounced sodomy and 
all its variations in the strongest language.   Thus, Edward Coke 
declared: 
“Buggery is a detestable, and abominable sin, amongst 
Christians not to be named.   …   [It is] committed by carnal 
knowledge against the ordinance of the Creator and order of 
nature, by mankind with mankind, or with brute beast, or by 
womankind with brute beast”.16 
When William Blackstone, between 1765 and 1769, wrote his 
Commentaries on the Laws of England, he too included the “abominable 
crime” amongst the precious legacy that English law bequeathed to 
its people.   By reason of the contemporaneous severance of the 
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14 M. Hyde, The Love That Dared Not Speak Its Name:  A Candid History of Homosexuality 
in Britain (Boston, Little Brown 1970).   The Buggery Act 1533, after its original repeal, 
was re-enacted as the Buggery Act 1563 during the reign of Elizabeth I. 
15 Hyde, ibid., 142.   See Human Rights Watch (n.6), 13-14. 
16 E. Coke, The Institutes of the Laws of England (London, E. and R. Brooke 1797) 
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American colonies from allegiance to the British Crown in 1776, 
Blackstone‟s Commentaries were to have a profound influence on the 
development and expression of the criminal law in the American 
settlements and elsewhere.17   So in this way, by common law, statute 
law and scholarly taxonomies, the English law criminalising sodomy, 
and other variations of “impure” sexual conduct was well-placed to 
undergo its export to the colonies of England as the British Empire 
burst forth on the world between the seventeenth and twentieth 
centuries. 
The result of this history was that virtually no jurisdiction which at 
some stage during that period was ruled by Britain, escaped the 
pervasive influence of its criminal law and, specifically, of the anti-
sodomy offence that was part of that law.   The British Empire was, 
at first, highly successful as a model of firm governance and effective 
social control.   At the heart of any such governance and control must 
be an ordered system of criminal and other public law.   What better 
criminal law could the imperial authorities at Westminster donate to 
their many new-found colonies, provinces and settlements beyond the 
seas, than the criminal laws which they observed and enforced at home?   
The consequence of this historical development and coincidence 
is that the anti-sodomy laws, applicable in Britain at the time of Coke 
and Blackstone, came swiftly to be imposed or adopted in the huge 
domain of the British Empire, extending to about a quarter of the 
land surface of the world, and about a third of its people.   To this 
day, approximately 80 countries of the world impose criminal 
sanctions on sodomy and other same-sex activities, whether 
consensual or not or committed in private or not.   Over half of these 
jurisdictions are, or were at one time, British colonies.18   The offence 
spread like a pestilence. 
The nineteenth century in Europe witnessed a significant 
challenge to the inherited criminal laws of medieval times.   In 
France, Napoleon‟s codifiers undertook a complete revision and re-
expression of the criminal laws of royal France.   This was an 
enterprise which Napoleon, correctly, predicted would long outlive 
his imperial battle honours In the result, the sodomy offence, which 
had existed in France and was first repealed in 1791, was more 
effectively abolished in 1810, with the adoption of the French Penal 
Code.   That code was to prove profoundly influential and quickly 
spread to more countries even than Britain ruled.   It did so through 
derivative codes adopted, following conquest or example, in the 
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Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Portugal, Scandinavia, Germany, Russia, 
China, Japan and their respective colonies and dependencies.   
Although some of the latter occasionally, for local reasons, departed 
from the original French template19 and provided for sodomy offen-
ces, this was the exception.   The consequence has been that virtually 
all of the countries of the European empires, other than the British, 
never imposed criminal sanctions specifically on adult same-sex con-
sensual activity in private.   The existence of such offences has been a 
peculiar inheritance of British rule and of societies influenced by the 
Shariah law of Islam.   Such law, in its turn, traced its attitudes to 
religious understanding, in their turn, derived from the same Judeo-
Christian scriptural texts as had informed the medieval laws of England. 
Just as the Napoleonic codifiers brought change, and the 
termination of the religion-based prohibition on same-sex activities in 
France and its progeny, so in England a movement for codification of 
the law, including specifically the criminal law, gained momentum in 
the early nineteenth century.   A great progenitor of this movement 
was Jeremy Bentham.   He was the jurist and utilitarian philosopher 
who taught that the principle of utility, or the attainment of the 
greatest measure of happiness in society, was the sole justiciable 
object both of the legislator and the moralist.20   Bentham was highly 
critical of the antique morality that he saw evident in the writings of 
Blackstone.   In his A Fragment on Government (1776) and An 
Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789), Bentham 
strongly criticised Blackstone for his complacency about the content 
of the law of England as he presented it.   Bentham attacked 
Blackstone‟s antipathy to reform where such was so evidently needed.    
Encouraged by contemporary moves for legal reform in France, 
Bentham urged a reconsideration of those forms of conduct which 
should, on utilitarian principles, be regarded as punishable offences 
under the law of England.   He continued to urge the acceptance of 
the utilitarian conception of punishment as a necessary evil, justified 
only if it was likely to prevent, at the least cost in human suffering, 
greater evils arising from putative offences.   Bentham eventually 
turned his reforming zeal to plans for improved school education for 
the middle class;  a sceptical examination of established Christianity 
and reform of the Church of England;  as well as economic matters 
and essays treating subjects as diverse as logic, the classification of 
 
 
19 Thus French colonies such as Benin (originally Dahomey), Cameroon and Senegal 
adopted such laws, possibly under the influence of their British ruled neighbours.   
Germany, in Bismarck‟s time, adopted para. 175 of the German Penal Code.    
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20 H.L.A. Hart, „Jeremy Bentham‟, in A.W.B. Simpson (Ed.), Biographical Dictionary of 
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universal grammar and birth control.   Somewhat cautiously, he also 
turned his attention to the law‟s treatment of what later became 
named as homosexuality.21 
Bentham died in 1832.   But not before influencing profoundly a 
number of disciples, including John Austin, who wrote his Province of 
Jurisprudence Determined (1832) and John Stuart Mill who wrote his 
landmark text On Liberty (1859).   Mill, like Bentham, urged the 
replacement of the outdated and chaotic arrangements of the 
common law by modern criminal codes, based on scientific principles 
aimed at achieving social progress in order to enable humanity, in 
Bentham‟s words, “to rear the fabric of human felicity by the hands 
of reason and of law”.22    
The movement for reform and codification of the criminal law 
gathered pace in England as a result of the response of scholars and 
parliamentarians to the efforts of Bentham and his followers.   
However, the attempts in the United Kingdom to introduce a 
modernised, simplified and codified penal law for Britain eventually 
came to nothing.   The forces of resistance to Bentham‟s ideas (which 
he had described as “Judge and Co.”, i.e. the bench and bar) proved 
too powerful.   He had targeted his great powers of invective against 
the legal profession, charging it with operating, for its own profit and 
at great cost to the public, an unnecessarily complex and chaotic legal 
system in which it was often impossible for litigants to discover in 
advance their legal rights.   The legal profession had their revenge by 
engineering the defeat of the moves for statutory reforms of the 
criminal law, although reform of the law of evidence was enacted 
after 1827.    
What could not be achieved in England, however, became an idea 
and a model that could much more readily be exported to the British 
colonies, provinces and settlements overseas.   So this is what 
happened.   There were five principal models which the Colonial 
Office successively provided, according to the changing attitudes and 
preferences that prevailed in the last decades of the nineteenth 
century, when the British Empire was at the height of its expansion 
and power.   In chronological order, these were: 
(i) the Elphinstone Code of 1827 for the presidency of Bombay 
in India;23 
(ii) the Indian Penal Code of 1860 (which came into force in 
January 1862), known as the Macaulay Code, after Thomas 
Babbington Macaulay (1800-59), its principal author;24 
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(iii) the Fitzjames Stephen Code based on the work of Sir James 
Fitzjames Stephen (1829-94), including his A General View of 
the Criminal Law (1863) and Digest of the Criminal Law (1877);25 
(iv) the Griffith Code named after Sir Samuel Hawker Griffith 
(1845-1920), first Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia 
and earlier Premier and Chief Justice of Queensland, who 
had drafted his criminal code, adopted in Queensland in 
1901, drawing on the Italian Penal Code and the Penal Code of 
New York;26  and  
(v) the Wright Penal Code.   This was based on a draft which 
was prepared for Jamaica by the liberal British jurist R.S. 
Wright, who had been heavily influenced by the ideals of 
John Stuart Mill.   Wright‟s draft code was never enacted in 
Jamaica.   However, curiously, in the ways of that time, it 
became the basis for the criminal law of the Gold Coast 
which, on independence in 1957, was renamed Ghana.27 
Although there were variations in the concepts, elements and 
punishments for the respective same-sex offences in the several 
colonies, provinces and settlements of the British Empire, a common 
theme existed.   Same-sex activity was morally unacceptable to the 
British rulers and their society.   According to the several codified 
provisions on offer, laws to criminalise and punish such activity were 
a uniform feature of British imperial rule.   The local populations 
were not consulted in respect of the imposition of such laws.   In 
some instances (as in the settler colonies), no doubt at the time, the 
settlers, if they ever thought about it, would have shared many of the 
prejudices and attitudes of their rulers.   But in many of territories in 
Asia, Africa and elsewhere where the laws were imposed and 
enforced, there was no (or no clear) pre-existing culture or tradition 
that required the punishment of such offences.   They were simply 
imposed to stamp out the “vice” and “viciousness” amongst native 
peoples which the British rulers found, or assumed, to be intolerable 
in a properly governed society. 
The most copied of the above templates was the Indian Penal Code 
of Macaulay.   The relevant provision appeared in Chapter XVI, titled 
“Of Offences Affecting the Human Body”.   Within this chapter, 
section 377 appeared, categorised under the sub-chapter titled “Of 
Unnatural Offences”.   The provision read: 
“377.   Unnatural Offences – Whoever voluntarily has carnal 
intercourse against the order of nature with any man, woman 
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or animal, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or 
with imprisonment of either description for a term which may 
extend to 10 years and shall also be liable to fine. 
Explanation – Penetration is sufficient to constitute the 
carnal intercourse necessary to the offence described in this 
section.”28 
This provision of the Indian Penal Code was copied in a large 
number of British territories from Zambia to Malaysia, and from 
Singapore to Fiji.   The postulate inherent in the provision, so 
defined, was that carnal activities against the order of nature violated 
human integrity and polluted society so that, even if the “victim” 
claimed that he had consented to it, and was of full age, the act was 
still punishable because more than the individual‟s will or body was at 
stake.   The result of the provision was that factors of consent, or of 
the age of the participants or of the privacy of the happening, were 
immaterial.   Legally, same-sex activities were linked and equated to 
the conduct of violent sexual criminal offences.   Consensual erotic 
conduct was assimilated to the seriousness of prohibited acts of 
paedophilia.    
The Griffith Penal Code for Queensland was not only the basis 
for the provisions of the criminal codes in those jurisdictions of 
Australia which opted for a code (Western Australia, Tasmania and 
eventually the Northern Territory).   It was also widely copied outside 
Australia, not only in the neighbouring territory of Papua New 
Guinea (where effectively it is still in force) but in many jurisdictions 
of Africa, including present-day Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda and 
Tanzania.   The Queensland Penal Code introduced into the Indian Penal 
Code‟s template a particular notion stigmatising the category of 
“passive” sexual partners who “permit” themselves to be penetrated 
by another male.   Thus, section 208 of the Queensland code provided: 
“Any person who –  
(a) has carnal knowledge of any person against the 
order of nature;  or 
(b) has carnal knowledge of an animal;  or 
(c) permits a male person to have carnal knowledge of 
him or her against the order of nature 
is guilty of a felony and is liable to imprisonment for 14 
years.”29 
This version of the offence (“person”) not only extended it to women 
participants, but cleared up an ambiguity of the provision in the  
Indian Penal Code.   The Queensland code made it clear that both 
partners to the act were criminals.   It also widened the ambit beyond 
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“penetration” by introducing an independent provision for “attempts 
to commit unnatural offences”.30 
In some jurisdictions of the British Empire, when the anomalies 
of the legislation were pointed out, provision was made (as in Nigeria 
and Singapore) to exempt sexual acts between “a husband and wife” 
or (as in Sri Lanka) to make it clear that the unspecified offences of 
carnal acts against the “order of nature” extended to sexual activities 
between women. 
I can recall clearly the day in my first year of instruction at the law 
school of the University of Sydney when I was introduced to this 
branch of the law of New South Wales.   That state of Australia had 
resisted the persuasion of the codifiers.   Like England, it had 
preferred to remain a common law jurisdiction, so far as the criminal 
law was concerned.   That law was the common law of England, as 
modified by imperial statutes extended to the colonies and by colonial 
and later state enactments.   In the last year of the reign of Queen 
Victoria, the colonial parliament of New South Wales, just before 
federation, enacted the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), still in force.   Part III 
of that Act provided for the definition of “Offences against the 
Person”.   A division of those offences was headed “Unnatural 
Offences”.   The first of these provided, in section 79: 
“79.   Buggery and Bestiality:  Whosoever commits the 
abominable crime of buggery, or bestiality, with mankind, or 
with any animal, shall be liable to penal servitude for 14 
years.”. 
This provision was followed by one, similar to the Queensland  
Penal Code, providing for attempts (s.80) and another providing for 
indecent assaults (s.81).    
Three years before I came to my acquaintance with section 79, the 
State Parliament had enacted new sections, probably in response to 
the ceaseless urgings of the State Police Commissioner (Colin 
Delaney) for whom homosexual offences represented a grave crisis 
for the moral fibre of Australian society.   The new offence included 
additional punishment for those who, in a public place, solicited or 
incited a male person to commit any of the foregoing unnatural 
offences.    
Possibly in response to concern about the unreliability of police 
evidence in such offences, the State Parliament added a provision 
(s.81B(2)) requiring that a person should not be convicted of such an 
offence “upon the testimony of one person only, unless such 
testimony is corroborated by some other material evidence 
implicating the accused in the commission of the offence.”   By 1955, 
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in Australia, the infection of hatred had not yet died.   But new 
anxieties were beginning to surface. 
As I listened to the law lecturer explaining peculiarities of the 
unnatural offences, including the fact that, in law, adulthood and 
consent were no defence and both parties were equally guilty;31  the 
availability of propensity evidence and evidence of similar facts;32  and 
the heavy penalties imposed upon conviction,33 I knew that these 
provisions were targeted directly and specifically at me.   I could 
never thereafter share an unqualified belief that the inherited criminal 
law of Australia was beyond criticism.   Along with others of my 
generation, I concluded that there was a need for modernisation and 
reform. 
 
THE PRESENT 
The criminal laws introduced into so many jurisdictions by the British 
imperial authorities remained in force in virtually all of them long 
after the Union Jack was hauled down and the plumed Britannic 
viceroys departed, one by one, their imperial domains.    
Occasionally, the needs of a particular territory were reflected in 
modifications of the statutory provisions before the end of British 
rule.   Thus, in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, the Sudanese Penal Code of 
1899 contained an adaptation of the Indian Penal Code.   Uniquely 
among the British colonies, this introduced the requirement of lack of 
consent for most versions of the offence, but not where one of the 
participants was a teacher, guardian, person entrusted with the care or 
education of the victim, or where the victim was below the age of 16 
years.   Likewise, in the Sudanese code, the crime of “gross 
indecency” was only punishable where it was non-consensual.34   
Inferentially, these variations on the Indian Penal Code were  
introduced to reflect the colonial administrators‟ understanding of the 
then current sexual customs and practices in that relatively late 
addition to their area of responsibility.   The distinctions in the 
colonial code survived in Sudan until 1991 when the government 
imposed an undifferentiated sodomy offence, justified by reference to 
the requirements of Shariah law.   Similar moves are reported35 in 
other post-colonial Islamic societies, including Northern Nigeria and 
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Pakistan, described as involving a “toxic mix” of the influence of the 
two international streams that explain most of current criminal 
prohibitions against consenting adult private same-sex conduct (the 
British and Islamic). 
As the centenary of the formulation of the Indian Penal Code 
approached in the middle of the twentieth century, moves began to 
emerge for the repeal or modification of the same-sex criminal 
offences, commencing in England itself and gradually followed in all 
of the settler dominions and European jurisdictions.    
The forces that gave rise to the movement for reform were many.   
They included the growing body of scientific research into the 
common features of human sexuality.   This research was undertaken 
by several scholars, including Richard Krafft-Ebing (1840-1902) in 
Germany;  Henry Havelock Ellis (1859-1939) in Britain;  Sigmund 
Freud (1856-1939) in Austria;  and Alfred Kinsey (1894-1956) in the 
United States.   The last, in particular, secured enormous public 
attention because of his unique sampling techniques and the 
widespread media coverage of his successive reports on variation in 
sexual conduct on the part of human males and females.36    
The emerging global media and the sensational nature of Kinsey‟s 
discoveries ensured that they would become known to informed 
people everywhere.   Even if the sampling was only partly correct, it 
demonstrated powerfully that the assumption that same-sex erotic 
attraction and activity was confined to a tiny proportion of wilful anti-
social people was false.   Moreover, experimentation, including acts 
described in the criminal laws as sodomy and buggery, treated as 
amongst the gravest crimes, was relatively commonplace both 
amongst same-sex and different-sex participants.   If such acts were 
so common, the questions posed more than a century earlier by 
Bentham and Mill were starkly re-presented.   What social purpose 
was secured in exposing such conduct to the risk of criminal 
prosecution, particularly where the offences applied irrespective of 
consent, age and circumstance and the punishments were so severe? 
A number of highly publicised cases in Britain, where the 
prosecution of well-known public figures appeared harsh and 
unreasoning, set in train in that country widespread public debate 
and, eventually, the formation of committees throughout the United 
Kingdom to support parliamentary moves for reform.   Eventually, a 
royal commission of inquiry was established, chaired by Sir John 
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Wolfenden, a university vice-chancellor.37   The commission‟s report 
recommended substantial modification and containment of 
homosexual offences, removing adult consensual conduct from the 
ambit of the criminal law.   The Wolfenden Committee expressed its 
principle with near unanimity in terms that would have gladdened the 
heart of Jeremy Bentham:38 
“Unless a deliberate attempt is made by society, acting 
through the agency of the law, to equate the sphere of crime 
with that of sin, there must remain a realm of private morality 
and immorality which is, in brief and crude terms, not the 
law‟s business.”. 
As a result of the report, important debates were initiated in Britain 
involving leading jurists.39   Excuses were advanced, by the 
government of the day for not proceeding with the reform, generally 
on the footing that British society was “not yet ready” to accept the 
proposals.40   Ultimately, however, private members‟ bills were 
introduced into the House of Commons and the House of Lords, by 
proponents of reform, neither of whom was homosexual.    
Within a decade of the Wolfenden Report, the United Kingdom 
Parliament changed the law for England and Wales.41   At first, the 
age of consent was fixed by the reformed law at 21 years and there 
were a number of exceptions (relating to the armed forces and 
multiple parties).   The law did not at first apply to Scotland or 
Northern Ireland.   Eventually, the age of consent was lowered to be 
equal to that applicable to sexual conduct involving persons of the 
opposite sex.   The other exceptions were repealed or confined.   
Reforming laws were then enacted for Scotland and Northern 
Ireland.   The last-mentioned reform was achieved only after a 
decision of the European Court of Human Rights held that the 
United Kingdom was in breach of its obligations under the European 
Convention on Human Rights by continuing to criminalise the private 
consenting sexual conduct of adult homosexuals in that province.42    
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The engagement of the European Court (made up substantially of 
judges from countries long spared of such offences through the work 
of Napoleon‟s codifiers) spread eventually to the removal of the 
criminal offences from the penal laws of the Republic of Ireland43 
and Cyprus,44 to whom Britain had earlier made that gift.   In 
consequence, the law of Malta was also reformed.   Later cases (as 
well as the discipline of the Council of Europe upon Eastern 
European countries which had followed the Soviet imposition of 
such offences) led to repeal in each of the European nations aspiring 
to membership of the Council and of the European Union. 
The influence of the legislative reforms in the country from which 
the imperial criminal codes had been received resulted, within a 
remarkably short time, in the legislative modification of the same-sex 
prohibition in the penal laws of Canada (1969),45 Australia (1974), 
New Zealand (1986), Hong Kong (1990) and Fiji (2005 by a High 
Court decision).   Likewise, a decision of the Constitutional Court of 
South Africa in 198846 struck down the same-sex offences as 
incompatible with the post-apartheid constitution of that country.   In 
that decision, Ackermann J. said: 
“The way in which we give expression to our sexuality is the 
core of this area of private intimacy.   If, in expressing our 
sexuality, we act consensually and without harming one 
another, invasion of that precinct will be a breach of our 
privacy.”47 
To the same end, the Supreme Court of the United States of 
America (another country which, with few exceptions, inherited its 
criminal law from the British template), eventually,48 by majority, held 
that the offence enacted by the State of Texas, as expressed, was 
incompatible with the privacy requirements inherent in the United 
States Constitution.49   Kennedy J., writing for the court, declared: 
“… [A]dults may choose to enter upon this relationship in the 
confines of their homes and their own private lives and still 
retain their dignity as free persons.   When sexuality finds 
overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the 
conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is 
more enduring.   The liberty protected by the constitution 
allows homosexual persons the right to make this choice.   …   
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When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the 
state, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject 
homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public and 
the private spheres.”50 
In Australia, the journey to reform was not always easy.   It began 
with removal of the offences in the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) which 
were then (1975) applied to the Australian Capital Territory, a federal 
responsibility.   Reform of the law in South Australia followed (1976).   
One by one, the other states of Australia, by parliamentary action, 
amended their criminal laws to remove the “unnatural offences”.   
Amongst the last to make the change were Western Australia (1989) 
and Queensland (1990).   In each of those states, the distaste at 
feeling obliged to repeal the template of the Queensland Penal Code then 
applicable, was given voice in parliamentary preambles which 
expressed the legislature‟s discomfiture.   Thus, in Western Australia, 
the preamble introduced in 1989, and finally settled in 1992, expressly 
stated: 
“Whereas the Parliament disapproves of sexual relations 
between persons of the same sex;  [and] of the promotion or 
encouragement of homosexual behaviour … 
And whereas the Parliament does not by its act in removing 
any criminal penalty for sexual acts in private between persons 
of the same sex wish to create a change in community 
attitudes to homosexual behaviour … [or of] urging [young 
persons] to adopt homosexuality as a life style …”51 
Still, the old defences were modified by the provision of a defence if 
the accused believed, on reasonable grounds, that a girl victim was 
over 16 years of age or a male over 21.52 
In Queensland, where the legislators were called upon to repeal 
the provision continued in the original source of the Griffith Code, a 
preamble was also enacted only slightly less disapproving: 
“Whereas Parliament neither condones nor condemns the 
behaviour which is the subject of this legislation … [but] 
reaffirms its determination to enforce its laws prohibiting 
sexual interference with children and intellectually impaired 
persons and non-consenting adults.”53 
For the first time, the Queensland law introduced a reference to the 
then growing significance of the dangers of HIV/AIDS by then a 
consideration in the Australian reform discourse:  
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“And whereas rational public health policy is undermined by 
criminal laws that make those who are at high risk of infection 
unwilling to disclose that they are members of a high-risk 
group.” 
Only one Australian jurisdiction held out, in the end, against 
repeal and amendment, namely Tasmania.   In that state, a variation 
of the Queensland Penal Code continued to apply.54   Endeavours to rely 
on the dangers of HIV/AIDS to attain reform failed to gain traction.   
Eventually, immediately after Australia, through its federal 
government, subscribed to the First Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, a communication was 
made by way of complaint to the Human Rights Committee in 
Geneva.   This argued that, by criminalising private same-sex conduct 
between consenting adults, the law of Tasmania brought Australia, in 
that jurisdiction, into breach of its obligation under the covenant.    
In March 1994, the Human Rights Committee of the United 
Nations in Toonen v. Australia55 upheld the complaint and found 
Australia in breach.   The majority of the committee did so on the 
basis of a breach of Article 17 (privacy).   A minority report suggested 
that there were other breaches in relation to discrimination on the 
grounds of sex and of the requirement to treat persons with equality.   
Reliant upon the Human Rights Committee‟s determination, the 
Australian Federal Parliament enacted a law to override the Tasma-
nian same-sex prohibition, purporting to act under the external affairs 
power in the Australian Constitution.56   The validity of the law so 
enacted57 was then challenged by Tasmania in the High Court of 
Australia.   That court in Croome v. Tasmania58 dismissed an objection 
to the standing of one of the successful complainants to Geneva in 
seeking relief against the Tasmania challenge.   With this decision, the 
Tasmanian Parliament surrendered.   It repealed the anti-sodomy 
offence of that state.   It was not therefore necessary for the High 
Court to pass on the constitutional validity of the federal law.   In all 
Australian jurisdictions, the old British legacy had been removed by 
legislation and the democratic process.   It had taken 20 years. 
For a long time, no further significant moves were made in non-
settler countries of the Commonwealth of Nations to follow the lead 
of the legislatures in the old dominions and the courts in South Africa 
and Fiji.   On the contrary, when a challenge was brought to the 
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Supreme Court of Zimbabwe in Banana v. The State,59 seeking to 
persuade that court to follow the privacy and equality reasoning of the 
South African Constitutional Court, the endeavour, by majority, failed. 
Another setback was suffered in Singapore, which, like Hong 
Kong, was a small common law jurisdiction with a prosperous 
Chinese society unencumbered by cultural norms of Judeo-Christian 
origin, except as grafted onto them by their temporary British colonial 
rulers.   In Hong Kong, the then territory‟s law reform commission 
supported the Wolfenden principles and favoured their 
introduction.60   The change was effected in 1990 after vigorous 
advocacy by the local homosexual community and its friends.   But 
the course of reform in Singapore was less favourable. 
In 2006, the Law Society of Singapore delivered a report 
proposing repeal of section 377A of the Singapore Penal Code.   
Apparent support for the course of reform was given by the 
influential voice of the foundation Prime Minister (and “Minister 
Mentor”) Lee Kuan Yew.   However, a fiery debate ensued in the 
Singapore Parliament where opponents of reform justified the 
continuance of the colonial provision on the basis that it contributed 
to “social cohesiveness”;  reflected “the sentiments of the majority of 
society”;  and that repeal would “force homosexuality on a 
conservative population that is not ready for homosexuality”.61   The 
result was that the reform bill was rejected, although the prime 
minister made it clear that the laws would not generally be enforced, 
so that gays were welcome to stay in, and come to, Singapore, 
inferentially so long as they preserved a low profile and observed the 
requirements of “don‟t ask don‟t tell”. 
Occasional glimmerings of hope of reform arose in particular 
countries of the Commonwealth where the same-sex prohibitions 
were repealed, such as The Bahamas.   However, these instances of 
encouragement had to be counter-balanced against the violence of 
popular culture in other Caribbean countries (especially Jamaica) in 
the form of homophobic rap music;  the denunciation of “the 
homosexual lifestyle” by leaders in African countries such as Robert 
Mugabe (Zimbabwe), Daniel arap Moi (Kenya), Olusegun Obasanjo 
(Nigeria) and Yoweri Museveni (Uganda).   The successive 
prosecutions for sodomy in Malaysia of an opposition politician, 
Anwar Ibrahim, were strongly supported by that country‟s leader (Dr. 
Mahatir).   In Jamaica (2004) and in Uganda (2011), leading advocates 
of law reform were brutally murdered against a backdrop of verbal 
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calumny in popular culture, politics and sections of the media.   On 
the face of things, the scene in these Commonwealth countries looks 
grim and forbidding.   Only Nelson Mandela, father of South Africa‟s 
multi-racial democracy, spoke strongly in Africa against the 
proposition that homosexuality was “un-African”.   For him, it was 
“just another form of sexuality that has been suppressed for years.   
…   [It] is something we are living with.”62  Still, the advocacy of 
change in many such countries is dangerous and risky.   The future 
looks bleak. 
 
THE FUTURE 
Against this background, a remarkable development occurred in India 
on July 2, 2009.   The Delhi High Court (constituted by A.P. Shah 
C.J. and S. Muralidhar J.) on that day handed down its long awaited 
decision in Naz Foundation v. Delhi & others.63   The court unanimously 
upheld a challenge brought by the Naz Foundation against the 
validity of the operation of section 377 of the Indian Penal Code, to the 
extent that the section criminalised consensual sexual conduct 
between same-sex adults occurring in private.   At a stroke, the court 
liberated large numbers of the sexual minorities described by the 
scientists, defended by Wolfenden, freed by legislation elsewhere, but 
kept in legal chains by the enduring penal code provisions of the 
British Empire. 
Curiously, before the Delhi High Court, the Union Ministry of 
Health & Family Welfare joined with other health respondents to the 
proceedings to support the foundation‟s challenge.   The Union 
Ministry of Home Affairs, on the other hand, appeared to oppose 
relief and to assert that section 377 reflected the moral values of the 
Indian people.   This is not the occasion to recount every detail of the 
judicial opinion of the Delhi High Court which was immediately 
flashed around the world, not only because of its potential 
importance for India beyond Delhi, but also because of its possible 
significance in the many other Commonwealth countries which retain 
identical or like provisions in their criminal codes and enjoy identical 
or like constitutional provisions, such as were the source of the relief 
provided by the court. 
The participating judges: 
 traced the history of the Indian Penal Code,64  
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 identified the nature of the challenge65 and of the specific 
interest of the Naz Foundation which works in the field of 
HIV/AIDS intervention and prevention;   
 set out the response of the respective Union governmental 
agencies66 and of other respondents in the case, many of 
them supporting the Naz Foundation;67   
 invoked the right to life and the protection of personal 
dignity, autonomy and privacy under the Indian 
Constitution;68   
 marked out the context of global trends in the protection of 
the privacy and dignity rights of homosexuals, many of them 
noted above;69 
 noted the absence of a compelling state interest to intrude 
into such private and intimate conduct and, on the contrary, 
the strong contrary conclusion in the context of the AIDS 
epidemic;70  and 
 concluded that section 377 violated the constitutional 
guarantee of equality under Article 14 of the Constitution of 
India;71  and impermissibly and disproportionately targeted 
homosexuals as a class.72 
The Delhi court concluded that the provisions of section 377 were 
severable in so far as they applied to offences against minors (for 
which there was no other equivalent law in the same-sex context);73  
and that the ultimate affirmation of the notion of equality in the 
Indian Constitution, upheld in the decision, represented an underlying 
theme which was essential because of the very diversity of the Indian 
society upon which the Constitution operated.74 
The decision of the Delhi High Court in the Naz Foundation case is 
presently subject to appeal to the Supreme Court of India.   At the 
time of writing this article, its decision is not known.   It may be 
expected later in 2011.   But whatever the outcome, no appellate 
court could ever re-configure the state of the law or of society to the 
conditions prevailing in India prior to the delivery of the judgment in 
Naz.   The discourse has shifted.   Significantly, the Government of 
India elected not to appeal against the decision of the Delhi court.    
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It was content to leave the authority of the decision to stand as stated, 
with the high implication, thereby, that it would be observed in  
all other parts of the nation.   The Supreme Court of India will  
in due course reveal its conclusion.   But the discourse in India  
(and in the many other countries where the same or similar provisions 
of the imported criminal codes apply) has changed. 
Yet, notwithstanding this hopeful sign, the prospect of change in 
the other 41 jurisdictions of the Commonwealth of Nations that 
continue to criminalise same-sex conduct still appears discouraging.   
But, here too, several things are happening which may be occasions 
for cautious optimism, at least in the long term.   Most of these 
developments arise in the context of responses by the global 
community to the HIV/AIDS epidemic.   It is, to some extent, 
unpalatable to support the important arguments advanced by 
Bentham and many reformers since, for the winding back of the 
criminal law to its proper realm of operation, on grounds based on 
the pragmatic concern to respond effectively to the HIV epidemic.   
At one stage in the reasoning in the Naz Foundation case, as the 
distinguished Indian judges move to their conclusion, they quote 
from remarks that I had made shortly before to a conference of the 
Commonwealth Lawyers‟ Association held in Hong Kong.75   The 
Delhi High Court must have discovered my remarks on the internet.   
They noted that my observations had been offered in the context of 
an analysis (similar to that set out above) concerning the criminal 
codes “imposed on colonial people by the imperial rulers of the 
British Crown”.76   As stated in the Naz Foundation case, and accepted 
by the Delhi High Court, I contended that the criminalisation of 
private, consensual, adult homosexual acts was wrong:  
“– Wrong in legal principle because they exceed the proper 
ambit and function of the criminal law in a modern 
society; 
 Wrong because they oppress a minority in the 
community and target them for an attribute of their 
nature that they do not choose and cannot change.   In 
this respect they are like other laws of colonial times that 
disadvantaged people on the ground of their race or sex;   
 Wrong because they fly in the face of modern scientific 
knowledge about the incidence and variety of human 
sexuality;  and 
 Wrong because they put a cohort of citizens into a 
position of stigma and shame that makes it hard to reach 
 
 
75 M.D. Kirby, „Homosexual Law Reform:  The Ongoing Blind Spot of the 
Commonwealth of Nations‟ (Commonwealth Law Conference,  
Hong Kong, April 8, 2009). 
76 Naz Foundation case (n.63), 879, [85]. 
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them with vital messages about safe sexual conduct, 
essential in the age of HIV/AIDS.”77 
Of the foregoing errors, only the last is relevant to the HIV epidemic 
and AIDS.   Yet this is now an important line of reasoning upon which 
hang many international attempts to persuade countries that still adhere 
to their colonial legacy to think again and to change by legislation or 
judicial decision, their local equivalents to section 377 of the Indian 
Penal Code that was the provisions before the Delhi High Court. 
This is not the occasion to identify all of the developments that 
are occurring.   However, they include: 
1. Repeated statements by the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations (Mr. Ban Ki-moon), urging member states to change 
their legal proscriptions of this kind without delay.   Thus, on 
January 25, 2011, in remarks to the session of the Human 
Rights Council in Geneva, the Secretary-General said: 
“Two years ago I came here and issued a challenge.   
I called on this council to promote human rights 
without favour, without selectivity, without any 
undue influence … .   We must reject persecution of 
people because of their sexual orientation or gender 
identity … who may be arrested, detained or 
executed for being lesbian, gay, bisexual or 
transgender.   They may not have popular or political 
support, but they deserve our support in 
safeguarding their fundamental human rights.    
I understand that sexual orientation and gender 
identity raise sensitive cultural issues.   But cultural 
practice cannot justify any violation of human rights 
… .   When our fellow human beings are persecuted 
because of their sexual orientation or gender 
identity, we must speak out.   That is what I am 
doing here.   That is my consistent position.   
Human rights are human rights everywhere, for 
everyone.”78 
The Secretary-General has made many similar statements.   
They are backed up by strong international declarations of 
commitment in the context of HIV/AIDS.79   His words are 
supported by like statements on the part of the Administrator 
of the United Nations Development Programme, the 
 
 
77 ibid., 889-895, [116]-[128]. 
78 Ban Ki-moon, Secretary General of the United Nations, “Remarks to the  
Human Rights Council” (Geneva, January 25, 2011). 
79 United Nations, General Assembly, 65th session, Implementation of the Declaration of 
Commitment on HIV/AIDS and the Political Declaration on HIV/AIDS (Report of  
the Secretary-General, March 28, 2011) 
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Director-General of the World Health Organisation, the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the 
Executive Director of UNAIDS and other United Nations 
voices.   Rarely has the world organisation spoken with such 
unanimity and unvarnished clarity. 
2. Additionally, the United Nations Development Programme 
has established a Global Commission on HIV and the Law.   
The chairman of this body is Federico Henrique Cardoso, 
former President of Brazil.    It includes in its numbers 
several distinguished lawyers of the common law tradition, 
legislators and other experts.   I am myself a member of the 
commission.   In considering the areas of law reform that are 
required to strengthen the global response to the continuing 
epidemic of HIV/AIDS which each year claims about 2.6 
million lives, the commission has identified several fields of 
law for priority action.   These include criminal laws that 
impede successful strategies to support prevention of the 
spread of HIV and to respond effectively to the needs of 
those who are infected and vulnerable to infection for 
medical care and therapy.   It may be expected that the global 
commission will turn its attention to the legacy of imperial 
criminal codes as they continue to apply in so many countries 
of the common law world and beyond. 
3. A third source of action is the Eminent Persons Group 
(EPG) of the Commonwealth of Nations.   This body arose 
out of the Trinidad and Tobago Affirmation that followed 
the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting 
(CHOGM) held in Port of Spain, Trinidad in October 
2009.80   I am a member of the Eminent Persons Group.   
Among the priority areas requiring attention, identified by the 
group, is the response of Commonwealth nations to the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic.   Although Commonwealth countries 
comprise one-third of the world‟s population, it is estimated 
that two-thirds of those who are currently living with HIV or 
AIDS are Commonwealth citizens.81   The Eminent Persons 
Group has drawn this fact to the notice of the 
Commonwealth leaders.   It will be an important component 
of the group‟s report.   That body will recommend that those 
laws that may impede a successful strategy against HIV and 
 
 
80 „Trinidad and Tobago Affirmation of Commonwealth Values and Principles‟, in 
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (27-29 November 2009),  
Trinidad and Tobago Outcome Documents (Commonwealth Secretariat 2010), 7, [13]. 
81 United Nations Development Programme, Comparative Table of HIV Infection  
in the World (2010). 
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AIDS should be considered for reform and prompt action.   
The alternative is that the nations that have received the 
unlovely legacy of same-sex criminal prohibitions will 
continue to watch as their citizens and residents become 
infected and die in conditions of poverty, stigma and shame. 
In the post-imperial age, there are no gunships that can be sent to 
enforce the messages of reform voiced in the United Nations, by 
United Nations Development Programme or by the Commonwealth 
Eminent Persons Group.   No armed force or coercive military action 
can be brought to bear.   All that is available is the power of ideas and 
persuasion that is based on the experience of other countries.   But 
there is also the argument of self-interest because the impact of HIV 
is not only devastating in personal terms.   It is also an enormous 
burden on the economies of the countries that persist with their 
current disabling legislation.   Where human rights, individual dignity 
and relief from suffering do not prove persuasive, other means must 
be deployed including economic arguments and the force of 
international good opinion. 
The Naz Foundation case demonstrates that the power of 
international law and good example today is a force far more potent 
than even the coercive orders of the Privy Council were, at the 
heyday of British imperial power.   Words spoken in conferences will 
sometimes be read and will enter the minds of legislators and judges 
worldwide.   Decisions of final national courts will be published in the 
Law Reports of the Commonwealth, on the internet and in journals that 
make their way to equivalent courts in other lands.   Journals such as 
this and associations such as ours, will bring wisdom and good 
experience beyond our own lands to colleagues elsewhere who, so far, 
are walking in darkness. 
This is now the global reality of the law.   In that global 
community, we who share the English language, have a special, added 
advantage.   We can readily communicate ideas with one another in 
the English language and through courts, legislatures and other 
institutions that share many commonalities.   The anti-sodomy 
offences and same-sex criminal prohibitions of the British Empire 
constitute one target of communication that needs to be enhanced, 
expedited and accelerated. 
This imperative does not exist only to achieve an effective 
response to the AIDS epidemic.   It is also there for the proper 
limitation of the criminal law to its appropriate ambit;  for an end to 
oppression of vulnerable and often defenceless minorities;  for the 
adoption of a rational attitude to empirical scientific evidence about 
human nature;  and for the removal of a great unkindness and 
violence by state authorities that has burdened human happiness for 
too long, precisely as Jeremy Bentham wrote 200 years ago. 
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TWENTY YEARS OF  
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE  
IN NEW ZEALAND – 
REFLECTIONS OF A JUDICIAL PARTICIPANT 
JUDGE F.W.M. MCELREA* 
 
New Zealand has had twenty interesting years‟ experience of 
restorative justice, in one form or another.   As someone involved 
throughout that period, I should offer some reflections of possibly 
wider interest.   What have we learned that may assist the cause of 
criminal justice, both here and in other English-speaking1 countries? 
First, what is restorative justice?   I use the term here to mean an 
approach to wrongdoing that brings together those most affected by 
the wrong – both victims and offenders – preferably in a face-to-face 
meeting, to acknowledge the harm done and consider how best to 
redress that harm and prevent similar harm in the future.   Restorative 
justice is not a single technique or procedure, and has application 
beyond the criminal justice system.2 
1990 was New Zealand‟s first full year of operation of the new 
youth court system for dealing with young offenders – and the year of 
my appointment as a youth court judge.   By then, I had found my 
feet as a district court judge (appointed in 1988).   I continued in this 
role, dealing with adult offenders, and thereby seeing two different 
systems in operation.3   One was the English-based, adversarial 
system of criminal justice for people aged 17 and over, and the other 
a home-grown system centred on family group conferences that, 
along with youth courts, had been introduced by the Children, Young 
Persons and their Families Act 1989.4 
The family group conference model quickly came to be seen as 
essentially restorative in nature, although it had not been designed 
with “restorative justice” in mind.   Indeed that term did not circulate 
 
 
* District Court Judge, New Zealand. 
1 I have used this term to include not only Commonwealth countries but the United 
States of America. 
2 Different restorative techniques include family group conferences, adult restorative 
conferences, victim-offender mediation, healing circles, and a variety of other 
“restorative practices”.   Outside the criminal justice system, restorative justice is 
applied in some schools, work places and even in dealing with infringing trade 
practices. 
3 District court judges in New Zealand have both civil and criminal jurisdiction.   The 
latter includes all summary matters and most trials of indictable offences, the 
remainder being dealt with in the High Court. 
4 Henceforth, “the 1989 Act”. 
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in New Zealand until 1993, which was after the distinctive nature of 
the new youth court system had been recognised.5 
Family group conferences in New Zealand are convened and 
facilitated by an independent person employed by the state, on receipt 
of a “referral” from either a youth court or a police youth aid officer.   
The court does this for all cases that are admitted or proved in court.   
The police may do so in any case where the 1989 Act prevents them 
arresting a young person and taking them to court – these are 
“diversionary conferences”, as I mention shortly.   There is state 
funding for lawyers at the former but not the latter.  The young 
person is entitled to a lawyer at any conference, but their role is that 
of adviser and supporter rather than advocate.   Matters that are 
denied have to be proved in court in the usual way, i.e. with the 
burden of proof on the prosecution. 
The following aspects of the family group conference system 
stand out after 20 years6 as being both innovative and of potential 
value to adult systems as well: 
 A real attempt was made to divert offenders away from the 
court system altogether.   This was achieved by making 
diversionary conferences the default option – i.e. charges 
could not be laid in court unless certain criteria were met.7   As 
a result, almost half of all family group conferences have not 
been court-directed8 and the matter has been handled 
without any court appearance whatsoever.   In addition, other 
diversionary practices adopted by the police, using their 
 
 
5 In 1993, Howard Zehr‟s account of restorative justice in Changing Lenses (Herald 
Press, 1990) first started making waves in New Zealand. 
6 I remained a youth court judge until 2001 when I gave up this work and instead 
worked as an alternate environment judge – again, while continuing my role as a 
district court judge.   I acknowledge the leadership of Principal Youth Court Judge 
Andrew Becroft in the last 10 years, and that of his predecessors – Principal Youth 
Court Judges Mick Brown and David Carruthers – all of whom have been great 
supporters of restorative justice.   Chief District Court Judge Russell Johnson and his 
predecessors are in the same category. 
7  See s.245 of the 1989 Act.   Diversionary conferences (also called “intention to 
charge” conferences) are initiated – and attended – by the police.   However, New 
Zealand does not subscribe to the practice in some parts of Australia, Canada and the 
U.K. of having the police run the conferences.   There is always an independent 
facilitator in charge.   If agreement can be reached as to an outcome that does not 
involve the laying of charges, then no charges are laid – so long as the outcome is 
implemented.   
8 The figure is 49.3% of all referrals over the last 10 years, although a small (but 
unknown) percentage of referrals will not have resulted in a conference, and another 
small (but unknown) percentage of diversionary family group conferences will have 
resulted in charges being laid in court.   A reasonable estimate is that about 40% of all 
family group conferences do not follow or precede a court appearance by the young 
person – which is a significant number. 
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discretion whether to prosecute or not, have helped reduce 
the use of courts. 
 There are no gate-keepers deciding which cases go to a 
conference, and no limit on the seriousness of offences that 
can be dealt with.9   Other countries have limited family 
group conferences to first offenders, or to property offences, 
or to cases approved by the police or a judge.  The 
comprehensive nature of the New Zealand system was 
fundamental to its success.   As a result we can speak from 
considerable experience – there have been over 75,000 family 
group conferences in the last 10 years, so well over 100,000 (I 
do not have an exact figure) in the two decades. 
 There was a deliberate move away from the notion that 
therapeutic experts “know best”, thereby enabling family- 
and community-based knowledge to guide outcomes. 
 The legislation strongly encouraged accountability measures 
mixed with community-based, remedial outcomes, rather 
than punishment for the sake of punishment.   This resulted 
in a massive reduction in custodial outcomes, as well as in 
custodial remands pending sentencing. 
 One result of these first four features was that many 
expensive institutions were able to be closed, and court 
sittings dealing with young people were greatly reduced.   The 
changes produced unquantified but substantial savings – not 
only in dollar terms, but also in terms of the unintended 
damage that those institutions can cause. 
 State-paid officials, called youth justice coordinators, 
arranged and facilitated family group conferences.  Volunteer 
input was limited to those assisting conferences by attending 
as community or family members.   The professionalism of 
the coordinators, grounded in a strong set of statutory 
principles, was essential to making the system work.10  (Over 
the years the battle has been to retain that special youth 
justice or “accountability” focus when the coordinators have 
 
 
9 This general statement has three qualifications:  (i) murder and manslaughter cases 
are outside the 1989 Act (s.272);  (ii) at the opposite end of the scale, traffic offences 
that are fineable only are dealt with in a district court (s.272(3));  and (iii) for “purely 
indictable offences” (in some countries called felonies), a youth court has a discretion 
(s.275) as to whether the matter remains in the youth court or is dealt with in an adult 
court:  in my experience only the most serious cases were excluded from the youth 
court.   If the matter remains in the youth court and is admitted, it must be referred 
to a family group conference. 
10 A procedure based on clear principles, rather than a model “script” for the 
conference, distinguishes family group conference practice in New Zealand from that 
in some other jurisdictions. 
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been organised within the largely “welfare” culture of social 
workers in what was the Social Welfare Department and is 
now the Child Youth and Family service of the Ministry of 
Social Development.) 
 Related to this, specialist police officers called youth aid 
officers handle all cases involving children or young people, 
and specialist lawyers called youth advocates are provided for 
all alleged offenders in youth courts.   In my view both 
groups have been highly effective in their different roles and 
have really entered into and implemented the principles of 
the 1989 Act, but the general body of police and lawyers have 
failed to embrace the principles governing family group 
conferences – because of their training in a more adversarial 
and punitive model of justice. 
 The family group conference model has only been truly 
restorative when it has involved victims, and treated them as 
of equal importance to offenders.11   Unfortunately victim 
involvement in conferences – which of course is entirely 
voluntary – has been variable, ranging from 80 per cent of 
family group conferences down to around 40 per cent, and 
currently around 50 per cent.   Further, even when victims 
attend conferences it is difficult for a system to treat 
offenders and victims equally when it is designed and funded 
to deal with offenders.   Widespread attendance and 
participation of victims at family group conferences depend 
entirely on the good practice of youth justice coordinators;  
without further legislative change, and proper training, good 
practice goes only so far in overcoming this imbalance. 
 Young offenders retained the right to elect trial by jury on 
offences carrying more than three months‟ imprisonment 
(s.274), but hardly ever exercised that right.   Clearly they and 
their advisers saw it as more beneficial to remain within the 
youth court jurisdiction, where punishment played a part but 
the main emphasis was on remedial and rehabilitative 
outcomes. 
 The family group conference model is receptive to different 
cultural influences, and can accommodate indigenous, 
European and immigrant cultures with little difficulty.12   
 
 
11 Under s.251 of the 1989 Act, victims or their representatives are entitled to attend 
any family group conference. 
12 Subject to some basic requirements set out in the 1989 Act, a family group 
conference “may regulate its procedure in such manner as it thinks fit”:  s.256.   Thus 
Maori (the indigenous people of New Zealand) and Pacific Island communities, 
when dealing with offending within their own communities, are able to follow their 
own protocols for the conduct of meetings, use their own language, and produce 
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Both Maori and Pacific Island communities in New Zealand 
had argued for a model that empowered families and 
communities, and were influential in the shaping of the l989 
legislation.   However, I have never heard it said that family 
group conferences work only for those cultures – on the 
contrary, the process can be adapted to all cultures, and 
where different cultures are involved (e.g. as family or 
supporters of victim and offender) the conference process 
can be an important agent in building a sense of community 
across cultures. 
 Monitoring of family group conference outcomes, to ensure 
they are implemented, is important for the parties, and for 
the credibility of the system.   An example of the adaptation 
of the general family group conference model to the values 
of Maori communities is the establishment of “Rangatahi 
courts”.   These are special youth court sittings convened on 
Maori marae or meeting places, and using Maori language 
and customs.   They discuss how family group conference 
plans will be implemented and monitored.   Local elders and 
other knowledgeable community leaders will sit with the 
judge as advisers to bring specific Maori cultural perspectives 
into the process.   Maori judges preside in these courts and 
the young people are encouraged to appreciate fully the 
connectedness of their lives and actions to their ancestors 
and natural surroundings, as well as to their whanau (family) 
and wider community. 
 Finally, the 1989 Act avoided the formalities of “pleading” to 
charges, something inherently linked to the adversary 
model.13   Under section 246 of the 1989 Act, where a young 
person is brought before a youth court, he is asked, after he 
has had the opportunity of taking legal advice, whether he 
denies the charge.   If he does, the matter goes straight to a 
defended hearing (with all the protection of due process).   In 
any other case, the matter must be referred to a family group 
conference, where the first issue to be dealt with will be 
whether the charge is admitted.14   Nearly all charges are 
admitted.   The use of this language (“denied” or 
                                                                                                             
outcomes that are culturally appropriate for the young person and reinforce cultural 
values. 
13 A plea of “Not Guilty” might mean “You prove it”, rather than “I did not do it”.   
A system that emphasises accountability and taking responsibility for one‟s own 
actions puts the emphasis on the latter. 
14  See s.259.   In practice, therefore, the terms used at the first appearance in court 
are “denied” and “not denied” and, at a family group conference, “admitted” or “not 
admitted”.   These broadly follow the language used in the Act. 
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“admitted”), rather than the pleader‟s equivalents (“Not 
Guilty” or “Guilty”), has helped change the focus from legal 
technicalities to accountability and taking responsibility for 
harm done to victims and the wider community;  and this has 
been achieved while preserving a defendant‟s right to defend 
the charges in court in the usual way. 
New Zealand‟s experience of the new youth court model strongly 
influenced the development of restorative justice for adults, and 
ultimately in spheres other than criminal justice, e.g. education.15   In 
1994, at a conference of all district court judges, I presented a paper 
that described the restorative aspects of the family group conference 
model and invited their adoption in adult courts.   The same year saw 
the first such case before me, proceeding with the consent of victim 
and offender, and the establishment of the first of many community 
groups of volunteers trained in conference facilitation.16   These groups 
provided reports on individual cases to sentencing courts where 
judges had granted adjournments for a restorative conference to be 
held.   In each case the presiding judge had simply used his or her 
discretion to grant an adjournment so that information that might be 
relevant to sentencing could be put before the court.   No commit-
ment was made that the process would affect the outcome, and nor 
was any future judge obliged to consider the conference report.17 
While family group conferences deal with all manner of cases, 
some relatively trivial and some extremely serious, adult conferences 
have in the most part been for moderately serious offending – assaults 
(including assaults with a weapon), burglary, robbery, embezzlement, 
careless or dangerous driving causing death.18   I, and many others, 
feel that the more serious the harm, the greater the need for healing 
on the victim‟s part and the greater the potential for restorative justice. 
 
 
15 Many schools, here and elsewhere, convene restorative conferences to deal with 
offending at school by young people.   These schools usually have a lower rate of 
suspensions and expulsions from school as a result. 
16 These groups initially arranged their own training and evolved an admirable set of 
principles and standards for this purpose.   Once the Ministry of Justice started 
subsidising (one cannot say “paying for”) some “provider group” costs, the ministry 
introduced its own training system, which still continues. 
17 However, if the judge directed that the matter come back to himself or herself – as 
usually happened in those early years – all concerned would know that the report 
would be carefully considered.   In all cases, the defendant‟s consent was first 
obtained, so conditions of bail requiring attendance at the conference were 
unnecessary but could be imposed. 
18 “Moderately serious offending” was the focus of a pilot scheme in four district 
courts (as to which, see post, p.51), later expanded to several other courts.   However, 
other provider groups dealt mostly with less serious cases that the police were happy 
to see diverted through a community panel process.   Both types of groups are 
funded by the Ministry of Justice. 
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So what sort of difference does restorative justice make to 
sentencing?   It can make the difference between a term of 
imprisonment and some other outcome;19  between longer or shorter 
sentences of imprisonment;20  or it may influence the type of non-
custodial sentence to be imposed.21 
A number of the innovative attributes of family group conferences 
are characteristic of restorative justice as it has developed in the adult 
courts.   These include an emphasis on putting right the wrong, rather 
than punishment for punishment‟s sake;  the avoidance of adversarial 
procedures and attitudes – but the retention of adversarial procedures 
for dealing with defended cases;  the empowering of those directly 
affected by wrongdoing – importantly, victims – to consider meaningful 
ways of dealing with the wrongdoing;  the ability to adapt procedures 
to accommodate cultural differences;22  and the seeking of consensus 
about outcomes amongst those affected, rather than the imposition 
of outcomes “from above”.   However, the process for adults differed 
from family group conferences in that it was entirely voluntary 
 
 
19 In Kingi and McEwen v. New Zealand Police CRI-2007-483-4 (High Court, Wanganui, 
September 6, 2007, Simon France J.) the High Court on appeal set aside terms of 
imprisonment of four and five months for assault with intent to injure where 
restorative justice outcomes had been agreed and implemented, involving written 
apologies, 250 hours‟ community work, reparation payments to the victim, and 
attending remedial counselling.   Simon France J. commented that the role of the 
restorative justice process was more integral than in merely reducing the length of a 
prison term, as it “weighed in the crucial decision of custodial sentence or not.”    
In the light of the success of the conference and the defendants‟ compliance with its 
outcomes, the defendants were discharged without conviction, the appellate judge 
noting (para. 55) that “appropriate penalties had been served;  remorse was immediate 
and genuine;  reconciliation had occurred;”  and some other factors. 
20 In R. v. Buttar  [2008] NZCA 28, the Court of Appeal upheld sentences imposed in a 
district court of imprisonment for 30 months and 42 months where reductions of 30 
to 35 per cent were allowed on account of the restorative processes followed, together 
with a statement relating to the cultural background of the offenders as permitted 
under the Sentencing Act 2002, s.27 (which enables an adult court to receive evidence 
or advice on cultural factors affecting the offending, the offender or any proposed 
sentence).   The Court of Appeal noted that the district court judge had considered 
that the restorative processes had already addressed many of the sentencing purposes, 
which included deterrence within the Sikh community to which the defendants 
belonged.   (This was a defence appeal, not a Crown appeal, but an appellate court 
can increase a sentence of its own motion if it feels it is inadequate.   The discounts 
applied in the district court were regarded as generous but were not disturbed.) 
21 Good examples are found in the area of environmental offending, where 
imprisonment is possible but heavy fines are common.   There are several cases 
where more imaginative outcomes have been agreed at a restorative conference and 
accepted by the court, along with a lesser fine.   See, for example, Northland Regional 
Council v. Perkinson CRN 09088500008 (District Court, Whangarei, October 13, 2009, 
Newhook D.C.J.).   In that case a fine of only $1,000 was indicated if the defendant 
implemented the remedial and preventative outcomes of the restorative justice plan. 
22 Sentencing Act 2002, s.27. 
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(attendance at family group conferences by victims but not young offenders 
was voluntary).23   This has had both advantages and disadvantages. 
One advantage was that restorative justice for adults could get 
underway without any enabling legislation.   All that it needed was a 
judge prepared to adjourn the case for a conference report, and to 
consider that report (without any commitment to adopt its 
outcomes).   There were many such judges in the district courts and 
later some in the High Court.   Outcomes could be enforced in a 
variety of traditional ways – e.g. using sentences of community work, 
reparation and/or supervision – or simply by putting off final 
disposition until the conference plan had been completed (a common 
youth court procedure).24   Sometimes custodial sentences were still 
imposed, but for a shorter term where other sentencing objectives 
had already been achieved. 
The positive experience of these cases then encouraged the 
Ministry of Justice (as it now is) to fund a three-year pilot scheme for 
restorative justice in four district courts, with a positive evaluation 
later ensuing.   This in turn led to the extension of Ministry of Justice 
funding of restorative justice cases beyond the four “pilot” courts and 
to various restorative principles and procedures being incorporated 
into New Zealand‟s first full codification of sentencing law, the 
Sentencing Act 2002.   Thus, section 7 lists the purposes for which a 
court may sentence or otherwise deal with an offender as including 
“(a) to hold the offender accountable for harm done to the victim and 
the community by the offending;  or (b) to promote in the offender a 
sense of responsibility for, and an acknowledgment of, that harm;  or 
(c) to provide for the interests of the victim of the offence;  or …”.   
Importantly, under section 8, the court “must take into account any 
outcomes of restorative justice processes that have occurred”.   
A second advantage is that conferences only occur where both 
victim and offender agree to meet,25 which must lead to a better 
commitment to the process and the outcome than if adult offenders 
 
 
23 There is no offence of failing to attend a family group conference, but such a 
failure invites a remand in custody, or youth court jurisdiction being declined for a 
purely indictable matter, or both.   Where a young person fails to attend a 
diversionary conference the police can simply lay the charges in court.   In fact 
attendance rates by young offenders have always been high – a product also of family 
involvement in the conference, no doubt. 
24 At that point a defendant could be discharged without further formal sentence (i.e. 
discharged with or without conviction), or subject to the usual type of sentences 
depending on what had occurred in the meantime. 
25 Even so-called victimless crimes are amenable to restorative justice, as there are 
usually secondary victims – e.g. in drugs cases, the wife or partner whose 
housekeeping money has been squandered on drugs. 
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were forced into it.26   The situation with young people is slightly 
different, in that young offenders – in my experience – are generally 
prepared to be held accountable and nearly always admit their 
offending;  hearings where liability is denied are very much the 
exception.   This willingness to “own up” is perhaps more true in a 
family setting (including a family group conference), and may not 
carry through to an adult setting dominated by an adversarial culture 
and legal advice that the defendant can (or should) “put the 
prosecution to the proof”.  
As denials are unusual amongst young offenders, making the 
process compulsory (even for those cases proved after a defended 
hearing) has little impact overall from a victim‟s perspective.   This 
would probably not be true in the adult system, where offenders are 
more likely to be “in denial” (assuming they were rightly convicted – 
a fortiori if they were wrongly convicted) and worthwhile meetings 
would be less common.27 
However, we should not make the opposite mistake, of thinking 
that feelings of remorse by an offender are a prerequisite to a 
restorative conference.  “Owning up” and feeling remorseful are 
different experiences.   The latter is commonly (I would say, usually) 
the outcome of a well-facilitated conference – something felt because 
of empathy with the victim‟s plight, personally experienced in a face-
to-face setting (or sometimes more remotely, as when a victim sends 
a representative to the conference).   But there may be no remorse 
present beforehand.   Of course, in some types of case, such as 
accidental injury or death through a work accident or careless driving 
of a motor vehicle, remorse at a pre-conference stage is quite common, 
and those cases make for good conferencing because the opportunity 
(and need) for apology, reparation and mutual support is present. 
A major disadvantage of a fully voluntary system is that restorative 
justice can easily remain on the fringe of the criminal justice system.   
Despite the good work done by many people over two decades, 
 
 
26 Although young offenders are compelled to attend family group conferences, there 
remains a voluntary element in their participation:  the young offender can decline to 
agree to the outcome plan that other participants might support, so that there is no 
consensus and therefore no outcome of the conference.   His or her sentence is then 
entirely in the hands of the youth court judge.   This happens rarely, but is an 
available remedy where the young person might otherwise be coerced into agreeing 
to a particular outcome. 
27 One would hope, however, that the defendant‟s attitude of denial would be 
conveyed to the victim as part of the pre-conference preparation, so that forewarned 
victims would not face “re-victimisation” by attending such a conference.   That is, 
the risks of a compulsory system for offenders might be minimised by good practice 
in dealing with victims;  but where denial persists, the process would be largely 
pointless, which is why, in New Zealand, admission of the offending is a prerequisite 
of adults entering a restorative process. 
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restorative justice for adults is still very much the exception in New 
Zealand.   My estimate is that the total number of cases where 
restorative conferences are held for criminal wrongdoing by adults 
would be less than 2,000 per year28 – which, on one estimate, is only 
five per cent of cases that meet the ministry‟s criteria for funding.
29 
Why is the usage of restorative justice for adults so low, despite 
supportive legislation?   Lack of funding is obviously one factor.   
This is frustrating, because reduced reoffending rates, and reduced 
use of imprisonment in restorative justice cases, make the economics 
compelling.   In the United Kingdom politicians are starting to 
confront the advantages of a less punitive and more preventative and 
victim-friendly approach – even if only for fiscal reasons.   There is 
little sign of that yet in New Zealand, where there has been an unholy 
alliance between the media and most politicians to promote the illusion 
that punitive reactions promote community safety – despite all the 
evidence to the contrary.   The Ministry of Justice evaluation of the 
New Zealand pilot scheme showed a 17 per cent reduction in the use 
of imprisonment coupled with a nine per cent reduction in reoffending 
measured after two years, and a 50 per cent reduction in the seriousness 
of offences where participants did reoffend.   High rates of victim 
satisfaction were recorded, as has been shown in youth justice studies 
as well.   So the second reason is the political climate just described – 
although, in fairness, it is not uniform, and there are signs of change. 
The third reason is that so long as restorative justice is a voluntary 
process for offenders, key professionals (e.g. police, lawyers and 
judges) are able to ignore it, or (as anecdotal evidence suggests of 
some police) actively to discourage its use.30   The complete opposite 
is true of the family group conference, where the model is mandated 
for virtually all cases.   My explanation for the attitude of these 
 
 
28 The Ministry of Justice is currently providing (some) financial support for only 
about 1,400 court cases each year, and the Department of Corrections funds a 
handful of post-sentencing restorative conferences in prisons.   This seriously limits 
the number of cases handled by provider groups, although some take on more cases 
than their funding covers.   There are also restorative conferences held where the 
provider is paid a fee which is part of the agreed outcome, e.g. in environmental 
offending prosecuted under the Resource Management Act 1991.   Such cases are outside 
the ministry‟s figures, but would be a small number. 
29 That funding is directed, broadly, at cases involving reasonably serious offending, 
i.e. offences carrying possible prison sentences.   The figure given is from a personal 
communication. 
30 This has been true in New Zealand despite the Victims‟ Rights Act 2002, s.9, which 
states that “a judicial officer, lawyer for an offender, member of court staff, 
probation officer, or prosecutor” is to “encourage the holding of a [victim and 
offender] meeting” in certain circumstances – probably because section 10 then 
makes such obligation unenforceable!   S.9 has therefore been largely ignored – in my 
view a predictable result. 
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professionals in adult courts has been previously offered in terms of 
the domination of the adversary system: 
“The adversary ethos is so deeply imbedded in our legal 
structures, the legal profession, and the judges, who (in 
common law countries) are drawn from the profession, that 
restorative justice is continually pushed to the margins, 
despite the encouragement of the legislators.”31 
Does this mean that restorative justice for adults will flourish only 
if it is compulsory?   That is one option, but I believe it is not the only 
one.   The alternative is that restorative justice is given a non-court 
setting in which to operate, just as diversionary family group 
conferences were available from the outset under the 1989 Act.   This 
may require some state funding, which I suggest should be under the 
control of the Ministry of Social Development, as officials in the 
Ministry of Justice are just as likely to be wedded to a court-based 
system as the professionals operating in the courts.32   Such a system 
could be fully voluntary,33 or could be by law the default way for 
dealing with the same range of offences as are handled in youth 
courts, with the existing adult courts handling the remaining cases and 
those where agreement cannot be reached, or the outcome is not 
implemented after a conference. 
For those seeking a more satisfying, less damaging, and cheaper 
form of justice, the way forward, in my view, is clear.   It is not 
suitable in all cases, but with some principled support and seed 
funding, restorative justice could easily change the landscape of the 
criminal justice system in most common law jurisdictions. 
 
 
31 F.W.M. McElrea, „Restorative justice as a procedural revolution: some lessons from 
the adversary system‟ (Fourth International Winchester Restorative Justice 
Conference, October 10, 2007). 
32 I have argued over the years in favour of community justice centres able to 
perform this role.   Attempts (e.g. in the city of New Plymouth) to obtain funding 
from the Ministry of Justice for this purpose have not succeeded. 
33 By “fully voluntary”, I mean that it would require the agreement of defendant, 
victim and (if already involved) the police.  However, as with diversionary family 
group conferences, the police could still lay charges unless at the conference it was 
agreed on all sides that they were not necessary.  Such agreement would normally be 
conditional on any plan being implemented by the defendant within the agreed 
timeframe, so that the right to lay formal charges provides the incentive to perform 
the agreement. 
 55 
“NON-CONVICTION” DNA DATABASES AND 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE:  A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS 
LIZ CAMPBELL* 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Common law countries share a growing receptiveness to the use of DNA 
(deoxyribonucleic acid) in criminal investigation and prosecution, with the 
formalisation and steady expansion of schemes of DNA collection and 
retention.   Despite a general consensus regarding the significance and 
value of genetic material in criminal justice, there is considerable 
divergence in terms of the populations from whom DNA may be collected 
and the length of time for which DNA may be retained.   This article 
takes a comparative approach by assessing the trajectory of the law 
relating to DNA collection and retention in a range of common law 
jurisdictions, and ascertains how aspects of particular countries‟ laws seek 
to resolve common problematic issues that arise concerning human rights, 
in particular the rights to bodily integrity, of privacy and the presumption 
of innocence.   It identifies a common international movement to a risk-
based approach and concludes that of the comparator jurisdictions the 
Canadian model provides the most fitting accommodation for human 
rights in DNA database expansion. 
 
 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
Legal systems across the Commonwealth and beyond share a growing 
receptiveness to the use of DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) in criminal 
investigation and prosecution, with the formalisation and steady 
expansion of schemes of DNA collection and retention.   Gathering 
genetic material from crime scenes and individuals and running 
checks against existing records entail numerous potential benefits in 
the crime control sense:  the ready and speedy identification of 
suspects, the exclusion of innocent and wrongly suspected parties 
from police focus, the exoneration of the wrongfully convicted, and 
the deterrence of some would-be criminal actors due to the increased 
chance of detection.   Moreover, on-going storage of genetic material 
permits speculative or “cold” searching which hastens investigations 
and may provide leads for hitherto unsolved crimes.   This 
contributes to a general consensus regarding the significance and 
value of genetic material in criminal investigations;  however, 
common law countries diverge considerably in terms of the 
populations from whom DNA may be acquired and the length of 
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time for which DNA may be retained.   Collecting DNA from 
convicted adults and storing it in state databases is seen now as a 
relatively uncontroversial and proportionate incursion on human 
rights, given that it is predicated on a finding of guilt, but policies and 
practices relating to children and to unconvicted persons are more 
contentious normatively speaking and thus far from settled in a legal 
sense.1  
This article takes a comparative approach in assessing the 
trajectory of the law relating to DNA collection and retention in a 
number of common law jurisdictions, and ascertains how aspects of 
particular laws seek to resolve common problematic issues that arise 
concerning human rights.   The focus here is on competent adults 
alone, rather than also including children which would necessitate 
consideration of issues regarding consent, bodily integrity, labelling 
and reintegration which are particularly pertinent and controversial 
regarding minors.2   In the context of unconvicted adults, the non-
consensual collection of genetic material encroaches on the right to 
bodily integrity especially, while the subsequent storage of DNA 
arguably affects the right to privacy as well as the presumption of 
innocence.   The expansion of laws regarding non-conviction3 DNA 
collection and retention in many jurisdictions may be explained by 
broad trends away from a rights-oriented paradigm towards a more 
populist and punitive model, by the emphasis in political discourse 
and practice on the need to avert risk, and the desire to “rebalance” 
the criminal justice system in favour of the victim and the wider 
community.   However, the competing demands that relate to 
criminal justice have been resolved differently when it comes to DNA 
collection and retention, thereby rendering some countries‟ schemes 
more problematic in terms of human rights than others. 
After describing the implications for criminal justice of DNA in a 
broad sense, the article will consider a number of key precepts which 
may be affected by DNA collection and subsequent retention, namely 
the right to bodily integrity, the right of privacy and the presumption 
of innocence.   It will focus on how existing laws in a range of 
common law jurisdictions have sought to address these concerns.   
 
 
1 See Liz Campbell, „A rights-based analysis of DNA retention:  “Non-conviction” 
databases and the liberal state‟ [2010] Crim.L.R. 889. 
2 See Liz Campbell and Nessa Lynch, „Competing paradigms? The use of DNA in 
youth justice in New Zealand and Scotland‟, staff seminar, Victoria University of 
Wellington, New Zealand, December 2010.    
3 The term “non-conviction” DNA retention is used throughout this piece as 
shorthand for storage of DNA which is not dependent on a criminal conviction and 
occurs regardless of the results of a criminal investigation or prosecution.   The only 
viable alternative term, “pre-conviction”, may suggest that a conviction does indeed 
follow, which is not the case. 
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Throughout, the extent to which these comparator countries have 
influenced each other, in terms of policy adoption or avoidance, will 
be noted.   Crime control measures in the United States often 
represent a prototype for other countries, in terms of the usual trend 
and direction of policy transfer.4   However, rather than the 
“American exceptionalism” so often cited in criminological literature,5 
until recently England and Wales has stood as somewhat of an 
anomaly in regards to DNA surveillance with the most expansive 
scheme of DNA retention for innocent persons in the common law 
world.   Notably, this is now to be amended.   The shared theme 
evident in the comparator jurisdictions is a shift to a risk-oriented 
model of DNA in criminal justice, although the Canadian approach 
appears most cognisant of the human rights implications of the 
expansion of DNA databases. 
 
II.   THE USE OF DNA IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 
The genetic material in human DNA determines physical 
characteristics and traits, genetic disorders, susceptibility to disease 
and ethnic origin.   An individual‟s DNA is unique (except in the case 
of identical twins) and is inherited from both one‟s parents.   As more 
similarities may be seen in the DNA of siblings and family members 
when compared with unrelated persons, DNA may reveal familial 
relationships.   Thus, a DNA sample contains a range of intimate 
personal and family information.   In contrast, a DNA profile, 
generated from a sample, is a code comprising a set of identifying 
characteristics from regions of DNA that are not known to provide 
for any physical characteristics or medical conditions of the person.   
A DNA profile consists of a list of numbers based on specific areas 
of DNA known as short tandem repeats and a gender indicator, and 
thus may only be read and interpreted with the aid of technology.6   
While profiles are computerised, they still contain “substantial 
amounts of unique personal data”,7 including information about 
familial relationships and ethnic origin.    
 
 
4 Trevor Jones and Tim Newburn, „Learning from Uncle Sam? Understanding US 
Influences over UK Crime Control Policy‟ (2002) 15(1) Governance 97;  Tim 
Newburn, „Atlantic crossings:  “Policy transfer” and crime control in the USA and 
Britain‟ (2002) 4 Punishment and Society 165. 
5 See for example Trevor Jones and Tim Newburn, Policy Transfer and Criminal Justice:  
Exploring US Influence over British Crime Control Policy (Open University Press 2007), 5. 
6 Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, Postnote:  The National DNA 
Database, Number 258 (2006) <http://www.parliament.uk/documents/post/ 
postpn258.pdf> accessed May 2, 2011. 
7 S. v. U.K., 48 E.H.R.R. 1169 (Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human 
Rights), [73]-[76]. 
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Many misconceptions exist about DNA evidence, insofar as it is 
often viewed as infallible and beyond question.   However, as with 
other forms of physical evidence, the potential for false positives 
exists.   The profiling system used in the United Kingdom uses ten 
regions of DNA whereas a previous system used six;  in Australia 
nine loci are used;  in the United States and Canada 13 are used and in 
New Zealand 15.8   Thus, an “adventitious match” could occur 
between two DNA profiles, and this becomes more likely the fewer 
loci are used;  although it has been argued that further testing of 
additional DNA loci would distinguish between two such individuals‟ 
DNA, except in the case of identical twins.9   Moreover, 
contamination could occur at the time the swab was taken, or during 
comparison in the laboratory.   Furthermore, human error in storage, 
processing or interpretation is always possible, as in the context of 
other evidence.   It is also conceivable for a positive match to be 
found between crime scene material and a suspect‟s DNA without 
necessarily implying criminal culpability, either by virtue of innocent 
presence at a particular location or through the “planting” of 
evidence.   Finally, despite popular media portrayal, not all crime 
scenes are swabbed for genetic material due to logistical, practical or 
financial reasons, and so comparison with database profiles is not 
always part of an investigation. 
 
III.   DNA DATABASES 
Despite points of commonality, and evidence of a degree of 
convergence, some notable differences persist between current laws 
on non-conviction DNA databases in a range of common law 
countries.   England and Wales may be characterised as occupying 
one end of the spectrum insofar as its policies until 2011 were the 
most permissive, while Canada maintains the most restrictive laws.    
The United Kingdom‟s National DNA Database (NDNAD) was 
set up in 1995 and contains genetic material gathered from all over 
 
 
8 Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology (n.6), 1;  New South Wales Centre 
for Genetics Education, „Fact Sheet 22:  DNA Genetic Testing – Paternity and 
Forensic Use‟ <http://www.genetics.com.au/factsheet/fs22.asp#para_2> accessed 
May 2, 2011;  Federal Bureau of Investigation, „Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) 
on the CODIS Program and the National DNA Index System‟ 
<http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet> accessed May 
2, 2011;  Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, House of 
Commons Canada, Statutory Review of the DNA Identification Act, June 2009 (40th 
Parliament, 2nd Session), 2;  Institute of Environmental Science and Research, A brief 
history of Forensic DNA 1990-2010 <http://www.esr.cri.nz/SiteCollectionDocuments/ 
ESR/PDF/ForensicScience/Forensic20yearsDNA.pdf> accessed May 2, 2011. 
9 National DNA Database Strategy Board, National DNA Database Annual Report 
2007-09 (NOIA 2009), 42. 
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the UK.   Proportionately speaking the NDNAD is the largest of its 
kind in the world and contained 7.39 per cent of the UK population 
in 2009,10 while the most recent figures indicate almost nine per cent 
coverage.11   Second chronologically only to the United Kingdom, a 
DNA database was established in New Zealand in 1995, and this was 
followed at federal level in the United States with establishment of 
the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) and the National DNA 
Index System (NDIS) in 1998.12   Canada‟s National DNA Data Bank 
has been in place since 2000,13 and the National Criminal 
Investigation DNA Database (NCIDD) was constructed in Australia 
in 2001.14   Though the value of DNA in criminal investigations is not 
disputed, policies relating to the parameters of these databases and 
the duration of DNA storage are in flux. 
 
IV.   THE COLLECTION OF DNA 
While collection of genetic material on the one hand and retention on 
the other overlap in respect of their consequences they raise slightly 
different issues.   Collecting DNA from an individual encroaches on 
his right to physical integrity,15 by virtue of the seizure of his bodily 
material through an invasive procedure, and given that force may be 
used to obtain the sample if consent is not forthcoming.16   The 
degree of intrusion on the right to physical integrity, as protected 
through provisions relating to privacy or prohibiting unreasonable 
 
 
10 Constitution Committee, Surveillance:  Citizens and the State (HL 2008-09, 18-I), para. 180. 
11 National Policing Improvement Agency, „National DNA Database – Statistics‟ 
<http://www.npia.police.uk/en/13338.htm> accessed May 2, 2011. 
12 Federal Bureau of Investigation (n.8). 
13 DNA Identification Act 1998, amending the Criminal Code of Canada.   See Sylvain 
Lalonde, „Canada‟s National DNA Data Bank:  A Success Story‟ (2006) 39 Canadian 
Society of Forensic Science Journal 1. 
14 See David Whiley and Barbara Hocking, „DNA:  Crime, Law and Public Policy‟ 
[2003] University of Notre Dame Australia Law Review 4;  (2003) 5 University of 
Notre Dame Australia Law Review 37;  Jeremy Gans and Gregor Urbas, „DNA 
Identification in the Criminal Justice  System‟, in Trends and Issues in Crime and  
Criminal Justice (Australian Institute of Criminology 2002) No. 226;  Simon Walsh, 
Oliver Ribaux, John Buckleton, Alastair Ross and Claude Roux, „DNA profiling  
and criminal justice:  a contribution to a changing debate‟ (2004) 36 Australian 
Journal of Forensic Sciences 34. 
15 Though the privilege against self-incrimination may appear relevant in this context, 
case law has excluded tangible evidence decisively from its scope:  Saunders v. U.K., 23 
E.H.R.R. 313, [69] (European Court of Human Rights);  Schmerber v. California, 384 
U.S. 757 (1966), 761;  R. v. S.A.B. [2003] SCC 60, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 678.   See Jeremy 
Gans, „Something to Hide:  DNA, surveillance and self-incrimination‟ (2001) Current 
Issues in Criminal Justice 168. 
16 See text accompanying n.42, post. 
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searches,17 is affected by the stage at which sampling occurs, the 
threshold for the offence and the means of sampling.   Key 
differences exist between common law countries in terms of the 
populations from whom DNA samples may be taken, ranging from 
anyone arrested, through persons arrested for certain offences of a 
minimum gravity, or after the issue of a warrant in specific instances.   
In addition, the method by which DNA is collected, that is whether 
through a blood sample or buccal swab, may also determine the 
impact on human rights. 
 
A.   The population of the databases 
In the United Kingdom, the United States and now New Zealand, the 
police may collect DNA without judicial approval from a wide range 
of suspects.   In England, Wales and Northern Ireland a DNA sample 
may be taken from any individual arrested for or informed that he 
will be reported for a recordable offence,18 whether or not he is 
detained in a police station or in police custody.19   The equivalent 
Scottish measures are slightly narrower:  a bodily sample may be 
collected from a person detained or arrested for an offence 
punishable by imprisonment.20   Since the enactment of the DNA 
Fingerprinting Act of 2005,21 DNA sample collection has been required 
by United States‟ agencies “from individuals who are arrested or from 
non-United States persons who are detained under the authority of 
the United States”.22   In addition, a sizeable minority of American 
states now have laws authorising arrestee DNA sampling, although 
this pertains to felonies or offences punishable by a minimum period 
of imprisonment only.23   The Criminal Investigations (Bodily Samples) 
 
 
17 European Convention on Human Rights, Art. 8;  Fourth Amendment to the US 
Constitution;  Canadian Charter of Rights, ss.7 and 8;  and New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990, s.21. 
18 A recordable offence is one which carries the possibility of a custodial sentence as 
well as other, non-imprisonable offences in the schedule to the National Police Records 
(Recordable Offences) Regulations 2000 (S.I. 2000 No. 1139). 
19 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and the Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern 
Ireland) Order 1989 (S.I. 1989 No. 1341), as amended by the Criminal Justice and Police 
Act 2001 and the Criminal Justice Act 2003. 
20 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, s.18.   For further analysis of the Scottish 
scheme, see Paul Johnson and Robin Williams, „DNA and Criminal Investigation:  
Scotland and the “UK National DNA Database”‟ (2004) Scottish Journal of Criminal 
Justice Studies 10;  and Liz Campbell, „DNA Databases and Innocent Persons:  
Lessons From Scotland?‟ (2010) 4 Juridical Review 285. 
21 Passed as Title X of the Violence Against Women and Department of Justice 
Reauthorization Act 2005, Public Law 109-162, 119 Stat. 2960. 
22 ibid., 3085 (s.1004(a)(1)). 
23 Alaska, Arizona, California, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, 
New Mexico, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, 
Vermont and Virginia have laws authorising arrestee DNA sampling.   See the 
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Amendment Act 2009 in New Zealand changes the time at which the 
person‟s DNA can be acquired compulsorily to arrest (rather than 
after conviction as was previously the case), it removes the need for 
judicial authorisation before the taking of a sample, and lowers the 
offence threshold considerably.   Once the 2009 Act is implemented 
fully, police will be able to collect DNA from persons suspected of 
having committed an imprisonable offence or another offence listed 
in the Act‟s schedule (such as assault, receiving stolen goods, or 
peeping into a dwelling).24 
This outline indicates that many common law countries are 
increasing gradually the scope and populations of DNA databases, by 
permitting collection at arrest or charge, rather than it being 
predicated on conviction as was once the case.   Moreover, judicial 
approval is not required in the United Kingdom, United States or 
New Zealand.   However Canada and Australia differ somewhat from 
the other comparator jurisdictions, in limiting collection to indictable 
offences and in requiring a warrant for DNA collection in certain 
instances.   In Australia, the Crimes Act 1914 (as amended) permits the 
collection of a forensic sample from a person suspected of having 
committed an indictable offence, or charged with or summonsed to 
appear before a court in relation to an indictable offence.25   If the 
suspect is in custody, a senior constable may authorise non-intimate 
sampling, but a court order is required for intimate procedures.26   If 
the individual is not in custody sample collection must be based on a 
court order.   Furthermore, Canada has even more strongly resisted 
automatic non-conviction DNA collection and retention by police.   
Collection may occur only with a court warrant and in relation to a 
suspected indictable offence, if the best interests of the administration 
of justice necessitate a comparison between that person‟s DNA and 
material found at a crime scene.27   Thus, while DNA testing and 
banking in Canada has been described as symptomatic of a trend in 
criminal justice away from an emphasis on individual rights towards 
increased state control,28 in fact Canada retains one of the more 
                                                                                                             
website of the National Conference of State Legislatures: 
<http://www.ncsl.org/IssuesResearch/CivilandCriminalJustice/StateLawsonDNA 
DataBanks/tabid/12737/Default.aspx> accessed May 2, 2011. 
24 Pt 2B, inserting s.24J into the Criminal Investigations (Bodily Samples) Act 1995. 
25 See Australian Law Reform Commission, Essentially Yours:  The Protection of Human 
Genetic Information in Australia [2003] A.L.R.C. 96.   See also David Ormerod and 
Andrew Roberts, „DNA sampling and database – Australia‟ [2005] Crim.L.R. 330. 
26 S.23WC. 
27 S.487.05. 
28 Neil Gerlach, The Genetic Imaginary:  DNA in the Canadian Criminal Justice System 
(University of Toronto Press 2004) 219. 
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limited schemes,29 despite pressure from opposition political parties at 
the time the DNA Identification Act 1998 was being debated.30   In its 
2009 review of the relevant legislation, the Standing Committee on 
Public Safety and National Security recommended the automatic 
taking of a DNA sample upon conviction for all designated offences, 
but did not address systematic non-conviction DNA collection or 
retention.31   Indeed, the Canadian government is now proposing to 
expand the scheme by taking DNA from any individual charged with 
an indictable offence,32 demonstrating a possible shift to a model 
more akin to other common law jurisdictions. 
The compelling interest in DNA as a law enforcement tool and its 
importance in the detection of crime is stressed in many common law 
courts,33 although in S. v. United Kingdom, the Grand Chamber of the 
European Court of Human Rights noted that most states allow such 
materials to be taken only from individuals suspected of having 
committed offences of a certain minimum gravity.34   This approach 
is particularly evident in the United States and in Canada, while in 
New Zealand, the range of offences is being extended.   The rationale 
for this is that the need to investigate more serious criminality 
warrants certain special measures, and conversely that bodily 
intrusions should not occur in relation to minor offences.   
Maintaining a threshold in this way so that DNA collection pertains 
to crimes of a certain gravity only limits the population of the 
database, and thus may be seen as proportionate.   However, it is not 
apparent that the more serious the suspected offence the more we 
should permit limitations on the individual‟s rights pre-trial.35   Either 
a crime control tactic is permissible or not in a rights‟ sense, and the 
apparent severity of the crime should not be of consequence. 
 
 
 
29 See Julianne Parfett, „Canada‟s DNA Databank:  Public Safety and Private Costs‟ 
(2002-2003) 29 Manitoba Law Journal 33.    
30 Janet Hiebert, Charter Conflicts:  What is Parliament‟s Role? (McGill-Queen‟s 
University Press 2002) 128. 
31 Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security (n.8), 
Recommendation 3.    
32 Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA), „CCLA Concerned about Potential 
Expansion of DNA Databank‟ (May 14, 2010) <http://ccla.org/2010/05/14/ccla-
concerned-about-potential-expansion-of-dna-databank/> accessed May 2, 2011. 
33 U.S. v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc);  Anderson v. Virginia,  
650 S.E.2d 702 (Vir. 2006), 706;  U.S. v. Pool, 645 F. Supp. 2d 903 (2009), 912;  
Haskell and Ento v. Brown, 677 F. Supp. 2d 1187 (2009). 
34 S. v. U.K. (n.7), [106]-[108]. 
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B.   The method of DNA collection 
In addition to the populations from whom DNA may be taken, the 
mechanism by which this occurs is also significant.   In the United 
Kingdom, DNA is taken by police by means of a buccal (mouth) 
swab which is classified as a non-intimate sample and does not 
require consent,36 in contrast to the characterisation in Australia of 
such a swab as intimate which must be taken by a medical practitioner 
or another “appropriately qualified” person.37   In Canada and the 
United States, DNA is generally collected by means of a blood 
sample, while in New Zealand a bodily sample means either a blood or a 
buccal sample, although most profiles on the databank come from 
buccal scrapes.38   In Schmerber v. California the United States Supreme 
Court emphasised that a compulsory blood test after arrest for 
driving while intoxicated was reasonable given the minimal extraction 
of blood, its effectiveness and widespread use, the virtual absence of 
risk or pain for most people, and its performance by a physician in a 
hospital environment.39   Despite the absence of a specific Supreme 
Court case in point, for the most part, a Fourth Amendment analysis 
using a general balancing test has been applied in state and federal 
courts to uphold the collection of DNA samples from persons 
arrested for violent felonies on the basis that it entails a minimal 
privacy intrusion, and because of the diminished expectation of 
privacy of arrestees when compared with the general population and 
the compelling interest in DNA as a law enforcement tool.40   
Similarly, in R. v. Rodgers the Supreme Court of Canada found that the 
taking of a DNA sample by blood involves a “minimal” “impact on 
the physical integrity of the targeted offenders”.41 
If the person refuses to consent to bodily sampling, reasonable 
force may be used,42 although in Canada any “necessary” force may 
be used to take the sample,43 and the blood sample need not be taken 
by a medical physician.   Walker and Cram have stated that “the 
prospect of force being used by the police to keep a suspect still and 
to hold his lips open whilst his mouth lining is scraped does seem to 
 
 
36 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, s.58;  Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, 
s.18(6A). 
37 Crimes Act 1914, s.23WA. 
38 Institute of Environmental Science and Research (n.8), 7. 
39 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), 771. 
40 See n.33. 
41 R. v. Rodgers [2006] 1 S.C.R. 554 (Supreme Court of Canada).   See Andrew Roberts, 
„Case Comment:  DNA database – Canada‟ [2006] Crim.L.R. 866.    
42 Crimes Act 1914, s.23XJ (Australia);  Criminal Investigations (Bodily Samples) Amendment 
Act 2009, s.48A (New Zealand);  Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.117  
(England and Wales);  Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, s.19B. 
43 Criminal Code of Canada, s.487.07. 
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be an extremely intrusive search”.44   However, the limited enduring 
effect on the individual and the usefulness for criminal investigation 
indicate scraping the side of someone‟s mouth for DNA collection is 
justifiable, as is the taking of a blood sample, as long as it is 
predicated on reasonable suspicion which is judicially approved, as in 
the case of Canada, and as long as only reasonable force is used, as in 
the United Kingdom.   In this respect Redmayne‟s view of Walker 
and Cram‟s approach as unduly rigid seems persuasive, on the basis 
that it would lead to a loss of useful evidence and also that notions of 
bodily integrity and what constitutes acceptable investigative practice 
are not static.45   Indeed, in New Zealand, if consent to taking bodily 
material is not forthcoming and thus if force is needed to be used, a 
fingerprick blood sample must be taken rather than a buccal swab,46 
indicating some divergence in terms of political and legal perceptions 
of physical intrusions, given the legislative preference for the latter in 
non-consensual situations in the United Kingdom. 
The diminished expectation of privacy of arrestees when 
compared with the general population has been focused on in United 
States case law in particular in finding DNA collection to be 
constitutional.47   The rights of the arrested or accused person are 
affected through searches, seizures and detention, although pre-trial, 
the state must provide reasonable grounds for suspecting 
involvement in a particular crime before limiting such rights.   These 
accepted incursions are of comparable impact to the forcible scraping 
of the inside of the suspect‟s mouth or the taking of a blood sample, 
which is and should be permissible as long as grounded upon 
reasonable suspicion.    
 
C.   Warrant requirements 
Many of the comparator jurisdictions permit DNA collection to be 
predicated on arrest and police discretion.   However, the warrant 
requirement in Canada for any DNA collection is preferable because 
of the express articulation of reasonable suspicion and judicial 
involvement.   Judicial approval of a warrant protects the DNA 
collection process from abuse, given the independent examination of 
police suspicions and reasoning which underpin the request for a 
bodily sample.   Limiting the power to authorise DNA collection to 
judges ensures that an adequate detachment is maintained between 
 
 
44 Ian G. Cram and Clive Walker, „D.N.A. profiling and police powers‟  
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45 Mike Redmayne, „The DNA database:  civil liberty and evidentiary issues‟  
[1998] Crim.L.R. 437, 443. 
46 Criminal Investigations (Bodily Samples) Amendment Act 2009, s.48A. 
47 See n.33. 
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the investigating body and the appraiser of reasonable suspicion on 
which DNA collection is predicated. 
Arrest must be based on reasonable suspicion, that is, an 
“articulable and particularised belief that criminal activity is afoot”48 
which has “an objective basis … based on facts, information, and/ or 
intelligence” and “can never be supported on the basis of personal 
factors”.49   However, arrest practices by the police may be 
discriminatory or premised on incorrect information or unjustifiable 
concerns.50   Indeed, it was reported that in England and Wales 
“arrest for DNA sampling” has occurred,51 although this has been 
denied by the Association of Chief Police Officers.52   Regardless of 
the veracity of such claims, the interference involved in bodily 
sampling and the sensitivity of the data in DNA implies that 
collection should be strictly limited to cases where reasonable 
suspicion is established firmly in a court setting.   Though the impact 
of a mouth swab or blood test on bodily integrity seems 
proportionate to the aim of crime control, permitting this to occur 
systematically upon arrest rather than at charge is dubious.   Thus, as 
outlined, the Canadian approach in this context is preferable, given 
that express articulation of reasonable suspicion and judicial approval 
is required.   Indeed, in R. v. Briggs the Ontario Court of Appeal found 
that the “best interests of the administration of justice” standard 
which needs to be satisfied before DNA collection and comparison 
could occur was constitutional as it requires the court to consider and 
balance privacy interests against the societal aim of crime control.53 
In essence, it does not appear that there is robust normative 
opposition to the taking of DNA, as long as judicial approval is 
granted.   What appears more problematic in a rights‟ sense is the 
effect of DNA retention on the right to privacy and on the 
presumption of innocence.    
 
 
 
48 Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996), 695. 
49 Home Office, Police And Criminal Evidence Act 1984, Code A:  Code of Practice for the 
Exercise by:  Police Officers of Statutory Powers of Stop and Search;  Police Officers and Police 
Staff of Requirements to Record Public Encounters (London 2011), para. 2.2. 
50 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, The Forensic Use of Bioinformation:  Ethical Issues 
(London 2007), para. 4.23. 
51 Human Genetics Commission, Nothing to Hide, Nothing to Fear?  
(Department of Health 2009), para. 1.19. 
52 See Association of Chief Police Officers, „Press Release‟ 
<http://www.acpo.police.uk/pressrelease.asp?PR_GUID={C24A0DF6-B7AA-4B5 
A-979B-27FD52310EA3}> accessed May 2, 2011;  see also BBC, „Police making 
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8375567.stm> accessed May 2, 2011. 
53 R. v. Briggs (2001) 157 C.C.C. (3d) 38. 
66 Journal of Commonwealth Criminal Law [2011] 
 
V.   DNA RETENTION AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
The right to privacy is that most often cited in relation to DNA 
retention,54 given the exceptional nature of genetic material which 
determines physical characteristics and traits, genetic disorders, 
susceptibility to disease and ethnic origin.   While the storage and use 
of a DNA profile rather than a DNA sample may mitigate the impact 
on personal privacy, both forms affect the right to informational 
privacy, which is the right to retain control or at least oversight of 
data or material taken from or relating to oneself.   The effect of 
DNA retention on privacy has been judged partly by the categories of 
people whose DNA may be retained, the duration of retention and 
the form in which DNA is stored.   Keeping the genetic material of 
convicted persons has been approved by numerous common law 
courts,55 but the situation concerning unconvicted persons is less 
clear. 
 
A.   Duration of retention 
Until the Protection of Freedoms Bill 2011 is enacted, indefinite retention 
of DNA may occur in England, Wales and Northern Ireland after 
genetic material is collected upon arrest, regardless of whether the 
individual is charged or prosecuted or not.56   Such retention must 
have been for the purposes of the prevention and detection of crime;  
the investigation of an offence;  or the conduct of a prosecution.   
When challenged, the European Court of Human Rights found in  
S. v. United Kingdom that this “blanket and indiscriminate” retention of 
DNA violated the right to privacy and family life under Article 8 of 
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the European Convention on Human Rights,57 and thus a more 
restrictive model is currently being debated in the Protection of Freedoms 
Bill.   The bill, as it stands at the time of writing (May 2011), permits 
non-conviction DNA retention for three years in the case of arrest 
for certain serious offences.58   This may be extended for two years 
on application to a magistrates‟ court, with an appeal against this 
decision being permitted to the Crown Court.59   Although material 
may be retained pending investigation or proceedings, it must be 
deleted after acquittal or discontinuance of proceedings for minor 
offences.60 
In contrast to the scheme impugned in S. v. United Kingdom, 
specific time frames are provided in Scotland, Australia and New 
Zealand, and will soon be in England and Wales.   Retention of 
genetic samples is permitted in Scotland only where there has been a 
prosecution, and only in relation to certain sexual or violent 
allegations,61 and this found favour in the European Court.62   In 
other words, retention is permitted if proceedings have been 
instituted rather than after arrest or charge, and this applies to a 
limited range of more serious offences.   Indefinite retention of DNA 
without conviction is not allowed per se;  according to the Criminal 
Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 the destruction date is three years 
following the conclusion of proceedings and a sheriff may extend this 
for no more than two years,63 and nothing prevents recurring police 
applications to amend further this date.   In Australia, the material 
must be destroyed as soon as practicable after 12 months from the 
taking of the sample if proceedings have not been instituted or have 
been discontinued, or if the person has been acquitted and no appeal 
is lodged or the appeal is withdrawn, unless there is an outstanding 
arrest warrant for the person from whom the sample was taken.64   
Once such a warrant lapses the material must be destroyed, or if the 
person is apprehended destruction must occur within 12 months.65   
Furthermore, on application by a constable or the Director of Public 
Prosecutions, a magistrate may extend retention for 12 months if 
there are special reasons for doing so, and such an extension may be 
 
 
57 S. v. U.K. (n.7), [119].    
58 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.63F, as inserted by the Protection of  
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59 ibid. 
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Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2006.   The list of these is contained in s.19A6. 
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given more than once.66   In New Zealand, a sample must be 
destroyed as soon as practicable after a DNA profile is obtained from 
it, and records of analysis must be destroyed as soon as practicable 
within two months of taking the sample, if the person is not charged, 
if the charge is withdrawn or the person is acquitted.67   A district 
court judge may extend this on police application by increments of six 
months if good reason remains to suspect the person of committing a 
relevant offence or if retention of the samples and records is 
important to the investigation or to related criminal proceedings.68 
Under the Canadian Criminal Code, bodily substances taken under 
warrant will be destroyed “without delay” if a match is not found 
between the suspect‟s DNA and the material from the crime scene or 
if the person is finally acquitted, or will be destroyed within a year if 
proceedings are discontinued.69   An exception may be made to this 
by order of a provincial court judge if the bodily substances or results 
might reasonably be required in an investigation or prosecution of the 
suspect or of someone else in relation to the suspected offence.70   In 
essence, the judge in this instance determines the appropriate 
retention period.   The Canadian government is now proposing to 
expand this scheme, to facilitate retention after an acquittal or failure 
to proceed with a charge.71   In the United States, the DNA 
Fingerprinting Act 2005 does not provide specific retention periods, but 
states that destruction occurs on receipt of a court order certifying 
that the charge has been dismissed or resulted in an acquittal, or that 
no charge was filed.72   Other than this, there are no rules relating to 
DNA retention at the United States federal level. 
Indefinite retention of DNA is problematic in terms of human 
rights;  the European Court of Human Rights held that “blanket and 
indiscriminate” retention of DNA in England and Wales violated the 
right to a private and family life,73 and favoured limiting non-
conviction retention to serious suspected offences.74   As noted 
above, DNA contains a range of intimate personal and family 
information, and thus retention engages and affects the right to 
privacy.   This is compounded by the fact that the original decision 
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about inclusion on the databases may be purely a police matter.   
While initially retention in Scotland is contingent on police 
judgment,75 the approval of a sheriff is required for extension of the 
time frame for unconvicted persons,76 and judicial approval will 
similarly be required in England, Wales and Northern Ireland.77   In 
Canada, a warrant is required before collection and a judge 
determines the retention period;  in Australia, retention beyond a year 
requires judicial approval, while in New Zealand a district court judge 
must order retention at six monthly intervals.   This judicial 
intervention is preferable to the police process in place in England 
and Wales until 2011, as it ensures proper judicial oversight and thus 
seeks to protect individuals from unjustified state intrusion into 
genetic privacy.   Indeed, central to the decision of the United States 
District Court in United States v. Pool in balancing the competing 
interests was the “judicial involvement” and grand jury determination 
of probable cause before DNA testing.78 
 
B.   Form of DNA storage 
Whether DNA is held as a sample or profile may also be relevant for 
privacy concerns.79   As previously detailed, a wider range of intimate 
genetic information may be gleaned from the former, while a DNA 
profile is a set of identifying characteristics from areas of DNA that 
do not reveal a person‟s physical traits or medical conditions.   
Moreover, a DNA profile is held as a code which may only be read 
with the aid of technology.80   Of the comparator jurisdictions 
focused on here, until 2011 only New Zealand clearly distinguished 
between the two formats, and requires the destruction of a sample as 
soon as practicable after a DNA profile is obtained from it.81   Under 
the Protection of Freedoms Bill, England, Wales and Northern Ireland will 
require destruction of a DNA sample as soon as a DNA profile has 
been derived from the sample, or within six months, if this is 
sooner.82   Though these policies limit the amount of information 
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which may be obtained, the right to privacy is still affected by 
profiles‟ retention, given the “substantial amounts of unique personal 
data” contained in them, including information about familial 
relationships and ethnic origin.83   In other words, storage as a profile 
may mitigate but not resolve completely concerns about privacy.    
 
VI.   DNA RETENTION AND THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE 
A further right or interest which is affected by the retention of the 
DNA of unconvicted persons is the presumption of innocence.   
Non-conviction DNA databases embody the state‟s suspicion of the 
risk of (re-)offending on the part of certain people, thereby 
distinguishing them from “truly” innocent people who have never 
come to the attention of the police.   In broad terms, this may 
compromise the precept that everyone should be presumed innocent, 
by keeping the DNA of legally innocent individuals on a database 
which is otherwise populated by convicted persons.   While the 
schemes in place in the United Kingdom, the United States and 
Canada narrow the range of relevant unconvicted persons, this does 
not mitigate the effect on those who remain included in the database.    
In S. v. U.K., the applicants claimed that retention casts suspicion 
on unconvicted persons implying that they were not “wholly 
innocent”.84   While the European Court of Human Rights 
concurred, stating that unconvicted persons, who “are entitled to the 
presumption of innocence, are treated in the same way as convicted 
persons”,85 this factor underpinned its final judgment on the right to 
privacy rather than representing a discrete finding on the substantive 
point.   Similarly, little attention has been paid in the United States to 
the presumption of innocence per se in relation to DNA databases.   
In United States v. Pool, when dismissing the claim that DNA collection 
breaches procedural due process as protected by the Fifth 
Amendment, the District Court for the Eastern District of California 
noted that the DNA destruction procedures after exoneration or 
dismissal of charges ensure that “the risk of an innocent person‟s 
DNA being included in CODIS [the US federal DNA database] is 
minimal”.86   However, in United States v. Mitchell the court granted the 
defendant‟s motion opposing the collection of a pre-trial DNA 
sample,87 stressing the neglect in United States v. Pool of “the moral 
polestar of our criminal justice system – the presumption of 
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innocence”.88   However, this reference to the presumption, as in S. v. 
U.K., was inextricably bound up with the right to privacy, and 
concerned collection and the storage that follows rather than 
retention specifically.   In the United States, however, the 
presumption of innocence is simply a rule of evidence which allows 
the defendant to stand mute at trial and places the burden upon the 
state to prove the charge against him beyond a reasonable doubt.89   
Thus, despite the instinctive feeling that DNA retention affects a 
person‟s right to be presumed innocent, the presumption as legally 
construed is not in fact compromised in the United States.   The same 
holds true for New Zealand. 
In the United Kingdom, the maintenance of formalised suspicion 
in the form of DNA retention may pose problems in a rights‟ sense, 
given that, unlike the situation in the United States, the presumption 
of innocence in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights extends beyond a strictly procedural guarantee to encompass a 
“reputational” aspect which aims to protect the image of the person.90   
As Trechsel notes, complex problems surround the application of this 
element of the presumption of innocence.91   Judicial decisions or 
reasoning reflecting an opinion that an acquitted person is guilty, such 
as requiring him to pay the costs of the proceedings or compensation 
or stating that had a prosecution not been time-barred it would “very 
probably have led to … conviction”, breach this aspect of Article 
6(2).92   Moreover, where a court expresses suspicion about an 
acquitted individual (rather than opining that he is guilty), such as by 
refusing compensation to him or by saying that suspicion has not 
been “dispelled”, the presumption will also have been infringed.93   
However, “[t]he voicing of suspicions regarding an accused‟s 
innocence is conceivable as long as the conclusion of criminal 
proceedings has not resulted in a decision on the merits of the 
accusation.”94   In other words, where criminal proceedings are 
discontinued, statements which describe a state of suspicion, as 
opposed to those which constitute a determination of guilt, are 
compatible with the presumption of innocence.95   Non-conviction 
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DNA retention is not an expression of guilt but arguably denotes 
suspicion on the part of the state as to the future criminality of the 
person and his likelihood of re-offending;  in S. v. U.K., the Grand 
Chamber stated that “the retention of the applicants‟ private data 
cannot be equated with the voicing of suspicions”.96   While this 
distinction is not explained or explored by the court, one can 
speculate that it is the absence of express articulation and 
dissemination of the fact of DNA retention which differentiates it 
from the voicing of suspicion.   One could respond that DNA 
retention is on a continuum from the latter as it represents the state‟s 
opinion about criminal tendencies on the part of the charged or 
acquitted person.   If such an analogy is accepted and, despite the 
comment of the Grand Chamber, state storage of DNA is conceived 
of as representing a type of expression of suspicion, then the 
presumption of innocence in its reputational sense may be threatened. 
In Canada, DNA profiles derived from bodily substances obtained 
from a suspect under warrant are not included in the national DNA 
data bank and are used only in the investigation and prosecution of a 
designated offence.97   In other words, speculative searching is not 
permitted.   This contrasts to the situation in the other comparator 
jurisdictions where the DNA of unconvicted and convicted persons is 
stored in the same repository and subject to the same searching 
mechanism.   In the United States, the DNA database is subdivided 
into a Forensic Index of profiles deriving from crime scene samples, 
and an Offender and Arrestee Index;98   New Zealand has two 
separate databases, the Crime Sample Database and the National 
DNA Database which contains profiles of individuals whether 
convicted or not,99 while the Australian NCIDD and the United 
Kingdom‟s NDNAD similarly contain both unconvicted and 
convicted parties‟ DNA.   The Canadian approach is a model of best 
practice by differentiating between the samples from convicted and 
arrested individuals, and by precluding exploratory comparisons of 
crime scene and stored samples.   This distinction mitigates the 
potentially stigmatising effect of DNA retention and safeguards the 
presumption of innocence as protected by section 11(d) of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
An analogy may be drawn between DNA retention and pre-trial 
detention after the refusal of bail which also appears to equate an 
individual with convicted persons.   Bail may be refused if there is, 
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inter alia, convincing evidence that pre-trial release could not assure 
the safety of any other person and the community, or to prevent the 
commission of an offence.100   Indeed, Laudan notes that bail 
hearings cannot be squared with a broad construal of the 
presumption of innocence:101  thus if refusal of bail is permissible 
surely the less invasive retention of DNA must be too.   Restrictions 
on the refusal of bail indicate what is appropriate in the context of 
DNA retention, given that in both instances the rights of an 
individual who is legally innocent are restricted by virtue of a possible 
risk of criminality.   “Clear and convincing evidence”102 or “strong 
and specific reasons” are required for restraining the defendant‟s 
liberty103 on account of his presumed innocence and the rule of 
respect for individual liberty:104  in other words, each bail case is 
examined on its merits unlike the “blanket” retention of DNA which 
could, until at least 2011, occur without conviction in England and 
Wales.   Conversely, in contrast to pre-trial detention, and as the 
United Kingdom government emphasised in S. v. United Kingdom, 
there appears to be no practical consequence of retention for the 
relevant individual unless his DNA later matches a crime-scene 
profile.105   Certainly, the impact on an individual‟s rights as a result of 
DNA retention is more remote and undoubtedly of less immediate 
effect than the refusal of bail, but the incursion into personal 
freedoms that it entails is no less real.   Storing DNA means state 
retention of unique personal data which may also reveal information 
about familial and genetic relationships and ethnic origin.106   While 
the retention of DNA does not compromise liberty in the physical 
sense, a similarly cautious approach should be adopted when 
considering whether DNA should be stored after acquittal, or when 
no action at all is taken, given the potential use of DNA and the level 
of personal information contained within it.   Moreover, bail refusal 
by definition ends on acquittal or the dropping of charges, whereas 
DNA retention may not.   Given that the refusal of bail follows a 
court decision, judicial intervention should similarly be required for 
 
 
100 Bail Reform Act 1984 (U.S.);  European Convention on Human Rights, Art. 5;  
Criminal Code of Canada, s.515(10)(b);  Bail Act 2000 (New Zealand), s.8. 
101 Larry Laudan, „The Presumption of Innocence:  Material or Probatory?‟  
(2005) 11 Legal Theory 333, 337-338. 
102 Bail Reform Act 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f). 
103 Andrew Ashworth, „Four threats to the presumption of innocence‟  
(2006) 10 International Journal of Evidence and Proof 241, 244. 
104 W. v. Switzerland, 17 E.H.R.R. 60;  Labita v. Italy, 46 E.H.R.R. 50;   
Smirnova v. Russia, 39 E.H.R.R. 450. 
105 S. v. U.K. (n.7), [94].    
106 ibid., [73]-[76]. 
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the retention of a DNA sample, as occurs in Canada and after a 
prescribed time frame in the United Kingdom and New Zealand.    
 
VII.   POLICY TRANSFER 
Incremental developments relating to non-conviction DNA databases 
across common law states may imply a convergence of laws and 
policies.   While it is questionable whether these changes may be 
characterised as involving policy transfer as such, which would 
require purposeful imitative activity, certainly there is evidence of 
policy spread which involves societies becoming more alike purely by 
the successive adoption of specific policy approaches.107   United 
States state agencies and projects108 and periodical police literature109 
on DNA databases cite the “U.K. [sic] experience” approvingly, while 
academic commentary reviews critically the English approach.110   
Nevertheless, an exploration of United States Senate and local 
debates indicates little evidence in political discourse or legislative 
debate of conscious or explicit emulation of other jurisdictions‟ 
experiences or policies.   Caution was sounded in New Zealand 
during the third reading of the Criminal Investigations (Bodily Samples) 
Amendment Bill about the “British” approach,111 while in the academic 
 
 
107 Trevor Jones and Tim Newburn (n.4), 103;  Colin Bennett, „What is policy conver-
gence and what causes it?‟ (1991) 21 British Journal of Political Science 215, 220-1. 
108 See US National Institute of Justice DNA Initiative, „Solving Property Crimes 
with DNA in the United Kingdom‟ <http://www.dna.gov/solving-crimes/property-
crimes/uk-experience> accessed May 2, 2011;  Human Genome Project (HGP), 
„DNA Forensics‟ <http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/elsi/ 
forensics.shtml> accessed May 2, 2011;  W. Mark Dale, Owen Greenspan and 
Donald Orokos, DNA Forensics:  Expanding Uses and Information Sharing (The National 
Consortium for Justice Information and Statistics, 2006), 3;  Christopher H. Asplen 
Smith, The Application of DNA Technology in England and Wales (Smith, Alling, Lane, 
2004) available at <http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/203971.pdf> 
accessed May 2, 2011. 
109 See Ken Wallentine „Collection of DNA Upon Arrest:  Expanding Investigative 
Frontiers‟ The Police Chief (Alexandria, January 2010) <http://policechief 
magazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display&issue_id=12010&category_I
D=3> accessed May 2, 2011. 
110 See David H. Kaye, „Two Fallacies About DNA Data Banks for Law 
Enforcement‟ (2001) 67 Brooklyn Law Review 179;  Mark A. Rothstein and Sandra 
Carnahan, „Legal and Policy Issues in Expanding the Scope of Law Enforcement 
DNA Data Banks‟ (2001) 67 Brooklyn Law Review 127;  Mark A. Rothstein and 
Meghan K. Talbott, „The Expanding Use of DNA in Law Enforcement:   
What Role for Privacy?‟ (2006) 34 Journal of Law and Medical Ethics 153;   
Michelle Hibbert, „DNA Databanks:  Law Enforcement‟s Greatest Surveillance Tool‟  
(1999) 34 Wake Forest Law Review 767. 
111 Parliament of New Zealand, Criminal Investigations (Bodily Samples) Amendment Bill, 
Third Reading, (October 27, 2009), Vol. 658, 7495, per Rahui Katene. 
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setting it has been argued that Australia is likely to follow English 
expansionism.112   Conversely, discourse in Scotland emphasises 
resoundingly the differences between its scheme and that in place in 
England until 2011.113  
Policy convergence in the context of non-conviction DNA 
databases is evident when countries resolve in a comparable way the 
competing demands of crime control and human rights.   Indeed, the 
dominant narrative on non-conviction DNA databases has become 
one of risk rather than focusing on the appropriate level of state 
intervention in a liberal democracy, and this explains political support 
for the development and provides impetus for further expansion.114   
While risk has always been of concern in criminal justice, now the 
political and popular preference is for risk control which aims to 
prevent the recurrence of a new crime and to eliminate risk 
completely, rather than management or reduction which accepts the 
inevitability of error.115 
In England and Wales, risk was to the fore in justifying the 
continued existence of the non-conviction DNA database.   S. v. 
United Kingdom prompted a lengthy consultation process by the Home 
Office, ostensibly “to provide a proportionate balance between 
protecting communities and protecting the rights of the individual”116 
though the lack of a rights-focus in the resulting paper, “Keeping the 
right people on the database:  Science and public protection”, is 
noticeable.   The Home Office stressed that any change to the 
existing policy would “reduce the number of detections that DNA 
delivers, and will therefore have some adverse impact on public 
protection” and thus it aimed “to minimise this risk while complying 
with the … ruling” of the court.117   This was an explicit 
acknowledgment that the Home Office sought to maintain as lengthy 
 
 
112 Kirsten Edwards, „Cold Hit Complacency:  The Dangers of DNA Databases Re-
Examined‟ (2006-2007) 18 Current Issues in Criminal Justice 95. 
113 See Scottish Government, Acquisition and Retention of DNA and Fingerprint Data  
in Scotland.   Consultation Report (Scottish Government 2009), para. 18. 
114 This stems from the seminal work of theorists such as Mary Douglas and Ulrich 
Beck.   See Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky, Risk and Culture:  An Essay on  
the Selection of Technical and Environmental Dangers (University of California Press 1982), 
and Ulrich Beck, Risk Society:  Towards a New Modernity (Sheffield Region Centre for 
Science and Technology 1992). 
115 Clear and Cadora contend that risk calculation may be for one of three purposes:  
risk control, risk management or risk reduction.   Todd Clear and Eric Cadora,  
„Risk and Correctional Practice‟ in Kevin Stenson and Robert R. Sullivan (eds)  
Crime, Risk and Justice:  The Politics of Crime Control in Liberal Democracies (Willan 2001), 59. 
116 Home Office, „Keeping the right people on the DNA database – consultation and 
response‟ <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/cons-2009-dna-database/> 
accessed May 2, 2011. 
117 Home Office, Keeping the right people on the database:  Science and public protection  
(Home Office 2009), para. 2.9. 
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a retention period as would be permissible under the European 
Convention on Human Rights, and the definite emphasis in the 
consultation document is on risk rather than rights‟ analysis:  “In 
determining the most suitable retention period, the key question is 
one of risk”.118    Similarly, empirical studies on so-called 
“preventable crimes” have been relied upon in policy development in 
the United States and are often cited at federal and state level, 
indicating the growing centrality of risk in both discourse and 
practice.119   Such reference to science in criminal justice appeals to 
politicians who prefer the expertise of technical scientists who are 
seen as objective and non-ideological, in contrast to the “softer”, and 
by implication ideologically driven, expertise of human right lawyers, 
criminologists, psychologists and political scientists, who are 
neglected increasingly in the policy making process.   The use of 
science in criminal justice is ostensibly “universal, general, uniform, 
and neutral”120 and fits with the distrust of professionals, 
criminologists, officials, and practitioners identified by Rock in the 
Home Office the mid-1990s121 and the pervasive fall of “liberal 
 
 
118 ibid., para. 6.6.   For criticism of the methodology, see Keith Soothill and Brian 
Francis, Keeping Innocent People on the DNA Database (2009), available as Appendix 1 to 
The Information Commissioner‟s response to the Home Office consultation paper on the retention, 
use and destruction of DNA data and fingerprints available at <http://www.ico.gov.uk/ 
upload/documents/library/data_protection/notices/response_to_ho_consultation_
may09.pdf> accessed May 2, 2011. 
119 See City of Chicago, „Chicago‟s Study on Preventable Crimes‟ <http://sccvc.org/ 
sccvc/news/Chicagos_Study_on_Preventable_Crimes03-04-2008.pdf> accessed May 
2, 2011;  „Maryland Study on Preventable Crimes‟ <http://www.denverda.org/ 
DNA_Documents/MarylandDNAarresteestudy.pdf> accessed May 2, 2011.    
See Congressional Records (Senate) July 29, 2005, S9528 et seq., and December 16, 
2005, S13756, per Mr Kyl;  July 14, 2008, H6438 and December 10, 2009, S12904-
S12907, per Mr Schiff.   For example, see the minutes of the meeting of the Assembly 
Committee of Nevada on the Judiciary, Seventy-Fifth Session, March 13, 2009;  
Governor O‟Malley, „Comments on DNA Collection‟ (Maryland Politics Watch, 
March 26, 2009) <http://maryland-politics.blogspot.com/2009/03/omalley-
comments-on-dna-collection.html> accessed May 2, 2011;  „House Judiciary 
Committee Adopts Schiff Amendments to Improve DNA Tools for Law 
Enforcement and Investigators and Eliminate DNA Backlogs‟ (Website of Congressman 
Adam Schiff, June 11, 2008) <http://schiff.house.gov/index.cfm?sectionid=124 
&parentid=25&sectiontree=6,25,124&itemid=276> accessed May 2, 2011. 
120 Richard Ericson and Clifford Shearing, „The Scientification of Police‟ in Gernot 
Bohme and Nico Stehr (eds) The Knowledge Society (Kluwer Publishing 1986), 133. 
121 Paul Rock, „The Opening Stages of Criminal Justice Policy Making‟  
(1995) 35 British Journal of Criminology 1, 2. 
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elitism” in the governance of crime.122   Thus, while collection and 
retention of DNA encroaches on civil liberties, policy makers may 
couch the debate in terms of empirical validity to ensure the 
palatability of such policies.   Nevertheless, the discourse of risk has 
yet to result in systematic retention of DNA from non-convicted 
persons in Canada, but it has contributed to the extension of schemes 
in Australia and New Zealand. 
 
VIII.   CONCLUSION 
This analysis demonstrates the points of commonality that are 
emerging in the context of non-conviction DNA databases in various 
common law countries, though divergence remains regarding the 
populations from whom DNA may be acquired and the length of 
time for which DNA may be retained.   Underpinning this is a shift to 
a risk-based approach, although Canada seems to have withstood 
such pressures to a larger extent.   As the Canadian Supreme Court 
has commented, “The taking and retention of a DNA sample is not a 
trivial matter and, absent a compelling public interest, would 
inherently constitute a grave intrusion on the subject‟s right to 
personal and informational privacy.”123   In addition, inclusion on a 
state database is stigmatising and represents an expression of 
suspicion by the state.   Thus, the schemes in place should be limited 
to the greatest extent in terms of the populations included and the 
retention periods, and should require judicial warrant:  to this end, 
notwithstanding the ability to use all necessary force to obtain 
samples, the Canadian federal model seems preferable. 
 
 
122 See Ian Loader, „Fall of the “Platonic Guardians”:  Liberalism, Criminology and 
Political Responses to Crime in England and Wales‟ (2006) 46 British Journal of 
Criminology 561, 562 et seq. 
123 R. v. R.C. 2005 SCC 61, [2005] 3 S.C.R 99, [39]. 
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PREVENTIVE SENTENCES AND ORDERS: 
THE CHALLENGES OF DUE PROCESS  
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ABSTRACT 
Measures designed to prevent individuals committing future crimes are 
increasingly part of legal regimes in common law jurisdictions, typically 
made in relation to sexual offenders or violent offenders and typically 
imposed on the basis of evidence that the offender poses a risk of further 
offending that is unacceptable.   These measures may be in the form of 
community monitoring or restrictions, or both;  but they may also extend 
to preventive detention.   One of the many questions arising is the extent 
to which courts are alert to the difficulties of making such assessments 
and the rigour of the process followed.   This article outlines these 
difficulties, and reviews whether the courts in England and Wales, New 
Zealand and Australia are alert to them. 
 
 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
In R. v. Boswell,1 one of the grounds of challenge to the imposition of 
an indeterminate term of imprisonment for public protection for 
making threats to kill was to the conclusion of the writer of the pre-
sentence report that the use of “the probation tools” suggested that 
Mr Boswell “presents as a high risk of harm to the public, particularly 
to females with whom he may be involved in a relationship”.   Giving 
the judgment of the Court of Appeal, upholding the sentence, Dyson 
L.J.2 dismissed a criticism of the use of the “probation tools”, 
commenting that: 
“Those tools are no doubt the product … of a good deal of 
research and provide a satisfactory basis for reaching 
conclusions of the kind that were reached in this case.”3 
Despite this case involving the potential imprisonment for life of the 
defendant, there is no display even of intellectual curiosity into the 
“probation tools”.4   Such tools, and sentences or court orders that 
are designed to respond to the risk of future offending, are becoming 
a significant part of the criminal justice system, particularly in relation 
to violent or sexual offending. 
 
 
* Barrister (Inner Temple);  Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Auckland 
1 [2007] EWCA Crim. 1587. 
2 Now Lord Dyson J.S.C. 
3 Boswell (n.1), [12]. 
4 Which would probably have included the Offender Assessment System (OASys):  
this is mentioned further post. 
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The central function of the criminal court involves looking back 
to determine whether the crime occurred, and, if it did, to pass a 
sentence to mark the essentially backward-looking feature of 
punishment.   It has always been the case that the sentencing function 
would also look to the future:  the obvious example is deterrence.5   
But an aspect of sentencing that has grown in prominence is the need 
to protect the public, which involves the court looking forwards:  so 
section 142(1)(d) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 expressly refers to 
public protection as a purpose of sentencing in England and Wales, 
as does section 7(1)(g) of the Sentencing Act 2002 for New Zealand.   
Since public protection should follow from deterrence and also from 
the positive effects of rehabilitative programmes in a prison setting, it 
can be taken that these statutory references to public protection are 
designed to cover the incapacitation of the offender. 
The growing prominence of this function of protecting the public 
from future crime mirrors the recognition that the state has a duty to 
protect that entails not just the deterrent effect of the criminal law but 
also an obligation to take specific operational steps when there is a 
known risk of criminal behaviour.   Whilst the latter duty comes 
complete with an acceptance that it is only in limited circumstances 
that it arises, because of the difficulty of predicting human behaviour, 
the use of preventive sentences and orders has proceeded on the basis 
that it is possible to identify future violence to a degree of certainty that 
makes it appropriate for a court to make a coercive order. 
This article examines two overlapping issues that arise in this 
context.   The first is the approach to the question of preventive 
detention or control and its relationship with the duty to protect:  it is 
suggested that the use of preventive regimes in the criminal process 
arises primarily from a power to protect rather than from the duty;  
and that consequently the touchstone is whether the use of the power 
is arbitrary in any particular situation.    
The second is the approach that should be adopted by courts to 
the evidence presented in relation to the risk assessment questions 
behind the imposition of preventive orders.   It is suggested that the 
limitations on the duty to protect must be borne in mind at this stage 
because, in order to achieve due process or fairness and avoid 
arbitrariness, the difficulty of prediction is relevant.   It is noted that 
the courts in jurisdictions which often compare themselves in terms 
of standards of due process have adopted markedly different 
approaches;  and it is suggested that the courts of New Zealand have 
 
 
5 The purposes may be developed by the judiciary, but it is increasingly likely that 
they will have been given a statutory basis as legislatures have taken it as their task to 
provide frameworks for the judiciary.   See, for example, the Criminal Justice Act 2003 
(U.K.), s.142,  or the Sentencing Act 2002 (N.Z.), s.7. 
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developed an approach that is more likely to secure due process.   It 
will be suggested that the needs of due process mean that there 
should be a much more cautious acceptance of the results of the risk 
assessment tools as a guide for judgment than the large measure of 
deference accorded them by Dyson L.J. in Boswell. 
 
II.   PREDICTING THE FUTURE:  THE BACKGROUND 
A.   Context  
Whilst much judicial work involves assessing what is proved to have 
happened in the past (a finding of what is most likely to have 
happened in the past), it is also common for judges to have to predict 
the future and to assess what is likely to happen.   There are many 
examples of this in a criminal or quasi-criminal context.   So, in bail 
hearings, questions will arise as to the risk of the defendant 
absconding (itself typically an offence) or further offending, including 
by way of interfering with witnesses in a manner that would be 
criminal.   In these situations, a judgment has to be made as to the 
future and as to whether the deterrent effect of a further penalty is 
adequate to prevent the undesirable outcome.   Similarly, if a person 
poses a risk to others on the basis of a mental disorder, there are 
regimes in place in most jurisdictions to allow preventive detention 
rather than requiring the relevant authorities to wait for a criminal act 
to occur:  in such a case, it may be that the deterrent effect of the 
criminal process (including such matters as findings of unfitness to 
stand trial followed by a process to determine whether the actus reus 
was committed) is not of any real weight.    
Of course, the desire to prevent harm is understandable.   That is, 
no doubt, the motive behind the growth of regimes allowing 
protective actions to be taken against those who are judged to pose a 
risk of future criminality, particularly in relation to violent or sexual 
offending.   It is difficult to argue against preventive action being 
taken in such a case, extending to deprivation of liberty if necessary, 
but subject to the obvious caveat that there must be adequate 
satisfaction as to the risk of future criminality.   This will not arise 
solely from the fact that the person has perpetrated an offence in the 
past. 
International human rights standards are of relevance in this 
context;  these allow preventive detention.   Under Article 5(1) of the 
European Convention on Human Rights 1950,6 detention is 
 
 
6 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (ETS No. 5, November 4, 1950) 
<http://www.conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm> last accessed 
April 20, 2011. 
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permissible only in certain circumstances, but those include a 
collection of situations in Article 5(1)(e) – including alcoholism and 
mental disorder – that have been noted to have a theme of public 
protection.   So in Litwa v. Poland,7 the European Court of Human 
Rights noted that “a predominant reason why the convention allows 
the persons mentioned in paragraph (1)(e) of Article 5 to be deprived 
of their liberty is not only that they are dangerous for public safety 
but also that their own interests may necessitate their detention”.8   
The underlying motif of Article 5 is that it is designed to prevent 
detention that is arbitrary:9  this is the standard that is applicable 
under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,10 the 
United Nations‟ equivalent to the European Convention on Human 
Rights, Article 9(1) of which provides that detention must follow a 
lawful procedure and cannot be arbitrary.    
Groups against whom preventive action is taken may be unlikely 
to evoke public sympathy.   This is certainly the case in the current 
era, in which punitive notions seem to have captured the public 
mood.   However, the strength of a legal system is often assessed by 
its ability to give effect to the fundamental rights of unpopular 
groups.   Cases where courts have failed to recall this become 
notorious.   For example, the House of Lords sitting during the 
Second World War in Liversidge v. Anderson11 interpreted a requirement 
that the Home Secretary should have “reasonable cause” to categorise 
someone as hostile to the United Kingdom as preventing any court 
review beyond establishing the good faith of the Home Secretary.   
Lord Atkin dissented, noting that the need for “reasonable cause” 
imported the language of objective justification into which the courts  
 
 
 
 
7 33 E.H.R.R. 53, [2000] M.H.L.R. 226, at [60]. 
8 Also of potential relevance here is Art. 5(1)(b), which allows detention to secure the 
fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law:  there is limited case law on this 
provision, and it may be that it requires a specific obligation rather than a more 
general obligation such as the need to obey the criminal law.   In relation to the need 
for a restrictive interpretation, see Engel v. The Netherlands (No. 1), 1 E.H.R.R. 647 
(European Court of Human Rights). 
9 There are many examples of this:  one of them is H.L. v. U.K ., 40 E.H.R.R. 761, 
[2004] M.H.L.R. 236 (European Court of Human Rights). 
10 U.N. Treaty No I-14688, adopted and opened for signature, ratification and 
accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966;  
entry into force March 23, 1976, in accordance with Article 49 (35 signatures);  
available at <http://treaties.un.org> last accessed April 7, 2011, or at 
<http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm> last accessed April 7, 2011.  
11 [1942] A.C. 206. 
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could inquire.12   It is now accepted that the majority in the case were 
wrong.13  
 
B.   History 
Given the attractiveness of preventing harm before it has happened, 
it is not surprising that it has been tried in the past.   It has been 
found to be problematic.   So, from the 1930s onwards, more than 
half of the states of the United States of America introduced 
legislation to deal with “sexual psychopaths”, broadly those with an 
unstable personality who were unable to comply with social norms 
and laws and had a compulsion to commit sexual offences.14   At the 
same time, statutes authorised action to prevent harm to society in 
other contexts, including to prevent the birth of children who would 
grow up to be a burden on society.   Such eugenic statutes were 
common in the United States, and they passed constitutional muster:  
in Buck v. Bell15 the Supreme Court upheld the Virginia Eugenical 
Sterlization Act 1924, which rested on the view that the science behind 
eugenics was adequately established.16 
 
 
12 In an unusually caustic comment about his colleagues, Lord Atkin said, at 244:  “I 
view with apprehension the attitude of judges who on a mere question of 
construction when face to face with claims involving the liberty of the subject show 
themselves more executive minded than the executive.   Their function is to give 
words their natural meaning, not, perhaps in war time leaning towards liberty … .   In 
this country, amid the clash of arms, the laws are not silent.   They may be changed, 
but they speak the same language in war as in peace.   It has always been one of the 
pillars of freedom … that the judges … stand between the subject and any attempted 
encroachments on his liberty by the executive, alert to see that any coercive action is 
justified in law.   In this case, I have listened to arguments which might have been 
addressed acceptably to the Court of King‟s Bench in the time of Charles I.” 
13 See Beatson, Matthews and Elliot, Administrative Law, Text and Materials (3rd edn, 
Oxford University Press 2005), 75:  “Although Liversidge v. Anderson has never been 
overruled, it is perfectly clear that Lord Atkin‟s dissenting view is today regarded as 
the correct one…”.   In Khawaja v. Secretary of State [1984] A.C. 74 (House of Lords), 
Lord Bridge speaks of the “now celebrated” dissent of Lord Atkin, and Lord 
Scarman comments that “The classic dissent of Lord Atkin … is now accepted … as 
correct … in its declaration of legal principle.” 
14 For a description, see John Kip Cornwell, „Protection and Treatment:  The 
Permissible Civil Detention of Sexual Predators‟ 53 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1293.   See 
also John M. Fabian, „Kansas v. Hendricks, Crane and Beyond‟ (2003) 29 William 
Mitchell Law Review 1367. 
15 (1927) 274 U.S. 200. 
16 Virginia Acts of Assembly 1924, ch. 394, preamble:  “… both the health of the 
individual patient and the welfare of society may be promoted in certain cases by the 
sterilization of mental defectives under careful safeguard and by competent and 
conscientious authority;  and … human experience has demonstrated that heredity 
plays an important part in the transmission of insanity, idiocy, imbecility, epilepsy and 
crime …”. 
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The preventive detention statutes relating to sexual psychopaths 
were all largely repealed by the end of the 1980s “principally due to 
concerns about civil rights and the apparent lack of success of sex-
offender treatment programs”.17   The eugenical sterilisation statutes 
also fell into disuse or were repealed. 
Civil rights arguments from the United States are also important 
for another reason.   Baxstrom v. Herold18 involved the propriety of 
detention of Mr Baxstrom in a prison hospital after the end of his 
sentence.   It was found to be unconstitutional because the process 
followed (certification by a doctor) was not as stringent as that 
applicable to a person being detained from the community (jury trial):  
as such, there was differential treatment that breached the equal 
protection provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.19   The significance of the case for present 
purposes is its consequences and the research into those 
consequences.   In the first place, many patients were transferred to 
civil mental hospitals and often then released;20  secondly, there was a 
significant group of people whose release from preventive detention 
allowed research on whether the claims that they were dangerous 
were borne out.   The recidivism rate in relation to violent offending 
was found to be 11 per cent (though it is to be noted that about a 
third of the patients remained detained in civil hospitals).21   This 
revealed a poor correlation between predictions of future crime and 
recidivism and hence a reason to be cautious about the ability to 
predict the future and base action on such predictions.  
 
 
 
17 Cornwell (n.14), 1297. 
18 (1966) 383 U.S. 107. 
19 Amendment XIV (1868), Section 1 “No state shall … deny to any persons within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” 
20 Tony Maden, Treating Violence (Oxford University Press 2007), 28:  “New York 
State realized that 966 other detained patients in their hospitals for the criminally 
insane could petition … on the same grounds and could expect to win.   They gave in 
gracefully and ordered that all 967 patients should be transferred to civil mental 
hospitals within the space of a few months.”   Dixon v. Att.-Gen. of the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania (1971) 325 F. Supp. 966 had a similar impact in that state. 
21 Thomas R. Litwack and others, Violence Risk Assessment:  Research, Legal and Clinical 
Considerations, in Weiner and Hess (eds), The Handbook of Forensic Psychology (3rd edn, 
John Wiley & Sons 2006).   They commented (at 491) that, in relation to the Baxstrom 
and Dixon patients, “Follow-up studies determined that only a small percentage had 
to be returned to secure facilities, and that only a small minority of patients ultimately 
released to the community were rearrested for violent offences.”   Therefore, 
“determinations of dangerousness for the purpose of preventive detention warrant 
careful judicial scrutiny.” 
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C.   The New Techniques of Risk Assessment 
The obvious response to the research into the Baxstrom patients was a 
recognition of the need to improve predictions as to future 
dangerousness.   In addition, there was a shift in focus, from the late 
1960s, from a paternalistic concern as to the treatment needs of those 
seen to be in need, to the risk that they would behave in a manner 
harmful to others, and the need for public protection.22 
As a result, there has been a significant growth in risk assessment 
mechanisms, particularly those making use of statistical or actuarial 
evaluations.   Monahan notes that “The general superiority of 
statistical over clinical risk assessment in the behavioural sciences has 
been known for almost half a century”.23   As there were few tools 
designed to predict violence, the Macarthur Study, in which Monahan 
was involved, sought to collate factors prevalent in those who had 
been admitted to a psychiatric facility and were then involved in 
further violence.24   The Macarthur Study was one of several.   There 
is now a significant number of tools designed to provide some form 
of actuarial score of the risk of future violence:  a leading Australian 
text on evidence lists 29 tools.25   The idea behind these tools was to 
apply an actuarial method, similar to that used in the life insurance 
industry, to information collected about a large number of offenders, 
to give statements of probability of reoffending.26 
For example, the VRAG tool was created from a seven-year 
follow-up on 618 male offenders who also had mental disorders and 
who passed through the Pentanguishene Mental Health Centre in 
Ontario.   The files on those being studied were coded for the 
presence or absence of 50 factors and compared against reports of 
further offending.27   Twelve factors were felt to have predictive 
associations, which were:28  
 
 
22 Monahan and others, Rethinking Risk Assessment (The Macarthur Study of Mental 
Disorder and Violence) (Oxford University Press 2001), 3. 
23 ibid., 7, citing studies commencing in 1954. 
24 Data was collected from mid-1992 to late 1995 on over 1,100 patients, leading to 
conclusions as to what features were linked with future violence:   
„The Macarthur Violence Risk Assessment Study – Introduction‟ 
<http://www.macarthur.virginia.edu/read_me_file.html> last accessed April 20, 
2011. 
25 Freckelton and Selby, Expert Evidence – Law, Practice, Procedure and Advocacy (4th edn, 
Lawbook Co. 2009), ch. 39, „Prediction of Risk Evidence‟.   Maden (n.20), 92,  
speaks of a “Risk Assessment Industry”. 
26 Maden (n.20), 79. 
27 See Monahan (n.22), 8. 
28 Maden (n.20), 82. 
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 the score on another tool, the Hare Psychopathy Checklist 
(designed to assess whether someone is a “psychopath”);29  
 problems at junior school; 
 personality disorder;  
 alcohol abuse;  
 separation from parents before age 16;  
 failure on prior conditional release;  
 history of non-violent offending;  
 never married;  
 schizophrenia;  
 the extent of victim injury;  
 age;  and 
 a female victim.  
The presence of the first eight factors was positively associated with 
further offending (i.e. made it more likely), the presence of the last 
four factors had a negative association with further violent offending 
(i.e. made it less likely).30   The VRAG tool is one that examines 
factors that are objectively ascertainable and on the whole are 
unchanging:  these are static factors, and some of the risk assessment 
tools measure only such factors.   Others combine these factors with 
dynamic factors, namely ones that are amenable to change over time. 
The number of different tools can be taken as an indication that 
this is a developing field.   This has been recognised judicially:  in 
D.P.P. v. Moolarvie,31 Blaxell J. of the Western Australia Supreme 
Court noted that: 
“It is … clear from a number of published articles in 
reputable international journals … that these tools are at an 
early stage of development and involve an area of behavioural 
science which is the subject of some controversy.”32 
It is also worth noting that there are disputes as to whether tools 
based solely on static factors provide a superior outcome to those 
that incorporate dynamic factors.   Maden gives a hint of the dispute 
(and of his position):   
 
 
29 This assesses 20 features, ranging from “interpersonal/affective” features such as 
glibness, lack of remorse, lack of empathy;  “social deviance”, such as parasitic 
lifestyle, lack of realistic long-term goals, juvenile delinquency;  and further items, 
including number of short-term marital relationships.   See ibid., 88-9. 
30 Maden (ibid., 82) notes that the association of these last four with reduced 
reoffending may seem surprising, but points out that the study‟s authors would 
defend it as merely reporting factual trends. 
31 [2008] WASC 37, available at <http://decisions.justice.wa.gov.au/supreme/ 
supdcsn.nsf> last accessed April 20, 2011. 
32 ibid., [41].   His Honour concluded that the psychiatric evidence as to whether the 
defendant was dangerous was based primarily on a clinical rather than actuarial 
foundation, and so was admissible:  [86]. 
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“While enthusiasts argue that actuarial methods should 
supplant clinical estimation of risk, a more balanced review 
concludes that the proper place of such instruments is as an 
adjunct to good clinical practice.”33 
The position of proponents of tools based solely on static factors is 
that, whether counter-intuitive or not, the results from such tools 
have proven reliability, whereas anything dynamic typically involves a 
judgment made on progress in addressing a risk factor, and therefore 
reintroduces the very element of judgment which has been found 
wanting in the past. 
Typically, the tools work by collating and scoring answers to a list 
of questions as to whether a given feature is definitely present, 
partially or probably present, or absent.34   The overall score can then 
be compared against the scale developed in the research that gave rise 
to the tool, to provide a prediction of the risk of further offending.35   
It is important to note that the outcome of the scoring of the tool is 
actuarial:  just as an actuary working in the life insurance industry 
cannot predict the death of an individual, but is limited to saying what 
will happen on average to a group of people with the identified 
characteristics, so it is for violence risk assessments.36   Accordingly, a 
conclusion that a defendant presents a 30 per cent risk of committing 
a further offence within the next 10 years means that 30 per cent of 
people sharing the defendant‟s characteristics will commit a further 
offence if they act in the same way as the group on whom the study 
was based.   The tool cannot say whether an individual will be one of 
the group who will or one of the group who will not.    
It is also important to note that the studies on which the tools are 
based are not 100 per cent accurate.  In the study that led to the 
VRAG tool and its twelve factors, when the offenders were 
categorised into those with a “high” or “low” likelihood of 
reoffending, “55 per cent of the group scoring high committed a new 
violent offence compared with 19 per cent of the group scoring 
low.”37   This is an impressive level of association;  however, it is 
equally true to say that, whereas 19 per cent of those assessed as low 
risk were falsely-assessed as low-risk because they did commit an 
 
 
33 Maden (n.20), 97. 
34 Depending on the nature of the tool, it may involve reviewing files on the subject, 
or assessing the subject at interview, or both. 
35 See, for example, Maden‟s description of two well-know instruments that use this 
scoring method, the PCL-R tool (the Hare Psychopathy Checklist, referred to ante) 
that measures whether someone is a psychopath and the HCR-20 (Historical Clinical 
Risk-20):  Maden (n.20), 88 and 105.   Both involve 20 questions. 
36 See Parry and Drogin, Mental Disability, Law, Evidence and Testimony (ABA 2007), 
276:  “actuarial predictions consider how people similar to the defendant have acted 
in the past in similar circumstances”. 
37 See Monahan (n.22), 8. 
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offence, 45 per cent of those assessed as high-risk were falsely placed 
there, in that they did not commit a further offence. 
It should be readily apparent that the use of these risk assessment 
tools raises issues for the prediction of dangerousness in relation to 
an individual:  the tools are developing, are subject to continuing 
debate within the expert community, do not produce the 
individualised results that courts need, and produce results that have 
error rates;  but their development is predicated on the frailties of 
professional judgment in predicting the future behaviour of 
individuals.   What the courts should do in light of these features 
should be a subject for debate.   The fifth part of this article will 
examine the extent to which there has been such a debate in the 
courts.   But, first, it sets out briefly the framework which makes 
preventive action legitimate, and the relevant statutes. 
 
III.   THE DUTY AND POWER TO PROTECT 
A.   The State‟s Duty to Protect 
The main human rights documents represent an attempt to create a 
framework against which to analyse whether individual rights are 
infringed.   Certain infringements are permitted for the protection of 
the rights of someone else, or of society in general.   The main 
international human rights treaty is the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights 1966.38   The rights particularly relevant for 
present purposes are: 
(i) the right to have life protected in Article 6(1);39 
(ii) the right to avoid arbitrary loss of liberty in Article 9(1);40  
there is also a habeas corpus right to have a court review of the 
lawfulness of detention in Article 9(4);  and 
(iii) the right to privacy and protection of the family in  
Article 17.41 
These rights are replicated in various regional human rights 
instruments, including the European Convention on Human Rights:42  
Article 2 protects the rights to life, Article 5 the right to liberty and 
Article 8 the right to privacy.   The language of the European 
 
 
38 See n.10, ante. 
39 “1. Every human being has the inherent right to life.   This right shall be protected 
by law.   No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.” 
40 “1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person.   No one shall be sub-
jected to arbitrary arrest or detention.   No one shall be deprived of his liberty except 
on such grounds and in accordance with such procedures as are established by law.” 
41 “1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, 
family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and 
reputation.   2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such 
interference or attacks.” 
42 See n.6, ante. 
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Convention is somewhat different to that in the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:  to use Article 5 as the 
example, rather than set out a general right not to be subject to 
arbitrary detention, it sets out a general right to liberty and provides 
that it can only be taken away in a given list of circumstances and 
provided that it is “lawful” to do so.43   But the European Court of 
Human Rights has made it clear that the primary objective of the 
language is to ensure that there is no arbitrariness in detention.44 
In relation to the right to life, Article 6 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides a protection against 
arbitrary deprivation of life;  Article 2 of the European Convention 
prevents the intentional taking of life but then qualifies that in 
relation to self-defence, lawful arrest or prevention of escape and 
quelling of riots provided that no more than absolutely necessary 
force is used, which seems to define circumstances lacking in 
arbitrariness.   Both instruments provide expressly for the protection 
of the right to life, thereby ensuring that it is not just a matter of a 
negative obligation on the state not to take life but also a positive 
duty.   This was usefully summarised by the House of Lords in R. 
(Middleton) v. West Somerset Coroner:45 
“The European Court of Human Rights has repeatedly 
interpreted Article 2 ... as imposing on member states 
substantive obligations not to take life without justification 
and also to establish a framework of laws, precautions, 
procedures and means of enforcement which will, to the 
greatest extent reasonably practicable, protect life.”46 
In addition to a “framework of laws”, it is also necessary to have a 
“framework of … precautions, procedures and means of 
enforcement” so as to protect life.   This may extend to offering 
protection against individual assailants.   In Mastromatteo v. Italy,47 the 
Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights examined 
whether Article 2 was breached when a member of the public was 
killed by prisoners who had absconded from prison leave granted on 
the basis of a finding that they did not pose an undue risk.   The court 
held that the applicable principles were: 
(i) the primary specific obligation arising under the duty to 
safeguard life was to put in place effective criminal-law 
 
 
43 The various forms of lawful arrest listed include “the lawful detention of persons 
for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound 
mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants”:  see Art. 5(1)(e). 
44 See, as a recent example, H.L. v. U.K. (n.9), [115]. 
45 [2004] UKHL 10, [2004] 2 A.C. 182. 
46 ibid., [2]. 
47 App. no. 37703/97 (European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber,  
October 24, 2002) [2002] Inquest L.R. 182, [2003] Prison L.R. 11. 
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provisions to deter offences against the person, backed up by 
law-enforcement machinery for the prevention, suppression 
and punishment of breaches of such provisions; 
(ii) there might also be a positive obligation on the authorities to 
take preventive operational measures to protect an individual 
whose life is at risk from the criminal acts of another 
individual;  but 
(iii) this obligation had to be interpreted in a way that was not 
disproportionate in light of the difficulties involved in 
policing modern societies, the unpredictability of human 
conduct and the operational choices which must be made in 
terms of priorities and resources.    
The court concluded that: 
“Accordingly, not every claimed risk to life can entail for the 
authorities a convention requirement to take operational 
measures to prevent that risk from materialising.    A positive 
obligation will arise, the court has held, where it has been 
established that the authorities knew or ought to have known 
at the time of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the 
life of an identified individual or individuals from the criminal 
acts of a third party and that they failed to take measures 
within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, 
might have been expected to avoid that risk.”48 
The court then noted that this duty might be breached by the 
action of prisoners, given that “[o]ne of the essential functions of a 
prison sentence is to protect society, for example, by preventing a 
criminal from re-offending”.49   But, in assessing whether there was a 
breach of duty, account had also to be taken of the fact that it was 
proper to have a process of reintegrating prisoners into society by 
early release.   The court observed that the Italian system of early 
release required good behaviour in prison and willingness to 
participate in a rehabilitation programme, and a judicial assessment 
that the prisoner did not present a danger to society;  and those 
convicted of certain serious offences could not qualify for leave.   
This system was adequate from the point of view of the obligations 
under Article 2: 
“The court considers that this system in Italy provides 
sufficient protective measures for society.   It is confirmed in 
this view by the statistics supplied by the respondent state, 
which show that the percentage of crimes committed by 
 
 
48 ibid., [68];  the authorities cited by the court were:  Osman v. U.K., 29 E.H.R.R. 245 
(European Court of Human Rights), [116];  Edwards v. U.K., 35 E.H.R.R. 487 
(European Court of Human Rights), [55];  and Bromiley v. U.K., App. No. 33747/96 
(European Court of Human Rights, November 23, 1999). 
49 Mastromatteo v. Italy (n.47), [72]. 
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prisoners subject to a semi-custodial regime is very low, as is 
that of prisoners absconding while on prison leave […].   
Accordingly, there is nothing to suggest that the system of 
reintegration measures applicable in Italy at the material time 
must be called into question under Article 2.”50 
The test for a breach of Article 2 – namely, whether there was a 
failure to do all that could reasonably be expected to avoid a real and 
immediate risk to life of which the authorities had or ought to have 
had knowledge – was not met on the facts because the information 
available did not suggest that the prisoners involved would pose a real 
and immediate threat to life on release;  nor could this be said to arise 
from the fact that one of the prisoners was released after a previous 
accomplice had absconded, as there was no material suggesting that 
there was a conspiracy afoot;  and the failure of the police to arrest 
the absconders was not shown to involve any negligence.51  
The facts of Mastromatteo, in which the central question was 
whether or not the state should have predicted violence and so have 
taken action to prevent it, are obviously analogous to the question of 
whether someone who has a conviction for a sexual or violent 
offence should be subjected to specific preventive measures based on 
the assessment of the risk they pose.   If it is not possible for the state 
to say that there is a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified 
individual or individuals, then there is no duty to the putative victim 
to take preventive measures against the putative assailant.   In such a 
case, the duty of the state is to have in place a criminal law that 
prohibits assaults (or behaviour that may be linked with causing harm, 
such as possession of offensive weapons) and a police force able to 
take action to enforce the law. 
 
B.   Preventing Arbitrary Detention 
If the risk assessment techniques available allow the identification of 
those individuals who do in fact present that real and immediate risk 
to the life of an identified individual or individuals, the corollary is 
that the duty to take measures exists.   The limitations of the actuarial 
tools suggest that they will not allow the identification of such a risk.   
No doubt there are situations in which the risk posed by a particular 
individual is high enough to engage the duty;  but that will not arise 
on the basis merely of membership of a group that is statistically 
likely to offend over a particular time period.   Something more will 
be required. 
But, if a duty to detain does not arise, a second question that does 
arise is whether there is a power to operate a regime of preventive 
 
 
50 ibid., [72]-[73]. 
51 ibid., [76]-[78]. 
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detention.   The exercise of such a power must be weighed against the 
rights of the person against whom the measures will be directed.   
The human rights framework indicates that where the duty to protect 
does not arise (such that there is no-one with a right to protection 
because there is no sufficiently clear threat from which the authorities 
can be required to give protection), society may intervene provided 
that it does so in a manner that is not arbitrary and so does not 
infringe the rights of the person against whom action is taken.   This 
involves asking whether there would be an arbitrary loss of liberty (if 
it is preventive detention) or an arbitrary interference with privacy (if 
it is a form of monitoring).52  
When considering the avoidance of arbitrariness, the context set 
out above becomes important.   The ability of professionals to predict 
future crime has been shown by the Baxstrom research to be limited.   
Although actuarial tools have since been developed, they at best 
produce a result for a group rather than for an individual.   
Accordingly, the question arising from the results of the risk 
assessment tools alone is whether it is proportionate, or whether it is 
arbitrary, to impose measures on all people who are identified as 
being members of that group who pose a risk, and so to provide 
restrictions on both the true positives (who will offend) and the false 
positives (who will not), in order to prevent or reduce the risk of 
further criminal activity by the true positives.   It is suggested that the 
tests of proportionality and arbitrariness also allow consideration of 
fundamental features of the system of justice, which may seem so 
self-evident that they risk being forgotten:  one of these is the need to 
avoid group condemnation (which in a wholly criminal context would 
equate to guilt by association), given that action against an individual 
should be based on an assessment of that individual.    
Another fundamental principle is that the condemnation of a 
person as a criminal requires proof beyond reasonable doubt of the 
commission of an offence;  this can be taken as ensuring that the risk 
of error is one that falls on the state (or society as a whole) rather 
than the individual charged.   Should there be any different approach 
when a person is condemned as someone who poses too much of a 
risk?   From the point of view of the person against whom the action 
is taken, it is no doubt true that the effect is the same as detention or 
community monitoring as part of a criminal sentence.   Moreover, the 
action is taken on the basis of a view that the person is a future 
 
 
52 See Uzun v. Germany, App. No. 35623/05 (European Court of Human Rights, 
September 2, 2010).   Also relevant would be the right to freedom of movement in 
Protocol No. 4, Art. 2, to the European Convention on Human Rights, or Art. 12 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;  both may be curtailed by 
proportionate restrictions, so the same analysis applies. 
92 Journal of Commonwealth Criminal Law [2011] 
 
criminal, and so the element of stigma is the same (and, indeed, could 
be higher since the basis for taking the measure is that the person 
cannot help but be criminal despite the deterrent effect of 
punishment).   In addition, when criminal offences are created on the 
basis of the risk posed by a particular action, such as speeding in a 
vehicle or possession of an offensive weapon, the criminal standard 
of proof applies:  why should it not be the case when the analysis is 
that the defendant is himself the risk (“possession of a dangerous 
personality”)?  
On the other hand, as the aim of the measures at issue is to 
prevent harm from occurring, a parallel may be drawn with detention 
on the grounds of mental disorder, which is long-established to be a 
civil detention to which the criminal standard of proof does not 
apply.   As is noted below, there have been different conclusions on 
whether preventive orders are civil or criminal, and as to what 
standard of proof is applicable to the risk assessment question behind 
them. 
 
IV.   PREVENTIVE ORDERS:  THE CURRENT LEGISLATION 
The final sections of this article turn to the current regimes in place 
and the case law as to whether the courts are applying the basic 
standards of due process. 
 
A.   The United States of America  
As noted above, the “sexual psychopathy” laws that were common in 
the United States from the 1930s onwards disappeared from the 
statute books by the late 1980s, but “sexually violent predator” laws 
have been promulgated in around half of the states since the model 
was introduced by Washington in 1990 as part of the mental illness 
section of the Washington Code.53   The target of the legislation is the 
“sexually violent predator”, defined as: 
“(16) „Sexually violent predator‟ means any person who has 
been convicted of or charged with a crime of sexual violence 
and who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality 
disorder which makes the person likely to engage in predatory 
acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility.”54 
 
 
53 The Revised Code of Washington, title 71, “Mental Illness”, specifically Chap. 71.09, 
available at <http://apps.leg.wa.gov/RCW/> last accessed April 25, 2011.    
The law is predicated on legislative findings that the existing mental health regime  
is inadequate to deal with the personality disorders that lead to repeat sex offending:  
Section 71.09.010, “Findings” of the legislature. 
54 Section 71.09.020, “Definitions”‟. 
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The legislation allows the post-sentence detention of such a 
person (whether or not they have already been released) if there is 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the person is a sexually violent 
predator.55   (Other states may have a lesser standard:  in Virginia, for 
example, the standard is “clear and convincing evidence”.)56   
Detention continues until the person no longer meets the definition 
or conditional release will meet public safety needs.57   The version of 
the legislation adopted in Kansas has been upheld by the United 
States Supreme Court in Kansas v. Hendricks58 and Kansas v. Crane;59  it 
was determined that the detention was civil in nature and was valid 
provided that the requirements of due process were met. 
 
B.   Australia 
Queensland has the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003,60 
which provides control over those who have been in prison for sexual 
offending involving violence or children and are found to present an 
unacceptable risk of committing a further such offence if released, or 
if released without supervision – so the court may order detention 
(which will continue until the order is rescinded)61 or release under 
supervision.   This requires “cogent evidence … to a high standard of 
probability”.62   The matters to be taken into account are any that the 
court considers to be relevant, but this must include medical 
evidence, the results of any offending behaviour work, antecedents 
and information as to propensity to offend.63   Similar legislation is in 
place in New South Wales, in the Crimes (Serious Sex Offenders) Act 
2006,64 under which an order for continuing detention lasts for up to 
five years, but may be renewed.65   See also the Dangerous Sexual 
 
 
55 Section 71.09.060, “Trial – Determination – Commitment procedures”. 
56 Virginia Code, s.37.2-908, title 37.2 – “Mental Health, Mental Retardation, and 
Substance Abuse Services”, Chap. 9 – “Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent 
Predators”, available at <http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?000+ 
cod+TOC> last accessed April 25, 2011.   This is the standard applicable to mental 
health detention in the United States:  see Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979). 
57 Section 71.09.060.   There is a right to treatment (Section 71.09.080, “Rights of 
persons committed under this chapter”) and a review process (Section 71.09.070, 
“Annual examinations of persons committed under this chapter”, and Section 
71.09.090, “Petition for conditional release to less restrictive alternative or 
unconditional discharge – Procedures”). 
58 521 U.S. 346 (1997). 
59 534 U.S. 407 (2002). 
60 Available at <http://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/OQPChome.htm> last accessed 
April 25, 2011. 
61 S.13(5). 
62 S.13(3). 
63 S.13(4). 
64 Available at <http://www.legislation.nsw.gov.au/> last accessed April 25, 2011. 
65 S.18. 
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Offenders Act 2006 in Western Australia,66 and the Serious Sex Offenders 
(Detention and Supervision) Act 2009 in Victoria (which added the 
prospect of detention to the previous legislation, the Serious Sex 
Offenders Monitoring Act 2005).67 
 
C.   New Zealand 
New Zealand‟s regime does not provide for detention but instead 
allows for community supervision of those found to pose a risk of 
further offending, through “extended supervision orders”.   This is 
regulated by Part 1A of the Parole Act 2002, inserted by the Parole 
(Extended Supervision) Amendment Act 2004.68   An order may be made, 
in relation to anyone convicted of a sexual offence involving a victim 
under 16, for their post-release supervision for up to 10 years.   
Section 107I sets out the basis for the making of the order and 
indicates that risk assessment is central:  its purpose is “is to protect 
members of the community from those who, following receipt of a 
determinate sentence, pose a real and ongoing risk of committing 
sexual offences against children or young persons” and the order may 
be made if the court is satisfied that “the offender is likely to 
commit” a further such offence. 
The statute does not set out the standard of proof applicable:  
although it has been determined that an extended supervision order is 
a penalty,69 it has also been determined that it does not follow that the 
criminal standard of proof applies.   Rather, the Court of Appeal in R. 
v. McDonnell70 has ruled that the statutory requirement that the court 
be satisfied as to the likelihood of the commission of a further 
offence is simply a matter of it reaching a judicial conclusion as to 
that, rather than applying a particular standard of proof.   The court 
expressly rejected the view of the High Court that it was necessary to 
be satisfied to the criminal standard that the relevant risk existed. 
Whilst New Zealand law does not at present allow for an 
application for preventive detention at the end of a prison sentence, it 
does have a regime for preventive detention that is imposed as a 
sentence for an offence if the defendant poses a continuing risk to 
the safety of the public (Sentencing Act 2002, s.87).   It requires a 
 
 
66 Available at <http://www.slp.wa.gov.au/legislation/statutes.nsf/main_actsif.html> 
last accessed April 25, 2011. 
67 Available at <http://www.legislation.vic.gov.au/> last accessed April 25, 2011. 
68 Available at <http://www.legislation.govt.nz/> last accessed April 25, 2011. 
69 Belcher v. Chief Executive, Department of Corrections [2007] 1 N.Z.L.R. 507:   
the New Zealand Court of Appeal expressly rejected an analogy with the  
Supreme Court‟s view in Kansas v. Hendricks (n.58), that the action taken was  
a protective order and so not criminal. 
70 [2009] NZCA 352. 
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conviction for one of a list of serious sexual or violent offences71 and 
a finding by the court that the “the person is likely to commit another 
qualifying sexual or violent offence” if released from the sentence 
that would otherwise be imposed.72   Amongst the material to be 
taken into account is medical risk assessment evidence.73   Release 
from such a sentence is a question for the Parole Board, which 
applies a risk assessment test.74 
 
D.   England and Wales 
In England and Wales, there is the sexual offences prevention order 
regime provided for in the Sexual Offences Act 2003, ss.104-113.75   
This allows an order to be made if necessary to protect the public or 
any particular members of the public “from serious sexual harm”:76  
this can be done by a court sentencing an offender for various 
specific sexual or violent offences,77 or if an application is made by 
the police on the basis that an order is necessary and the person is a 
“qualifying offender”78 because of a past conviction.   The order sets 
out the prohibitions placed on the defendant and lasts for a fixed 
period of at least five years and can be replaced.79   Breach of its 
terms is an offence punishable by up to five years‟ imprisonment.80 
The Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 introduced a similar 
regime in relation to violent offenders, namely the violent offender 
order, under which the police may seek an order from magistrates to 
control places visited and contact with other people81 if it is shown 
that the person is a qualifying offender and there is a risk of further 
offending.   A qualifying offender82 is someone who has been 
sentenced to 12 months‟ imprisonment (or made subject to a hospital 
order) in relation to causing grievous bodily harm,83 manslaughter, 
 
 
71 Set out in s.87(5). 
72 S.87(2)(c). 
73 This is one of the procedural requirements set out in s.88. 
74 S.28 of the Parole Act 2002 refers to the lack of an “undue risk to the safety of the 
community or any person” as a precondition for release. 
75 Available at <www.legislation.gov.uk> last accessed April 25, 2011;  see previously 
the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, s.2.    There are also provisions relating to the making 
of risk of sexual harm orders in relation to people thought to be involved in 
sexualized conduct involving children:  Sexual Offences Act 2003, ss.123-129.  
76 S.104(1). 
77 S.104(2) and (3);  the offences are listed in Scheds 3 and 5 to the Act. 
78 S.104(4) and (5). 
79 S.107;  there are provisions for the variation, renewal or discharge of the order in 
s.108. 
80 S.113. 
81 S.102 of the 2008 Act. 
82 See ss.98 and 99 of the 2008 Act. 
83 S.18 or 20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861.  
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soliciting murder, or attempting or conspiring to commit murder.   
The test for the making of an order is that the person “acted in such a 
way as to make it necessary to make a violent offender order for the 
purpose of protecting the public from the risk of serious violent 
harm”.84   The order lasts for from two to five years, but can be 
renewed.85   Unlike a sexual offences prevention order, such an order 
cannot be made by a sentencing court. 
In addition, there is a range of other orders designed to prevent 
criminal behaviour.   These include football banning orders in the 
Football Spectators Act 1989 (as amended), which can be added to a 
conviction or sought on a complaint to magistrates;  drinking banning 
orders made under the Violent Crime Reduction Act 2006, and the anti-
social behaviour order regime, currently regulated by the Crime and 
Disorder Act 1998.86 
In terms of the standard of proof, the civil standard of proof has 
been held to be applicable to various orders of a protective or 
preventive nature:  so the High Court held87 that a sex offender order, 
the precursor to the sexual offences prevention order, was a civil 
order and so involved the civil standard of proof.   But, as Lord 
Bingham C.J. noted, the civil standard of proof was a flexible 
standard and should be considered to be indistinguishable from the 
criminal standard in relation to the imposition of such an order.   He 
commented that the strictness of the standard turned on “the 
seriousness of what has to be proved and the implications of proving 
those matters”.88   In another situation, namely the making of an anti-
social behaviour order, which might result in imprisonment for 
breach and so has obvious analogous value, the criminal standard has 
been held applicable in relation to the question of whether it had 
been proved that a person against whom the order was sought had 
acted in an anti-social manner.89   In contrast, the detention of those 
classified as mentally unwell and therefore posing a risk to themselves 
or others is decided under the civil standard of proof, which should 
 
 
84 S.101 of the 2008 Act. 
85 Ss.98 and 103 of the 2008 Act. 
86 The 1998 Act was heavily amended by the Anti-social Behaviour Act 2003.   See also 
the serious crime prevention order regime under the Serious Crimes Act 2007:  these 
are designated to be civil, but the Crown Prosecution Service expected the criminal 
standard of proof to apply in light of the cases discussed in the following paragraph – 
see the C.P.S. guidance at <http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/s_to_u/serious_crime_ 
prevention_orders_(scpo)_guidance/> last accessed May 9, 2011. 
87 In B. v. Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset [2001] 1 W.L.R. 340 (Queen‟s Bench 
Divisional Court). 
88 ibid., [30]. 
89 R. (McCann) v. Crown Court at Manchester [2002] UKHL 39, [2003] 1 A.C. 787. 
J.C.C.L. Due Process in Preventive Sentences and Orders 97 
 
be understood as a simple preponderance of evidence that the 
relevant risk existed.90 
As in New Zealand, there is in England and Wales provision for 
the imposition of preventive detention as a sentence of the court 
(rather than at the end of a sentence).   The courts have long had 
available the option of imposing a discretionary life sentence91 for 
those convicted of a serious example of an offence for which that was 
the maximum sentence available and who presented to the court as 
posing a risk of further serious offending over a time-scale that could 
not adequately be assessed by the court, so making them unsuitable 
for a determinate sentence.92   In the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997, the 
legislature created a presumption that the second commission of a 
specified list of serious offences carrying a life sentence should lead to 
an automatic life sentence93 unless there were exceptional 
circumstances that justified avoiding such a sentence.94  
The regime was amended significantly by the dangerous offender 
provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.95   Automatic life sentences 
were abolished.   Instead, conviction of one of a list of sexual or 
violent offences that carry 10 years‟ imprisonment or more, and a 
finding that the defendant posed a significant risk to the public of 
causing serious harm by committing further sexual or violent 
offences, required the imposition of either a life sentence, or an 
indeterminate sentence of “imprisonment for public protection”.96   
Release from an indeterminate sentence depends on the Parole Board 
 
 
90 R. (A.N.) v. Mental Health Review Tribunal [2005] EWCA Civ. 1605, [2006] Q.B. 468;  
detention under the Mental Health Act 1983 requires that the patient have a mental dis-
order that makes detention for treatment appropriate and necessary:  see ss.72 and 73. 
91 As distinct from the mandatory life sentence for murder which still applies in 
English law. 
92 See, for example, R. v. Chapman [2000] 1 Cr. App. R. 77 (Court of Appeal). 
93 The regime was re-enacted as section 109 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) 
Act 2000 when sentencing provisions were consolidated. 
94 See R. v. Offen;  R. v. McGilliard;  R. v. McKeown;  R. v. Okwuegbunam;  R. v. S. [2001] 1 
W.L.R. 253 (Court of Appeal) for guidance that exceptional circumstances were met 
if the defendant demonstrated that he did not present as dangerous despite his 
offending. 
95 Pt 12, Ch. 5. 
96 The regime was amended by the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, to give the 
judiciary more discretion to avoid an indeterminate sentence when a short 
determinate sentence would otherwise have been imposed.   The rationale for the 
change appears to be entirely pragmatic:  the regime led to a significant number of 
indeterminate sentences for which the prison system was not equipped, leading to the 
courts concluding that the introduction of the regime was irrational – see R. (Walker) 
v. Secretary of State for Justice (Parole Board intervening);  R. (James) v. Same (Same intervening) 
[2008] EWCA Civ. 30, [2008] 1 W.L.R. 1977, a conclusion that was not challenged by 
the Secretary of State when the case went to the House of Lords (R. (James) v. Secretary 
of State for Justice (Parole Board intervening);  R. (Lee) v. Same (Same intervening);   
R. (Wells) v. Same (Same intervening) [2009] UKHL 22, [2010] 1 A.C. 553, [3]). 
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finding that the risk posed by the prisoner no longer requires 
detention.97 
 
V.   RISK ASSESSMENT EVIDENCE:  THE CASE LAW 
A.   Summary of the Context 
The statutory regimes described above are predicated on the courts 
making predictive judgments that individuals will carry out further 
criminal offences.   As has been noted, this is the very thing that the 
Baxstrom research suggested professional judgment could not do with 
any significant degree of accuracy.   Further, whilst various risk 
assessment tools have been developed with the aim of securing more 
reliable predictions of dangerousness, there are features of these tools 
that demand caution:  they are developing, the methodologies are 
subject to continuing debate, and they all have error rates.   More 
importantly, given that the courts have to make individualised 
judgments, the actuarial risk assessment tools do not produce the 
individualised results that they need.   These features suggest that 
courts face significant difficulties in making assessments of future 
dangerousness with a level of confidence that avoids arbitrariness, the 
standard that has to be met.   However, there are only limited 
indications in the case law to suggest that the courts are grappling 
with these problems.    
 
B.   The High Court of Australia 
The Queensland legislation, outlined above, was assessed by 
Australia‟s highest court, the High Court of Australia, in Fardon v. 
Att.-Gen.98   Kirby J. dissented, concluding that detention on the basis 
of expert evidence as to a matter that was notoriously difficult to 
predict, namely future criminality, was too problematic:   
“Even with the procedures and criteria adopted, the Act 
ultimately deprives people such as the appellant of personal 
liberty, a most fundamental human right, on a prediction of 
dangerousness, based largely on the opinions of psychiatrists 
which can only be, at best, an educated or informed „guess‟.”99 
The majority had no particular qualms:  for example, Gleeson C.J. 
accepted that “No doubt, predictions of future danger may be 
 
 
97 Crime (Sentences) Act 1997, s.28(6).   The prisoner can apply to the board only after 
serving a minimum period to reflect the seriousness of the offence:  thus the 
sentence is of two parts, one punitive and the other preventive. 
98 [2004] HCA 46, (2004) 223 C.L.R. 575. 
99 ibid., [125]. 
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unreliable, but … they may also be right”.100   His Honour also 
commented on the alleged vagueness of the test set in the statute of 
an “unacceptable risk” of further offending:  he dismissed the 
objection, noting that it was a risk of a magnitude that justified an 
order, and indeed it should not be given a greater degree of definition 
than it was capable of yielding.101  
This case was then taken to the Human Rights Committee of the 
United Nations, which hears complaints of alleged breaches of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.   In Fardon v. 
Australia,102 the committee found that the detention was arbitrary, and 
so in breach of Article 9, because Australia had not demonstrated 
why community supervision was inadequate.103   The reasoning 
process of the committee was that “predicted dangerousness to the 
community … is inherently problematic.   It is essentially based on 
opinion as distinct from factual evidence, even if that evidence 
consists in the opinion of psychiatric experts.   But psychiatry is not 
an exact science.”   To avoid arbitrariness when requiring courts to 
make findings as to future criminality, therefore, it was necessary to 
show why other action short of detention was inadequate.104 
 
C.   The English Court of Appeal 
The courts in England and Wales have shown no interest in 
examining the reliability of the risk assessment process.   In R. v. S., 
Burt and others,105 the Court of Appeal suggested that it would be rare 
to have an expert report from a psychiatrist to assist in the assessment 
of dangerousness.106   This may reflect a more traditional view that 
sentencing is a judgment based on the offender‟s antecedents and 
 
 
100 ibid., [12].   He relied on Veen v. R. [1979] HCA 7, (1979) 143 C.L.R. 458, where a 
life sentence - which had been imposed on the basis of a finding of dangerousness 
following a conviction for a serious offence, namely manslaughter on the basis of 
diminished responsibility - was quashed on appeal by the High Court of Australia and 
replaced by a determinate term.   The prisoner was duly released from that term and 
killed again:  this led to a further conviction for manslaughter on the basis of 
diminished responsibility (Veen v. R. [No 2] [1988] HCA 465, (1988) 164 C.L.R. 465).   
The implication is that, as courts may get it wrong by not detaining people who turn 
out to be dangerous, they should err on the side of caution. 
101 ibid., at [22]. 
102 May 10, 2010, Communication No. 1629/2007, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/98/D/1629/2007 (2010);  see also Tillman v. Australia, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/98/D/1635/2007 (2010), which considered the equivalent legislation in 
New South Wales. 
103 It also held that the action taken was a criminal penalty and had been imposed 
retrospectively, in breach of Art. 15;  and it had not been imposed in a manner 
consistent with a criminal process, and so breached Art. 14 as well. 
104 Para. 7.4(4). 
105 [2005] EWCA Crim. 3616, [2006] 2 Cr.App.R.(S.) 224. 
106 ibid., [101]. 
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circumstances rather than expert evidence.   However, the context is 
that there will almost always be a pre-sentence report by a probation 
officer containing the outcome from a risk-assessment tool.107   The 
court also said that it would rarely be necessary to allow cross-
examination of the authors of the pre-sentence report about the 
assessment made of the seriousness of the risk posed. 
“The assessment of risk contained in such a report is, of 
course, an important factor when the judge is assessing risk 
but it is not determinative.   The judge has to look at all the 
circumstances of the case and make his assessment in the 
light of the material before him.   It is only likely to be in very 
rare cases that it will be incumbent on a judge to permit the 
author of a pre-sentence report to be cross-examined in 
relation to assessment of seriousness.   It is, of course, open 
to counsel to make submissions about the contents of a 
report in relation to a defendant‟s history of criminal 
offending and all other material matters.”108 
Further, as noted at the outset of this article, the court has also 
revealed a total disinterest in assessing the validity of the underlying 
risk assessment tools:  the judgment in R. v. Boswell109 contained the 
happy assumption that the risk assessment tools were based on valid 
research.   However, at the time of the judgment, the United 
Kingdom government was engaged in a research project to “improve 
the validity of the offender assessment system as a predictor of re-
offending”,110 which makes clear that the process is very much a work 
in progress.   This, in turn, suggests that a court should be inclined to 
review whether or not the current state of research is adequate to 
allow weight to be attached to it and, if so, what weight. 
Moreover, it is clear that the tools used had been misinterpreted as 
to their effect:  the report-writer whose views were raised on appeal 
commented on the risk of further offending and indicated that: 
“Actuarial assessment tools used in the preparation of this 
report take into account Mr Boswell‟s extensive range of 
 
 
107 Section 156 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 requires a report “unless the court is of 
the opinion that it is unnecessary” (s.156(4)).   Such reports are from probation 
officers and contain an OASys risk assessment:  see Arnott and Creighton, Parole 
Board Hearings – Law and Practice (London, Legal Action Group 2006), ch. 4.19. 
108 R. v. S., Burt and others (n.105), [100]. 
109 [2007] EWCA Crim. 1587 (n.1). 
110 See Ministry of Justice Research Summary 2/09, which summarised changes that 
were being made to the OASys system as a result of continuing research (available at 
<www.justice.gov.uk/oasys-research-summary-02-09.pdf> last accessed April 25, 
2011). 
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previous convictions and indicate that his likelihood of re-
offending has been assessed to be of a high level.”111 
This reveals a failure to appreciate the limitations of the actuarial 
tools, namely that they could not make an individual assessment. 
 
D.   The United States Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court has also shown limited inclination to engage with 
the issue.   Whilst in Kansas v. Hendricks112 the court made plain that 
statutes such as the sexual predator laws had to ensure that proper 
procedures and evidentiary standards were applied, it has also 
accepted that the difficulty of prediction does not mean that it is 
beyond the function of a court.   So, in Jurek v. Texas,113 the court 
upheld the validity of a provision in the Texas death penalty law to 
the effect that a finding that a defendant would pose a continuing 
threat to society from the probability of further criminal acts could be 
made, as an aggravating factor relevant to the imposition of the death 
penalty.   It was noted that: 
“It is, of course, not easy to predict future behaviour.   The 
fact that such a determination is difficult, however, does not 
mean that it cannot be made.”114 
Slobogin and others115 have commented that this authority suggests 
that any contention that the lack of predictive accuracy in the risk 
assessment tools means that detention is improper is likely to be 
rejected, should the question reach the Supreme Court. 
 
E.   The New Zealand Court of Appeal 
The New Zealand Court of Appeal is one court that has grappled 
with the question of risk assessment evidence in some detail.   This 
occurred in R. v. Peta,116 which revealed a number of the problems 
that can arise.   The case was an appeal against the imposition of an 
extended supervision order (ante, p.94).   It was found that an 
actuarial tool used to assist the risk assessment process had been 
poorly scored, misinterpreted by the report writer, and then not 
explained properly to the court.117   The trial judge had given 
 
 
111 R. v. Boswell (n.109), [6]. 
112 n.58.   See also Kansas v. Crane (n.59). 
113 428 US 262 (1976). 
114 ibid., 274-5.   The court noted that the future has to be predicted all the time, for 
example in decisions as to bail. 
115 Law and the Mental Health System (5th edn, St Paul, Thompson West, 2009), 695. 
116 [2007] NZCA 28, [2007] 2 N.Z.L.R. 627. 
117 ibid., [62] et seq., for what the court describes as “disturbing” errors when the 
expert report was reviewed by a more senior official in the Department of 
Corrections for the purposes of the appeal. 
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inadequate reasons, and appeared to rely only on static factors 
referenced in the expert report rather than giving allowance for any of 
the dynamic factors capable of change over time.   The Court of 
Appeal therefore heard further evidence, and gave detailed reasons 
for its conclusions.   It found that an order was not required. 
The court concluded that “… there are well-validated actuarial 
measures that can help distinguish between higher and lower risk 
offenders”, and that “[s]uch measures are now augmented by 
standardised approaches to assessing dynamic risk factors” through 
another tool used in New Zealand.118   However, it is worth noting 
that the context was that the prosecution and defence experts agreed 
that actuarial risk assessments were more accurate than non-
structured clinical assessments “despite the limitations of those 
instruments”,119 and they endorsed the use of both static and dynamic 
factors.   Other experts on risk assessment, as has been adverted to 
above, have concerns about the use of anything other than static 
factors. 
As to the limitations in the risk instruments, the Court of Appeal 
noted that “risk is contingent on a variety of factors that are difficult 
or impossible to predict with certainty”, and so “the utility of tools 
such as ASRS [Automated Sexual Recidivism Scale] and SONAR [Sex 
Offender Needs Assessment Rating] is only realised when they are 
properly administered, scored and integrated with other relevant 
information known to relate to the risk of reoffending”.   Therefore, 
the other relevant information should be included, as well as any 
recognisable contingencies that influence the level of risk.120  
What is clear from this is that the Court of Appeal accepted that 
there might well be significant reasons to challenge risk assessment 
evidence.   Indeed, the court expressed surprise that it was unusual 
for counter-evidence to be called by defendants as to the factors 
relevant to the imposition of an order.121 
 
F.   Outline of Concerns about Risk Assessment Evidence 
Whilst it is welcome that the New Zealand Court of Appeal adopted 
an approach of acceptance of the difficulties that might be present in 
relation to the process of assessing future dangerousness, it may be 
asked whether it goes far enough.   If evidence is of a nature that it 
has to be handled with such extreme caution, can it be reliable 
 
 
118 ibid., [50]. 
119 ibid., [16].  The two experts were psychologists, and a co-authored article from 
them was quoted by the court at [48]. 
120 ibid., [51]. 
121 ibid., [13]. 
J.C.C.L. Due Process in Preventive Sentences and Orders 103 
 
enough to be admissible, or have more probative value than 
prejudicial effect? 
If those tests are met, there is the secondary issue of the weight to 
be attached to evidence from risk assessment tools.   It is suggested 
that the nature of these tools affords many grounds for cross-
examination of the authors of risk assessment reports;  and these 
authors should include various caveats, so that the court is given a full 
understanding of the limitations of their evidence.   In particular: 
(i) The tool will be based on statistics obtained from studies of 
particular populations over a period of time.122   It may be 
necessary to return to the original study to find out exactly 
what the statistics demonstrate.   For example, is there any 
evidence of causation as opposed to correlation (which may 
hide the fact that another factor is actually causative and so is 
the factor that needs to be assessed)? 
(ii) Aside from the question of causation, it is also possible that 
various questions can be raised as to what was studied.   For 
example, the studies will trace the link between various 
features and an indicator of recidivism, but the adverse 
outcome measured by the study may have traced arrests or 
charges or something other than a conviction.   If the 
question for the court is the likelihood of further offending, a 
tool that is based on statistics of arrests or even charges is of 
questionable value. 
(iii) The fact that the statistics will relate to a specific population 
(e.g. Canadian prison populations) means that the question 
will arise as to its validity in relation to the population to 
which it is applied.   This is because there may be different 
features as between populations that are more likely to be 
causative of further criminality.   For example, the population 
on which the tool is based may have alcohol abuse problems, 
or it may not have community support mechanisms or 
attitudes, or there may be other factors that are relevant to 
the likelihood of further offending but are specific only to the 
group studied in the initial research.   In other words, there 
may be questions as to the cultural validity of the application 
of the tool, or questions as to whether the statistics reflect 
features of the population studied that are not replicated in 
the populations to which the tool is applied.   There may be a 
line of questioning available, as to whether the tool being 
used has been validated for the population of which the 
individual being assessed is a member.  
 
 
122 See the descriptions of the Macarthur Study or of the VRAG tool (ante).   Indeed, 
the study may be a secondary analysis of studies carried out for other purposes. 
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(iv) The fact that the original tool was created at a particular time 
may also mean that it has lost its validity because other 
features relevant to anti-social behaviour have changed – 
such as the make-up of society, the existence of policy 
initiatives, changes in the criminal law, and the numerous 
factors that have been examined for their impact on 
criminality.  
These are features that go to the validity of the tool and are 
separate from the professional dispute already mentioned as to 
whether tools should be entirely actuarial or should incorporate 
dynamic factors.   There are then questions that may arise as to the 
propriety of the use of the tool, such as the training of the expert – 
for example as to how the tool‟s questionnaires should be completed 
– and the extent to which there is subjectivity in the scoring of the 
assessment.123   There is also the question of whether the tool has 
been explained adequately, and whether the court understands that it 
can only assess the risk presented by a group, rather than the 
individual in question.124 
A court is no doubt able to adapt its processes to ensure that all 
such questions are asked of the witness or witnesses.   But it seems 
evident that the answers given may reveal a situation in which the 
judge cannot be satisfied that the evidence of the forensic risk 
assessment tool is reliable enough to be admissible;  or its probative 
value is outweighed by its prejudicial effect on the defendant;  or is so 
weak that, even if admissible, little weight should be given to its 
results.   Courts cannot shrink from making these rulings:  that is their 
function as the guardians of procedural due process.   Equally, courts 
should be ready to accept that, however understandable the desire to 
prevent harm occurring, its seductive value should not deflect from 
an acceptance that predicting future criminality is difficult.   The need 
to avoid arbitrariness in detention or in imposing restrictions on 
individuals – even unpopular ones who have committed past crimes – 
remains a core function of the courts. 
 
 
123 For an example, see Att.-Gen. (Qld.) v. McLean [2006] QSC 37, where Dutney J. 
was confronted with evidence from three experts who used the same tools and 
reached wildly different results.   He was also confronted with tests developed for 
populations outside Australia and not validated for indigenous Australians, the group 
to which the defendant belonged. 
124 R. v. Peta (n.116), outlined above, indicates clearly that things do go wrong. 
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ABSTRACT 
This article examines the reforms to criminal procedure which are 
currently being considered by the New Zealand Parliament.   These are 
compared to developments that have taken place over the last two decades 
in England and Wales.   It is argued that reforms in both jurisdictions 
constitute an erosion of the common law adversarial system, in the name 
of political and economic expediency.   Areas given particular focus are:  
case management, defence disclosure obligations, representative charges 
and sentence indications. 
 
 
I. PROCEDURE:  … THE DOOR, AND THE ONLY DOOR … 
Criminal trials in common law systems are supposed to be adversarial.   
This follows from a jurisprudential position, reached over centuries of 
experience, that the prosecution should bear the burden of proving 
an allegation of crime, that nobody should be forced to condemn 
himself out of his own mouth, and that the best way to test the truth 
of a proposition is by exposing it to an adversarial process in which 
the evidence to support it is subjected to cross-examination.   Whilst 
some would take issue with Wigmore‟s claim that cross-examination 
is “beyond doubt the greatest legal engine ever invented for the 
discovery of the truth”,1 there is no doubting the power of cross-
examination to discover and reveal untruth.   The role of the judge in 
an adversarial system is to facilitate this process and to ensure that it 
is conducted fairly and in accordance with the substantive legal rules, 
the rules of evidence and the procedural rules.   As to the latter, the 
sole and proper purpose of rules of criminal procedure is to provide a 
framework for a fair means of delivering a verdict in relation to an 
allegation of criminality.   They are “the door, and the only door, to 
make real what is laid down by substantive law.”2   It is imperative, 
therefore, that procedural decisions are made on their own merits and 
 
 
* Editor, Archbold:  Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice (Sweet & Maxwell 2011) and 
Criminal Law Week (Sweet & Maxwell).   The author would like to acknowledge the 
invaluable assistance in the preparation of this article of Andrew Bershadski, 
Deborah Colbran Espada and Atli Stannard. 
1 J.H. Wigmore, Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law 
(3rd edn, Boston, Little Brown 1940), para. 1367. 
2 Karl Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush (New York, Oxford University Press 2008), 11. 
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without taking a preliminary view as to the truth of the allegation, 
which would be to put the cart before the horse. 
It is trite that promoting or even defending the rights of those 
accused of crime is not a vote-winning stance for a politician, whereas 
being “tough on crime” and espousing the need for a “re-balancing of 
the criminal justice system” generates political popularity and the 
approval of the popular media.   The Criminal Procedure (Reform and 
Modernisation) Bill currently before the New Zealand Parliament, 
examined in this article, is a product of this mindset.   It is also the 
mindset that has dominated criminal procedure reform in England 
and Wales, particularly since 1993, when Michael Howard became 
Home Secretary and turned his back on the cross-party approach to 
criminal justice, adopting the mantra that “prison works”.   It is the 
contention of this article that since 1993, and at an accelerating pace, 
the perspective that has informed all reforms to the rules of criminal 
evidence and procedure has been that the great majority of those 
accused of crime are guilty of what is alleged or something similar to 
what is alleged, that too many of them are getting away with it, and 
that the rules need to be changed with a view to securing a higher 
conviction rate.   Principle and justice have been sacrificed at the altar 
of expediency.   It will be suggested that the senior judiciary in 
England and Wales have, on the whole, not merely connived at this 
trend, but have endorsed it enthusiastically;  and it is feared that New 
Zealand will suffer a similar fate if the bill is passed in its current 
form. 
The primary casualty has been the principle that it is for the 
prosecution to prove guilt unaided by the defendant.   It will be 
suggested that there has been a perceptible movement away from the 
traditional adversarial model in England and Wales towards a more 
inquisitorial form of trial, which has been dressed up with the anti-
septic label of “case management”, that the authors of the English 
and Welsh criminal procedure rules lost sight of the proper purpose 
of such rules, and that, in consequence, a culture has emerged 
according to which it is acceptable to subordinate procedure to 
substance.   The topics of representative charges, sentence indications 
and appeal arrangements will be drawn on to illustrate how justice has 
been made to bow to expediency.   
The article draws attention to the similarities between what has 
happened in England and Wales and what is happening, or is about to 
happen, in New Zealand;  and it argues that many of the familiar 
complaints laid against the criminal justice system of either 
jurisdiction had, or have, little to do with the state of the statute book, 
and more to do with the quality of case preparation, and that a 
climate in which non-compliance with procedural rules is regularly 
indulged by the courts generates a vicious circle of declining standards. 
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The New Zealand bill was introduced by Justice Minister, Simon 
Power, in November, 2010, and is a major piece of legislation by any 
standard, running to 443 sections, and having seven schedules with 
200 plus pages of textual amendments to existing legislation.   The 
author of this article assisted the New Zealand Bar Association with 
its submissions in relation to the bill and gave evidence on behalf of 
the association to the Justice and Electoral Select Committee of the 
House of Representatives.   Numerous other interested parties in 
New Zealand made submissions criticising the bill, the most 
prominent being Dame Sian Elias, the Chief Justice of New Zealand, 
who raised several of the concerns that are developed in this article.   
In England and Wales, the reforms are in place.   In New Zealand, 
they are not yet a done deal.   At least one New Zealander has 
pondered on the question:  “If Britain were to jump off a bridge...”3.   
New Zealand‟s parliamentarians may wish to reflect on this before 
signing off on a bill which has been said to be a bill for the next 50 
years.4 
 
II. THE NEW ZEALAND BILL 
A. The mischief 
The preamble to the New Zealand Law Commission‟s commentary 
to their Bill Plan (draft bill) began: 
“Over the last 10 to 20 years, there has been building criticism 
of criminal procedure in New Zealand.   This criticism has 
focussed on „needless delay‟ and inefficiency of court 
processes, and an out-of-date and unnecessarily complex 
legislative framework, complicated by numerous piecemeal 
amendments over many years.”5 
Under the heading, “Aims of the proposed reforms”, it then lists the 
particular problems the bill seeks to address:  repeated adjournments, 
unnecessary court appearances to deal with matters that should have 
been addressed by the parties out of court, late guilty pleas that result 
in inefficient use of court and judge time, trials that fail to proceed on 
their scheduled date, inadequate incentives and sanctions to ensure 
that the parties progress cases as they should, long delays before the 
final disposal of cases, a trial system in which relatively minor cases 
 
 
3 Graeme Edgeler, „If Britain Jumped off a Bridge...‟, Leagle Beagle, June 10, 2008, 
<http://publicaddress.net/legalbeagle/if-britain-jumped-off-a-bridge/>, accessed 
May 13, 2011. 
4 R.J. Johnson, Chief District Court Judge, „Criminal Procedure (Reform and 
Modernisation) Bill:  Submission of the District Court Judges‟ (submission to the 
Justice and Electoral Select Committee) (February 18, 2011), para. 2.5. 
5 New Zealand Law Commission and Ministry of Justice, Criminal Procedure 
(Simplification) Project:  Reforming Criminal Procedure (December 21, 2009), para. 1. 
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may be tried by jury, barriers to the use of modern technologies and 
an excessively paper-based process, and an excessively complex and 
outdated legislative framework.   It is noteworthy that of all these 
complaints, apart from the generalised one relating to the legislative 
framework, only one (that relating to jury trial for minor offences) is 
directly related to the current state of the statute book.   All the other 
complaints boil down to poor case preparation.   Improved case 
preparation does not require drastic revision of the rules of criminal 
procedure. 
The paper continues (para. 6) by setting out what the reforms are 
intended to ensure, viz. that where a defendant intends to plead guilty, 
the plea is entered as soon as practicable, that court hearings are only 
held when a judicial decision or other judicial intervention is required, 
that better information is exchanged between the parties with out-of-
court discussions becoming the standard and expected way of 
progressing a case, that incentives and sanctions are in place to 
promote compliance with procedures by all parties, including counsel, 
that unnecessary adjournments and the number of cases that fall over 
close to trial are minimised, that all pre-trial matters are adequately 
dealt with before trial, that there is proper focus on the issues in 
dispute, that jury trials are reserved only for the most serious cases 
and that modern technologies are appropriately utilised. 
 
B. An overview 
The initial impression is of a bill that is poorly constructed, overly 
ambitious in the breadth of its reach, yet defective to the extent that it 
purports to be a code of criminal procedure because it omits 
important subjects which ought to be in the bill, the most obvious of 
which are the legislative provisions for prosecution disclosure 
(currently to be found in the Criminal Disclosure Act 2008).   If there 
are to be provisions for defence disclosure, then surely they should 
be, and should be seen to be, tied to the legislation regulating 
disclosure by the prosecution, as they are in England and Wales.6   As 
to the construction of the bill, Part 5 may be headed “General 
provisions”, but it comprises a veritable hotchpotch of clauses 
dealing with a huge range of wholly unrelated issues, some of which 
are pre-trial issues (witness summonses, service of documents), some 
of which are evidential issues (special provisions for taking evidence), 
many of which are trial issues (why not in Part 4 (“Trial”)?) and some 
of which are post-trial issues (proving previous convictions on 
sentencing, correction of erroneous sentence). 
 
 
6 Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996, Pts I and II. 
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The explanatory note issued with the Bill begins by declaring that 
its purpose is “to simplify criminal procedure and to provide an 
enduring legislative framework that ensures the fair conduct of 
criminal prosecutions ..., reduces unnecessary delay and inefficiency 
of court processes, avoids unnecessary stress to victims, witnesses, 
jurors and others involved in criminal processes, eliminates 
unnecessary complexity in the legislation governing criminal 
procedure, addresses shortcomings in the legislative framework 
arising from piecemeal amendments over many years, and enables 
courts to adopt new (and current) information technologies, as 
appropriate.”7   These are laudable aims, and the reference to 
“shortcomings in the legislative framework arising from piecemeal 
legislation over many years” will undoubtedly strike a chord with 
criminal practitioners in England and Wales, but, to the outsider at 
least, it is difficult to believe that this bill, with its shortcomings and 
the bewildering complexity of the arrangements for mode of trial and 
for appeals, will do anything to simplify criminal procedure, whilst it 
will surely provide a rich vein for litigation. 
This article is not concerned to examine the provisions relating to 
mode of trial.   In summary, however, the bill provides for four 
categories of offence (in reality five because one category, category 3, 
is sub-divided into “protocol offences” and non-protocol offences to 
which different procedures apply) and for trial by jury in one of two 
courts, a district court or the High Court.   To the practitioner from 
England and Wales, these arrangements seem unnecessarily complex, 
and they are matched by appellate arrangements of corresponding 
complexity.   The most controversial provision in relation to trial 
arrangements is that which removes the right to elect trial by jury for 
offences that carry no more than three years‟ imprisonment on 
conviction, and which will require amendment of the New Zealand Bill 
of Rights Act 1990. 
 
III. ADVERSARIAL OR INQUISITORIAL? 
A. Case management 
England and Wales 
In the commentary to the Bill Plan, the New Zealand Law 
Commission declare that “(e)ffective case management is essential to 
achieving many of the aims of our reforms”.8   This will sound all too 
familiar to practitioners in England and Wales where “case 
management” has been the watchword of the criminal courts since 
 
 
7 Criminal Procedure (Reform and Modernisation) Bill, p.1. 
8 New Zealand Law Commission and Ministry of Justice (n.5), para. 101. 
110 Journal of Commonwealth Criminal Law [2011] 
 
the Criminal Procedure Rules 20059 (subsequently replaced by the 
Criminal Procedure Rules 2010)10 provided that it was the duty of the 
court to “further the overriding objective by actively managing the 
case” (r.3.2), and it was the duty of the parties “actively [to] assist the 
court in fulfilling its duty under rule 3.2” (r.3.3).   Both the concept of 
“case management” and of an “overriding objective” had been lifted 
from the Civil Procedure Rules 1998,11 which had been made with the 
avowed intent of reducing costs and improving efficiency in the civil 
justice system.   Twelve years on, there is a widespread belief that far 
from reducing cost, delay and complexity, the 1998 rules have had 
exactly the opposite effect,12 but back at the time of the drafting of 
the original criminal procedure rules, the aura of Lord Woolf still held 
sway.13   Whilst borrowing two key concepts from the civil rules, the 
criminal rules went further in two vital respects.   The first was the 
imposition of a duty of active case management on the court for the 
purposes of furthering the overriding objective.   The second was the 
manner in which the overriding objective was elaborated.   In the civil 
rules, the rules were proclaimed to have the “overriding objective of 
enabling the court to deal with cases justly” (r.1.1(1)).   Rule 1.1(2) 
then stipulated that dealing with cases justly included such matters as 
ensuring that the parties are on an equal footing and saving expense.   
The criminal rules similarly declared the overriding objective of the 
rules to be that “criminal cases be dealt with justly”, but, critically, 
went on to state that dealing with cases justly includes “(a) acquitting 
the innocent and convicting the guilty”. 
 
Confusing procedure with outcomes 
So what is the criticism of such rules?   Making a rule that cases 
should be dealt with justly sounds unexceptionable, but hardly needs 
saying.   However, it is submitted that the inclusion of “the acquittal 
of the innocent and the conviction of the guilty” as an aspect of the 
overriding objective has no place in a criminal procedure code.   
Apart from the fact that there is no method of measuring how 
successful the rules are in achieving their objective of acquitting the 
innocent and convicting the guilty, such an objective, backed up by a 
duty on the court to further it, and by a duty on all parties to assist 
 
 
9 S.I. 2005 No. 384. 
10 S.I. 2010 No. 60. 
11 S.I. 1998 No. 3132. 
12 Michael Zander, „Zander on Woolf:  More harm than good?‟ [2009] 159 N.L.J. 367;  
Lawrence West, „Have the Woolf reforms worked?‟ The Times, April 9, 2009. 
13 The civil rules of 1998 had their origin in a review of the civil justice system by 
Lord Woolf, who was then Master of the Rolls (the head of the civil judiciary).    
The reforms are widely known as the “Woolf reforms”.   By the time of the first set 
of criminal procedure rules, Lord Woolf had become Lord Chief Justice. 
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the court to further it, is fundamentally inconsistent with an 
adversarial system of criminal justice.   It effectively obliges the court 
to abandon its position of impartial arbiter ensuring that the trial is 
conducted according to a set of rules for which it has no 
responsibility, and instead to descend into the arena and take an 
active role in having the case conducted by the parties in such a 
manner as will produce a true outcome.   Such is the role of the judge 
in an inquisitorial system. 
Apart from being pointless (because its achievement is incapable 
of being measured), making the conviction of the guilty and the 
acquittal of the innocent an aspect of the overriding objective and 
imposing a duty on all parties to further that overriding objective 
means (a) that any guilty defendant who pleads not guilty is in breach 
of his duty under the rules, and (b) that any counsel who represents a 
defendant who admits his guilt would be in breach of the rules if he 
were to advise his client that he is entitled to put the prosecution to 
proof.   He would also be in flagrant breach of the rules if he were 
then to make a submission at the conclusion of the prosecution case 
that there is no case to answer.   A further consideration is how a 
judge is to further this aspect of the overriding objective when ruling 
on procedural matters, on the admissibility of evidence and, 
particularly, when exercising a discretion.   The reality is that many 
judges see it as their responsibility to take a view as to the merits and 
to rule accordingly;  but this is to assume the very thing that the jury 
are there to decide.   In this context, Megarry J.‟s dictum in John v. 
Rees14 constitutes a salutary reminder: 
“As everybody who has anything to do with the law well 
knows, the path of the law is strewn with examples of open 
and shut cases, which, somehow, were not;  of unanswerable 
charges which, in the event, were completely answered;  of 
inexplicable conduct which was fully explained;  of fixed and 
unalterable determinations that, by discussion, suffered a 
change.”15 
Whilst the first-instance judiciary in England and Wales are taking 
a view as to the merits of the case in their conduct of a trial, and 
justifying this by the need to further the overriding objective, this 
attitude is matched by that of the appellate judiciary who, again by 
reference to the overriding objective, waste no opportunity to 
disparage the taking of procedural points, and frequently adopt 
pejorative expressions such as “ambush defence”.16   Their obsession 
 
 
14 [1970] Ch. 345 (High Court (Chancery Division)). 
15 ibid., 402. 
16 R. v. Gleeson [2003] EWCA Crim. 3357, [2004] 1 Cr.App.R. 406, [35] per Auld L.J;  
R. (D.P.P.) v. Chorley JJ. [2006] EWHC 1795 (Admin.), [26]-[28] per Thomas L.J.;  
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with the duty of the court to manage a case so as to further the 
overriding objective has blinded them to the true purpose of criminal 
procedure rules, which was clearly expressed by Kirby P. in R. v. 
Birlut17:  
“Criminal procedure in our tradition is generally strict.   The 
peril of liberty and the risk to reputation have imposed on 
criminal trials over the centuries a rigorous discipline so that 
procedural requirements are strictly complied with in the 
defence of the regularity of criminal process and the 
acceptability of its outcome.   Rules of practical 
commonsense and flexibility, which have become increasingly 
acceptable in civil trials, must be viewed with reservation and 
care in the context of criminal trials.   The fact that a point 
may be „technical‟ is irrelevant.   The strict application of the 
rule of law in criminal proceedings is the essence of the way 
in which, in our legal system, courts have defended due 
process.   The comment that the argument raised is 
„unmeritorious‟ is also beside the point: cf. Meagher J.A. in R. 
v. Perry (1993) 29 N.S.W.L.R. 589 at 594.   If the matter raised 
has legal merit, that is enough.”18 
 
The New Zealand case management proposals 
The New Zealand proposals have beyond question borrowed the 
concept of “case management” from England and Wales, albeit there 
are differences of detail, the most obvious being that the New 
Zealand bill places the primary responsibility for pre-trial case 
management on the parties rather than the court.   Clause 52(1) 
provides that if the defendant pleads not guilty to a category 2, 3 or 4 
offence (the three most serious categories), the court must set a date 
for the review of the case and adjourn the proceeding to that date 
“for case management by the parties.”   Sub-clause (3)(a) stipulates 
that if the defendant is represented by a lawyer, the prosecutor and 
defence counsel must “engage in case management discussions to 
ascertain whether the proceeding will proceed to trial and, if so, 
making [sic] any arrangements necessary to its just and expeditious 
resolution”. 
As in England and Wales, this proposal, which is very much at the 
heart of the bill‟s procedural proposals, confuses procedure with 
outcome.   What does “just” mean in this context?   The reality is that 
                                                                                                             
Malcolm v. D.P.P. [2007] EWHC 363 (Admin.), [2007] 1 W.L.R. 1230, [31]  
per Stanley Burnton J.;  Writtle v. D.P.P. ([2009] EWHC 236 (Admin.)), [2009] R.T.R. 367,  
[15] per Simon J.;  R. v. Penner [2010] EWCA Crim. 1155, [18]-[19] per Thomas L.J. 
17 (1995) 39 N.S.W.L.R. 1 (New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal), 5;  see also 
R. v. Clarke and McDaid (n.42). 
18 R. v. Birlut, ibid., 5. 
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the prosecution and the defence will be asserting diametrically 
opposite outcomes, so how can they agree on arrangements for a 
“just” resolution?   Or it may even be the case that the defendant 
admits his guilt to his lawyer, but is advised that the prosecution do 
not have the evidence to prove it, and that the defendant‟s 
instructions are limited to putting the prosecution to proof.   What is 
the defence lawyer to do if he is bound to make arrangements for the 
“just” disposal of the case?   Requiring the parties to make 
arrangements for the expeditious disposal of a case is 
unobjectionable, but requiring them to make arrangements for the 
“just” disposal of the case begs the question.   Whilst substituting 
“fair” would not be open to the same objection, this should not be an 
obligation of the parties.   The premise should be that the rules 
provide a framework for the fair resolution of criminal cases. 
 
B. Defence disclosure 
The bill, if enacted, will introduce into New Zealand a duty on the 
defence to identify issues in dispute, with sanctions for failure to 
comply.   Such a system exists in England and Wales, and has its 
origins in the alibi notice provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 1967.   
Apart from requirements relating to the giving of notice in relation to 
expert evidence, the principal steps on the way to the current regime 
have been:  the Criminal Justice Act 1987, which made special provision 
in relation to cases of serious or complex fraud, and allowed the judge 
to order the giving of a defence statement once the prosecution had 
nailed their colours to the mast by serving their evidence and their 
statement of case;  the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996, 
which introduced compulsory defence disclosure across the board in 
cases that were to be tried on indictment, the duty to make disclosure 
being triggered by the prosecution complying with their own 
disclosure duties which were set out in the same Act;  the Criminal 
Justice Act 2003, which amended the disclosure provisions of the 1996 
Act so as further to particularise the duties of the defence and to 
impose a duty to give notice of any witnesses the defence intended to 
call other than alibi witnesses (who were already covered by earlier 
legislation);  and the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, which 
extended yet further the 1996 Act requirements to include a duty to 
set out particulars of any matters of fact on which the defendant 
intends to rely in his defence.   These duties, as gradually extended, 
were to be enforced by section 11 of the Act (as amended over the 
years), which allowed for the making of adverse comment by the 
court or another party on a failure to comply with the statutory 
duties, and for the drawing of adverse inferences from such failure by 
the court or the jury. 
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There are three elements to the duty contained in the New 
Zealand proposals.   First, the defence must give notice, as part of 
prescribed case management processes, of the issues that are in 
dispute (cl.64), and leave of the court must be obtained to give notice 
of issues that are in dispute outside of those processes (cl.65).   
Secondly, at the start of a jury trial, both prosecution and defence 
must give an opening statement (cl.110).   The defence‟s opening 
statement is “for the purposes of identifying any issues of the kind 
described in section 64(1)” (cl.110(2)).   Thirdly, the fact-finder may 
draw an inference about the defendant‟s guilt from a failure to 
identify the issues in dispute (cl.114). 
The introduction of a defence disclosure regime was considered in 
detail in a discussion document issued by the Law Commission and 
the Ministry of Justice in May, 2009.19   A reading of this document 
would suggest to the uninitiated that it is the failure of the defence to 
identify the matters in issue at an early stage of the proceedings that is 
the source of all New Zealand‟s ills.   Assertions such as, “Unless the 
defence identifies before trial the stance it intends to take, the case 
must progress as if everything is disputed.” and “A failure to identify 
the issues in dispute leads to trials that are unnecessarily complex.   In 
addition to increasing the time required to conduct a trial, this 
unnecessary complexity makes the fact-finder‟s job ... more 
difficult.”20 are tendentious and misleading.   What the authors of the 
document overlook is that the best way to flush out the defence is to 
prepare the prosecution case properly.   Later in the document, it is 
said that “some defence counsel ... identify the issues in dispute 
before the hearing or trial and agree to the admission of evidence 
without proof that is not relevant to those issues.   This paper merely 
proposes that this good practice becomes uniform practice.”21   This 
is disingenuous.   Counsel, senior or otherwise, who follow this 
practice do not do so out of a sense of civic duty to keep the wheels 
of justice turning and costs down.   They do it because, in their 
judgment, it is in their client‟s interests to do so.   They choose to 
make a clean breast of their case because they recognise that the 
prosecution do have the evidence to prove all the elements of the 
offence and they decide to make a virtue of the fact that they are 
being “up front” about the issue in the case.    
 
 
 
19 New Zealand Law Commission and Ministry of Justice, Discussion Document:  
Identification of the issues in dispute (May, 2009). 
20 ibid., paras 2 and 3. 
21 ibid., para. 7. 
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Notification of issues in dispute 
Clause 64 (“Defendant must notify issues in dispute”) of the bill, 
taken together with clauses 110(2) (duty on defendant to make 
opening statement before any evidence adduced as to the matters in 
issue), and 112 to 114 (comment on failure to identify issues, and 
drawing of inferences from such failure), is probably the single most 
controversial clause in the bill.   Clause 64(1) stands the adversarial 
criminal process on its head.   It requires the defendant, before trial, 
to give notice “(a) of any particular elements of the offence that the 
defendant contends cannot be proved, and (b) ... of any particular 
defence, justification, exception, exemption, proviso or excuse on 
which the defendant intends to rely.”   While there may be some 
justification for a provision along the lines of sub-clause (b), 
paragraph (a) is indefensible.   Apart from the obvious scope for 
argument as to what the elements of any particular offence may 
comprise, it is not for the defendant to say what can or cannot be 
proved.   It is for the prosecution to identify what has to be proved 
and to set out to prove it;  and for the court (judge or jury) to say 
whether the various elements that have to be proved have indeed 
been proved.   What if the defendant denies identity?   Does this 
mean that the prosecution are spared the necessity of proving that the 
offence occurred?   If the defendant wasn‟t there, how is he to know 
whether the offence took place as alleged? 
Clause 67 provides that, for the purposes of clauses 106 and 112 
to 114, a failure to notify adequately the issues in dispute may include, 
(a) failing to give notice under clause 64, (b) giving notice under 
clause 64 that all issues are in dispute without identifying particular 
issues in dispute, and (c) notifying issues in dispute that, if the 
defendant‟s contention in relation to each were to be accepted, would 
be mutually contradictory.   Paragraph (b) raises in acute form the 
case of the defendant who simply wishes to put the prosecution to 
proof (a fundamental right in common law jurisprudence).   Under 
clause 64, he can give notice that he contends that “all the elements 
of the offence” cannot be proved;  but it seems that, under clause 67, 
this is potentially to be taken against him. 
In relation to these two clauses (64 and 67), it is also to be noted 
that there is a mis-match in the drafting.   Clause 64 refers to matters 
that the defendant contends “cannot be proved”, whereas clause 67 
(like all the other relevant provisions of the bill) refers to the 
identification of matters that are “in dispute”.   The draftsman 
singularly fails to appreciate the fundamental difference between a 
matter that is not admitted (that any offence took place) and a matter 
that is in dispute (that the defendant was responsible for the alleged 
offence). 
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Inferences from failure to notify adequately issues in dispute 
With the development, in England and Wales, of a comprehensive 
defence disclosure regime, came provisions for the drawing of 
adverse inferences by the court or the jury from:  (i) a failure to 
mention when interviewed a fact subsequently relied on by the 
defendant where, having regard to the circumstances existing at the 
time, the accused could reasonably have been expected to have 
mentioned the fact in interview;22  (ii) a failure or refusal by the 
accused to account for an object, substance or mark found on or 
about his person upon arrest and when asked to do so by a police 
officer;23  (iii) a failure or refusal by the accused to account for his 
presence in a particular place at or about the time the offence for 
which he was arrested is alleged to have been committed when asked 
to do so by a police officer;24  or (iv) a failure to give evidence.25 
Likewise, clause 106 of the New Zealand bill would allow the trial 
judge in a judge-alone trial to draw such inferences as appear proper 
from a failure by the defence to notify adequately the issues in 
dispute.   A corresponding provision is contained in clause 114 for 
jury trials.   The court will no doubt infer the existence of any element 
of the offence charged that the defence did not at the due time notify 
as being in dispute.   This puts the defendant who wishes to put the 
prosecution to proof in a particularly invidious position.   Notifying 
all elements of the offence as being in dispute will be held against 
him.   Notifying no elements as being in dispute will equally be held 
against him, even if the court does not go directly to a conclusion as 
to guilt. 
 
Requiring defence to be put before the conclusion of the prosecution case 
Clause 110(2) would oblige the defendant to make an opening 
statement after the opening statement by the prosecutor and before 
any evidence is adduced, for the purpose of identifying any issues of 
the kind described in clause 64(1).   It, also, is indefensible in an 
adversarial system.   It violates the defendant‟s absolute right to say 
nothing and put the prosecution to proof.   This is one of the most 
fundamental aspects of common law criminal justice, about which 
countless thousands of juries have been directed by judges.   The 
authors of the bill seem to have no appreciation of this bedrock 
principle.   Sub-clause (3) is almost as startling.   By conferring a 
discretion on the judge to direct that defence evidence should be 
 
 
22 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, s.34. 
23 ibid., s.36. 
24 ibid., s.37. 
25 ibid., s.35. 
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given before the conclusion of the prosecution case, it departs from 
the rule that the prosecution must call any evidence upon which they 
rely before the defence need say anything. 
 
Principled objections to a duty of defence disclosure 
The New Zealand Law Commission and Ministry of Justice‟s 
discussion document contains an attempt to head off any objections 
to their proposals.26   These are anticipated to be that giving effect to 
them will undermine the right to silence and the privilege against self-
incrimination, the burden of proof and the adversarial process.   All 
these issues are, of course, intimately related.   As to the right to 
silence, it is asserted that this is not a right to literal and continuous 
silence.   The right, according to the Law Commission and the 
Ministry of Justice, is no more than a right not to answer questions in 
interview and not to give evidence at trial.   However, this misstates 
the right at common law, which is indeed a right to literal silence 
prior to trial and at trial.   Requiring of a defendant any form of 
statement prior to trial or at trial, whether from his own lips or 
through his lawyer, is an invasion of that right.   As to the privilege 
against self-incrimination, it is said that the defendant is not being 
compelled to say anything incriminating.   This is naïve.   Compelling 
a defendant to identify that which is in dispute inevitably involves 
forcing him to admit that which is not in dispute.   And what of the 
defendant who does not “dispute” anything, but who does not admit 
anything, and who seeks merely to put the prosecution to proof?   
What is he to say at the outset of the trial?   He cannot say himself or 
through his counsel, “I dispute that I was the person who murdered 
the deceased.” because he has no right to mislead the court, so he will 
be reduced to saying, “I dispute that the prosecution have the 
evidence to prove that I am guilty of the murder with which I am 
charged.”   Every judge will know instantly what such a statement 
means;  and it will only take a jury a split second to work out its 
implications. 
In relation to the burden of proof, the conventional view is that 
under the common law, it is for the prosecution to adduce evidence 
to establish all the elements of the offence charged - it is for them to 
show why the defendant is guilty.   The imposition of an obligation 
on the defendant to say why he is not guilty immediately eases the 
burden on the prosecution.   They will inevitably seek admissions of 
fact in relation to elements of the offence that have not been flagged 
as being in issue, thus sparing themselves the necessity of obtaining 
evidence of matters that they might have had difficulty proving had 
 
 
26 New Zealand Law Commission and Ministry of Justice (n.19), paras 51-64. 
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they been required to do so.   The Law Commission and the Ministry 
of Justice actually concede that a consequence of their proposals will 
be that the defence will be required on occasion to point out the 
defects in the prosecution case;  but they say that “the wider interests 
of truth and justice arguably require that the prosecution have an 
opportunity to rectify its approach if that can occur without 
misconduct or abuse of process.”27   Principle apart, the practical 
objection is that such an approach simply encourages slackness and 
incompetence on the part of prosecutors, who expect the failings in 
their preparation to be pointed out to them by the defence and to be 
indulged by the judiciary. 
As to the adversarial process, a system of pre-trial disclosure by 
the defendant that is supervised by the judge with sanctions in the 
form of adverse inferences for non-compliance is, of course, 
completely alien to an adversarial process whereunder the accuser 
comes to court and makes his case, without help from the court or 
the defender, with the defender having an opportunity to answer his 
case if and when he has done so.   The establishment in England and 
Wales are in denial about this,28 but the truth of this proposition has 
rarely been better made than by Sopinka J. when delivering the 
majority judgment in the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Noble.29   
It deserves to be quoted at length: 
“The right to silence is based on society‟s distaste for 
compelling a person to incriminate him- or herself with his or 
her own words ... [T]he use of silence to help establish guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt is contrary to the rationale behind 
the right to silence.   Just as a person‟s words should not be 
conscripted and used against him or her by the state, it is 
equally inimical to the dignity of the accused to use his or her 
silence to assist in grounding a belief in guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.   To use silence in this manner is to treat it 
as communicative evidence of guilt.   To illustrate this point, 
suppose an accused did commit the offence for which he was 
charged.   If he testifies and is truthful, he will be found guilty 
as the result of what he said.   If he does not testify and is 
found guilty in part because of his silence, he is found guilty 
 
 
27 ibid., para. 59. 
28 See Sir Robin Auld, Review of the Criminal Courts of England and Wales:  Report 
(London, TSO 2001);  a speech given by Sir Igor Judge shortly before he became 
Lord Chief Justice at the University of Sydney in August, 2007, „The Criminal Justice 
System in England and Wales - Greater Efficiency in the Criminal Justice System, 
Time for Change?‟ <http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/ 
Speeches/sydney_timeforchange_0807.pdf> accessed May 11, 2011;  and His Honour 
Judge Roderick Denyer Q.C. (a member of the Criminal Procedure Rules Committee), 
„The changing role of the judge in the criminal process‟ (2010) 14 E. & P. 96. 
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because of what he did not say.   No matter what the non-
perjuring accused decides, communicative evidence emana-
ting from the accused is used against him.   The failure to 
testify tends to place the accused in the same position as if he 
had testified and admitted his guilt.   In my view, this is 
tantamount to conscription of self-incriminating communica-
tive evidence and is contrary to the underlying purpose of the 
right to silence.   In order to respect the dignity of the 
accused, the silence of the accused should not be used as a 
piece of evidence against him or her. ... 
If silence may be used against the accused in establishing 
guilt, part of the burden of proof has shifted to the accused.   
In a situation where the accused exercises his or her right to 
silence at trial, the Crown need only prove the case to some 
point short of beyond a reasonable doubt, and the failure to 
testify takes it over the threshold.   The presumption of 
innocence, however, indicates that it is not incumbent on the 
accused to present any evidence at all, rather it is for the 
Crown to prove him or her guilty.   Thus, in order for the 
burden of proof to remain with the Crown ... the silence of 
the accused should not be used against him or her in building 
the case for guilt”.30 
Many of the submissions on the bill voice opposition to these 
proposals.   These include the New Zealand Bar Association, the 
Criminal Bar Association, the Wellington Criminal Bar Association 
and the Auckland District Law Society.   Of most interest and 
significance, however, was the submission from Dame Sian Elias, 
made on behalf of herself, the President of the Court of Appeal and 
the Chief High Court Judge.   One of the matters she singled out for 
comment was: 
“the requirement for notification of issues in dispute in 
advance of trial and also at the commencement of trial, 
together with related provisions providing for sanctions in the 
event of non-compliance both at sentence and by way of 
costs orders against defendants and their counsel.   I have 
previously recorded my grave concern that these provisions 
are contrary to long-standing principle, being inconsistent 
with a defendant‟s right to have the prosecution prove its case 
beyond reasonable doubt, not being obliged to assist the 
prosecution by volunteering information.   I appreciate that 
some defendants and counsel are guilty of abusing the system 
but, on balance, [we are] not persuaded that this provides 
good reason for the departure from basic principle which is 
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involved in any requirement for advance disclosure of an 
intended defence.”31 
C. Sanctions 
Apart from the provision for the drawing of adverse inferences from 
a failure to comply with the duty to disclose matters in issue, the New 
Zealand bill backs up its case management and defence disclosure 
proposals with a mixture of carrot and stick.   As to stick, the bill 
provides for sanctions to be imposed by the court both against 
defendants themselves, and their legal representatives.   Two forms of 
sanction are available:  ordering a party to pay costs, and increasing 
the defendant‟s sentence.   As to carrot, the bill allows for co-
operation to be taken into account as mitigation. 
Clause 361 permits the court to order the defendant, the 
defendant‟s lawyer or the prosecutor to pay such sum as is just and 
reasonable in the light of the costs incurred if they have failed without 
reasonable excuse to comply with a requirement imposed by or under 
the bill or the Criminal Disclosure Act 2008.   This provision no doubt 
owes its origin to the wasted costs jurisdiction in England and Wales, 
but it goes far beyond it, in that a “wasted costs order” in England 
and Wales depends on a finding not only that costs have been wasted, 
but also that this was the result of an “improper, unreasonable or 
negligent act or omission”.32   Is it seriously being suggested that the 
court is not just to try a case but is to discipline the parties for the 
conduct of their cases?   The threat of orders in the nature of fines 
will intimidate legal representatives, undermine legal professional 
privilege, create distrust between bench and bar, imperil the 
confidence that a defendant should have in his legal representative, 
create conflicts of interest (will defence counsel be doing his best for 
his client if he has one eye looking out for any costs orders?) and give 
rise to satellite litigation. 
Clause 431 amends the Sentencing Act 2002 so as to require a 
sentencing judge to take into account as aggravating or mitigating 
factors (to the extent applicable) the failure of the offender (or of his 
lawyer arising out of his instructions) or the prosecution to comply 
with a procedural requirement or positive steps taken by the offender 
(over and above mere compliance) to expedite or reduce the cost of 
proceedings.   This is an entirely novel provision which has no 
precedent in England and Wales, and raises the spectre of the 
defendant who pleads guilty having the appropriate sentence reduced 
on that account whilst the defendant convicted after trial is exposed 
 
 
31 Sian Elias C.J., „Criminal Procedure (Reform and Modernisation) Bill‟ (submissions to the 
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to the risk that the appropriate sentence will be increased on that 
account. 
Given the numerous objections to the defence disclosure and case 
management regime contained in the bill, outlined above, it is 
submitted that such a sanctions regime will result in injustice to 
defendants.   Unsurprisingly, these clauses have met with as much 
opposition as those relating to the disclosure of issues by the defence.   
The issues are, of course, closely linked, in that the sanctions are 
plainly intended to make the disclosure regime effective.   Typical of 
many responses was the Chief Justice‟s.   She said that in part her 
objections to the sanctions regime had a similar basis to her objection 
to the disclosure regime: 
“... but I should also record that the view of the judiciary is 
that the sanctions are likely to prove to be impracticable to 
apply in practice because of uncertainty about whether the 
abuse of the system is the fault of the defendant or of 
counsel.   Judges will of course be inhibited in their inquiries 
by the existence of privilege for communications between 
counsel and client.  All-in-all, then, the sanctions provisions 
are likely, except in comparatively rare cases, to be 
ineffective.”33 
 
IV. JUSTICE OR EXPEDIENCY? 
A. Representative charges 
New Zealand 
The bill provides for “representative charges” to be preferred against 
a defendant in certain circumstances.   These are known as “sample 
counts” in England and Wales, where they were introduced in 2004, 
but will be referred to as “representative charges” hereafter.   The 
premise behind representative charges is that the verdict is likely to be 
the same in respect of all the charges, and that, therefore, in order to 
economise on time and money, it should be permissible for the 
remainder of the allegations to be tried by a judge alone (the England 
and Wales model) or not be tried at all (the New Zealand proposal).   
However, the drafting of the New Zealand measure leaves open so 
many issues that it will be unworkable in practice;  and it is submitted 
that representative charges are unnecessary and unjust in principle. 
Clause 17 provides for a representative charge if multiple offences 
of the same type are alleged, and either (a) the offences are alleged to 
have been committed in similar circumstances over a period of time 
and the nature and circumstances of the offences are such that the 
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complainant cannot reasonably be expected to particularise dates or 
other details of the offences, or (b) the offences are alleged to have 
been committed in similar circumstances such that it is likely that the 
same plea would be entered by the defendant in relation to all the 
offences if they were charged separately and, because of the number 
of offences alleged, if the offences were charged separately but tried 
together it would be unduly difficult for the court to manage the 
separate charges. 
A mere reading of this provision gives rise to a number of issues.   
First, how is the defendant to know that a charge is a representative 
charge?   Secondly, even if the charge is somehow flagged as being 
“representative”, how is the defendant or court to know what it is 
supposed to be representative of?   Thirdly, there appears to be no 
provision as to how a representative charge is to be tried.   Fourthly, 
there appears to be no provision as to how sentence is to be 
determined in the event of a conviction. 
The “problems” of multiple offences are gravely exaggerated, 
especially in an era of computerisation when producing an indictment 
or charge sheet with multiple counts creates little difficulty.   In this 
context, it should be borne in mind that the greater the similarity 
between the different offences, the more straightforward it is to 
produce a multi-count indictment.   As to the first case provided for 
by clause 17, this is presumably intended to deal typically with an 
allegation by, say, a child that she was sexually abused by her step-
father over a period of years.   Such allegations rarely allege a single 
activity only.   Almost invariably, they involve a progression in the 
offending.   Where such a range of offending is alleged, it is common 
for there to be convictions on some charges and acquittals on other 
charges (usually the more serious charges).   It is also common for 
there to be different verdicts even though the charges are of the same 
type of offence.   Is it really being suggested that a single charge is to 
be capable of being representative of various types of criminality? 
The premise in (a) is that the complainant “cannot reasonably be 
expected to particularise dates or other details of the offences.”   This 
is remarkably vague.   What degree of detail is the complainant to be 
unable to particularise with sufficient certainty for a representative 
charge to be sanctioned?   The reality is that complainants in sexual 
cases make their allegations in their own words and it is up to the 
investigators to establish as best they can the extent of what is being 
alleged.   The complainant may not be able to give dates, but will 
commonly be able to give sufficient details for appropriate charges to 
be preferred.   The particular allegations will often be referable to an 
occasion such as a birthday or a visit to a particular place or by a 
particular person.   The complainant may allege a pattern of offending 
– to take an example, that a particular teacher indecently touched the 
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complainant during swimming lessons.   Even if the allegation is as 
vague as “at least once a week until [some particular event]”, there is 
quite enough detail to draft an indictment or charge sheet that 
adequately represents the alleged criminality. 
Particular counts do not have to be specific about particular dates.   
They can, if necessary, allege “on an occasion other than that referred 
to in count 1” or “in counts 1 to 15”.   However it is done, it is 
perfectly possible to relate particular charges to particular allegations.   
Where, on the face of the allegation, identical conduct was indulged 
in by the defendant two or three times a week for two or three years, 
it will not be necessary to have 450 counts.   First, no prosecutor 
would draft an indictment on the basis that the tribunal of fact might 
be satisfied about the maximum level of offending alleged because no 
jury would accept that the offending happened to the fullest extent 
alleged.   Thus a prudent prosecutor would draft an indictment that 
took a sensible, minimum number of occasions.   Secondly, a 
prosecutor would not only reduce the number of counts on 
pragmatic grounds, but also because he would recognise that there 
comes a point when the number of offences committed is going to 
make no difference to sentence in the event of conviction. 
The essence of good prosecution practice is to have an indictment 
that adequately reflects the criminality alleged and which, in the event 
of conviction, would allow the court to pass an appropriate sentence 
for that criminality.   Representative charges are not only unnecessary, 
they are dangerous, because they create the possibility that the judge 
or jury will be unable to reflect their view of the scale of offending by 
convicting on some counts and acquitting on others.   The result will 
invariably be convictions in circumstances where a full set of charges 
would have resulted in some acquittals, and vice versa.   For instance, 
where it is known that the court will only try one allegation, there is 
an obvious risk that a complainant will exaggerate, or an investigator 
will encourage the exaggeration of, the level of criminality, safe in the 
knowledge that the evidence as to the scale of the offending will 
never be put to the test. 
As to the second situation provided for by clause 17, it is implicit 
within this category that the prosecution are in theory able to identify 
the totality of the offending.   On what possible basis therefore would 
it be “unduly difficult” to manage the separate charges?   Unless 
“difficult” is to be taken to mean “tiresome” or “laborious”, where is 
the difficulty?   As stated above, the more similar the allegations, the 
easier it will be to prepare an indictment or charge sheet that reflects 
the criminality. 
There is a fundamental flaw in these proposals which appears to 
have been overlooked by the authors.   Where there are allegations of 
a series of offences of a like nature, the prosecution will in any event 
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be adducing the evidence on all the other offences as evidence of 
system.   Thus, whether it is a swimming instructor alleged to have 
indecently touched one of his pupils on a large number of occasions 
or an allegation of passing worthless cheques, the prosecution will be 
putting in evidence the entire course of conduct.   Why then, if all the 
evidence in relation to all the offences is to be before the jury, should 
there not be counts covering the criminality alleged?   The 
overwhelming advantage is that there is certainty as to what has been 
established to the criminal standard, whereas the only disadvantages 
are that someone is going to have to take the trouble to prepare the 
charges, and, at some stage, the process of arraignment and, in due 
course, the taking of the verdicts will be a lengthier process (although 
certainly the process of arraignment could be short-circuited in a 
multi-count indictment). 
 
England and Wales 
In England and Wales, there are two instances at common law in 
which it is possible to include more than one offence in a single 
count.   First, there are cases of a “general deficiency”.   Here, there is 
no doubting that several offences have been committed, but it is 
genuinely impossible to give particulars of the individual offences.   
The typical example is of an employee stealing relatively small 
amounts from his employers over a long period, with the thefts going 
unnoticed until a stocktake or audit or some other form of 
investigation brings his offending to light.   It might be possible to say 
with some certainty what the total “deficiency” is, but impossible to 
break down the individual dates and amounts.   A charge of stealing 
(between specified days) the total amount missing would in such 
cases be acceptable. 
Secondly, there are what are known as the “continuous activity” 
cases.   A simple example might be a person who walks around a 
department store over the course of an hour or so and steals items 
from several different departments.   Provided there is no particular 
reason for saying the activity was not a single activity, a single charge 
of theft would be appropriate.34   Another example from the law 
reports was the activity of a person in felling several protected trees.35   
Technically, each tree felled would have been a separate offence, but 
common sense dictated that there be a single charge of felling 
however many trees were involved. 
In 2004, Parliament passed the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims 
Act 2004, sections 17 to 20 of which made provision for certain 
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counts to be tried without a jury.   Section 17 allows the prosecution 
to apply to a judge in the Crown Court (this procedure having no 
application to summary trials before a magistrates‟ court, and having 
limited application even in the Crown Court) for some counts in an 
indictment to be tried by a judge alone.   There are three conditions 
for acceding to such an application:  first, the number of counts in the 
indictment must be such as to make it likely that a trial of all counts 
by a jury would be impracticable.   Secondly, any count or counts to 
be tried by the jury must properly be regarded as a sample of the 
counts to be tried by judge alone.   Thirdly, it must be “in the 
interests of justice” to make the order. 
If an application under section 17 is acceded to, and there is a 
conviction on a sample count by a jury, then the defendant may be 
tried by judge alone on the other counts.   In much the same way as 
the New Zealand proposals are flawed because they fail to recognise 
that in any of these cases, the whole of the evidence of the other 
offending will be before the court in any event, so section 17 of the 
2004 Act is also flawed and, furthermore, pointless.   By definition, 
any count that is to be tried by judge alone will be a sample of all the 
counts, in which case it is inevitable that the prosecution will be 
putting before the jury all the evidence in relation to all the counts.   
Since the jury are considering all the evidence, why not let them 
return verdicts on all counts?   As at April, 2011, there has been no 
instance in the law reports of section 17 having been invoked 
successfully (or at all). 
 
Comparison of the legislation in the two jurisdictions 
The New Zealand proposed legislation goes significantly further than 
that in England and Wales.   Under the 2004 legislation, it is at least 
necessary that the full scale of the criminality is set out in the 
indictment, there being no question of a single representative charge;  
and, of course, there has to be a trial of all the other charges, albeit a 
trial by judge alone.   Whilst it may be thought that the verdicts on 
the other charges would be likely to be formalities, the process will 
still have to be gone through and a reasoned judgment will have to be 
delivered.   In New Zealand, the proposal allows for a defendant in 
effect to be sentenced for offences which have never been specified 
and which have never been proved.   As a matter of principle, this is 
fundamentally objectionable;  and, as anyone who has ever practised 
in the criminal courts will know, it is likely to give rise to miscarriages 
of justice.   The reality of practice is that cases do not always develop 
in a logical fashion:  the pattern of verdicts that lawyers and judges 
might predict (especially at the outset of proceedings) frequently does 
not reflect the verdicts eventually returned by a jury. 
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B. Sentence indications 
Clauses 58 to 63 of the New Zealand Bill formalise a system for 
enabling a court to give an indication of the likely sentence or range 
were the defendant to enter a plea of guilty at any point in the 
proceedings before trial.   Any system for giving a sentence discount 
in return for a guilty plea can work injustice in two ways.   First, an 
innocent defendant may be pressurised into pleading guilty.   
Secondly, a sentence may be imposed that does not reflect the harm 
done or the defendant‟s culpability.   A formalised system is likely to 
accentuate the risk of such injustices.   No longer will the defendant 
be in the position of having to make a judgment as to what is likely to 
happen.   He will know what sentence he will receive if he pleads 
guilty in response to the indication.   If his lawyers advise him that 
there is a real risk of conviction if he contests the case and that, if 
convicted, the sentence will almost certainly be custodial rather than 
the non-custodial indication, or that it will be 50 per cent longer than 
the sentence indicated, he may well feel he has no realistic alternative 
than to plead guilty.   On the other hand, a court may end up 
“buying” a guilty plea, with the result that a defendant receives a 
sentence that does not come close to reflecting the actual gravity of 
his offending.   There is plenty of anecdotal evidence in England and 
Wales, where the Court of Appeal sanctioned a non-statutory system 
of sentence indications in R. v. Goodyear (Practice note),36 that judges will 
“crack” trials (especially those that threaten to be long and complex) 
by giving inappropriately low indications. 
This is not to suggest that there should be no discount where 
there has been a plea of guilty.   A court should show mercy to those 
who are genuinely remorseful about what they have done, and a plea 
of guilty may be indicative of remorse, particularly where there is an 
early acceptance of responsibility accompanied by expressions of 
contrition and shame.   In many cases, however, the only remorse a 
defendant who pleads guilty feels relates to the fact that he has been 
caught, and his plea is merely a recognition of the inevitability, having 
regard to the strength of the prosecution case, of a conviction.   The 
approach of the courts in England and Wales and, more recently, of 
the Sentencing Guidelines Council, allows a defendant pleading guilty 
for this reason to be rewarded for his guilty plea.   This is 
unprincipled and is based on considerations of expediency alone:  the 
reasoning is that a plea of guilty saves time and money and should be 
encouraged, that the best way to encourage one is by granting a 
discount when it comes to sentence, and the earlier the plea is 
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indicated the greater the discount.   The practice is so well entrenched 
now that there is effectively a tariff of discounts available at different 
stages of the proceedings.   Even where the evidence is overwhelming 
such that the defendant is effectively left with no choice as to plea, 
the guideline says that he should receive a discount of 20 per cent. 
In New Zealand, the Supreme Court in R. v. Hessell37 rejected the 
heavily structured approach adopted by the Court of Appeal under 
the influence of the practice in England and Wales described above, 
in favour of a more principled approach.   The court said that the 
credit that is given must reflect all the circumstances in which the plea 
is entered, including whether it is truly regarded as an early or late 
plea and the strength of the prosecution case.   To treat the strength 
of the prosecution case as irrelevant was, in the court‟s view, also to 
treat as irrelevant the important factor of the extent to which a plea 
involves an acceptance of responsibility.   The New Zealand bill is 
silent as to the extent of any discount for an early plea;  it is hoped 
that in formalising a system of sentence indications in statute, the bill 
will not alter the principled approach of the Supreme Court in Hessell.   
The risk is that Parliamentary backing for discounts for early pleas 
will encourage judges to pitch their indications at levels which owe 
much more to expediency than to justice. 
 
C. Appellate arrangements 
This article has noted the complexities of the arrangements for trial 
under the New Zealand Bill, with its four categories of offence and 
the retention of the current arrangements whereunder there may be 
trial by jury in either a district court or the High Court.   
Unsurprisingly, the various appeal paths are correspondingly 
complex.   Whilst many of the submissions on the bill commented on 
the proposal to restrict jury trial, few addressed the more fundamental 
arrangements relating to trial and appeal.   One that did, however, was 
that of the Wellington Criminal Bar Association.   It argued, in 
relation to trial, that the shared indictable jurisdiction needs to be 
“addressed rationally with a fresh approach, not tinkered with”.38   In 
relation to appeals, the submission highlighted the fact that the Court 
of Appeal is already “inundated” with criminal appeals, and that a 
makeshift solution has been to form a criminal appeal division of the 
court, where the quorum of three judges will include one or two High 
Court judges.   “This creates the unsatisfactory spectacle of an appeal 
from [a] decision of a High Court judge being dealt with by ... judges 
 
 
37 [2010] NZSC 135, [2011] 1 N.Z.L.R. 607;  and see post, pp.161-164. 
38 Wellington Criminal Bar Association, „Criminal Procedure (Reform and Modernisation) 
Bill:  Submission for the Select Committee‟ (submissions to the Justice and Electoral 
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from the same common room as the trial judge. ...   Such a system 
raises an appearance of bias in the minds of many appellants and the 
appearance of a second rate appeal system.”39   This complaint will be 
familiar to practitioners in England and Wales, where a merry-go-
round of judges hear criminal appeals.   Justice and the appearance of 
justice have long since been sacrificed in the cause of efficiency.   Not 
only is it standard for judges of the High Court to sit in the criminal 
division of the Court of Appeal, but it is now commonplace for 
circuit judges (one rung down the judicial ladder from High Court 
judges) to sit as a member of the Court of Appeal.   The official 
justification for this practice was that their experience as judges 
presiding over criminal trials would bring valuable expertise to the 
criminal appeal process.   The reality is that they are there to make up 
the numbers.   When statute first permitted the practice,40 it was 
provided that a circuit judge could not sit on an appeal against a 
decision of a High Court judge, but even this restriction has now 
been lifted.41   England and Wales thus have not just the 
“unsatisfactory spectacle” of judges from the same common room 
hearing appeals from each other, but judges from the junior common 
room hearing appeals from judges from the senior common room.   
Add in the consideration that a particular court may be constituted by 
judges of three different levels in the hierarchy (circuit judge, High 
Court judge and judge of the Court of Appeal), and it becomes 
readily apparent that the notion that an appellant is having his appeal 
heard by a wholly “independent and impartial” tribunal is wide open 
to question.  
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Expediency v. Justice 
It has been seen how justice has been, or is at risk of being 
compromised, by the dictates of expediency.   Multi-count trials are 
inconvenient and expensive, pleas of guilty are essential to keep the 
wheels of justice turning, and fully independent appellate 
arrangements cannot be afforded, so traditional protections are 
jettisoned, bribes are offered and the traditional hierarchical court 
structure is rendered largely illusory by the constant rotation of 
judges. 
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41 Courts Act 2003, ss.67 and 109(3), and Sched. 10. 
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Expediency v. Principle 
It has also been seen that, in the cause of re-balancing the scales, core 
principles of common law criminal justice have been eaten into.   An 
adversarial process under which the prosecution alone have any 
burden of proof, and a key value of which is that a person should not 
be compelled to incriminate himself, cannot be squared with an 
advance duty on the defendant to say why he is not guilty, with 
inferences of guilt being permissible where there has been a failure to 
make advance disclosure or to give evidence, or with a case 
management role being imposed on the court.   This is especially the 
case where the court is expressly charged with the function of 
managing the case so as to secure a just (i.e. the factually correct) 
result and all parties (defendant and defence counsel included) are 
commanded to conduct their cases with a view to assisting the court 
in that task. 
 
A vicious circle? 
In R. v. Clarke and McDaid42 the House of Lords quashed the 
convictions of the appellants because, it was held, the failure of the 
appropriate court officer to sign the indictment as required by statute 
meant that there was no indictment at all.   This was widely perceived 
to be the quashing of convictions of serious criminals on account of a 
mere technicality,43 although as Lord Bingham said, “it may be 
thought that if the state exercises its coercive power to put a citizen 
on trial for serious crime a certain degree of formality is not out of 
place”.44  The reaction of government, predictably, was not to inquire 
into why there had been such a failure and to take steps to ensure that 
it was not repeated, but to abolish a rule that had existed for good 
reason for many years.45   The judgment of Sully J. in the New South 
Wales case of R. v. Swansson;  R. v. Henry46 exposes the dangers of such 
knee-jerk legislation.  He held that a failure to observe the long-
established rule of the common law that there can be only one 
indictment in any one criminal proceeding47 rendered the proceedings 
a nullity.   Having stated that the principle had always been regarded, 
not as a mere technicality, or as an optional procedural extra, but as a 
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44 R. v. Clarke and McDaid (n.42), [17]. 
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fundamental norm of a trial upon indictment according to law, Sully 
J. continued: 
“The submissions of the Crown deal with the particular 
fundamental norm in a way which is becoming ... 
disconcertingly familiar in the ongoing development of the 
criminal law, and not least in the ongoing development of the 
common law of crime.   It is now commonplace for 
proponents of what they are pleased to call law reform to 
attack some entrenched principle upon the sole basis that, to 
borrow the Chief Justice‟s paraphrase:  „It is a technicality 
which has no contemporary significance.‟ 
It seems to me that the experience of the recent past 
teaches that any use of that invocation of „contemporary 
significance‟ in the context of proposed fundamental changes 
to, especially, the law of crime should cause warning lights to 
flash in the mind of every common law judge.”48 
Having then referred to a paper given by Sir Owen Dixon (the former 
Chief Justice of Australia)49 and to an essay by G.K. Chesterton,50 he 
continued: 
“The origins of the present appeal are ... a paradigm example 
of the dangers against which, in their different ways, both 
Dixon C.J. and Chesterton were warning.   For if it be asked 
why the existing and well-entrenched norm of „one 
indictment, one jury‟ should now be swept away at, so to 
speak, a stroke of the curial pen, then the frank answer is that 
to sweep away the norm would rescue the amour propre of 
whoever it was who decided, for reasons which nobody was 
able to propound ..., to depart from the norm.   I can 
envisage, for my own part, no more unconvincing, no more 
unjustifiable, a basis upon which to disturb a fundamental 
norm of a criminal trial in our system of criminal justice.”51 
It has been suggested that many of the complaints about the 
operation of the criminal justice system in New Zealand had little to 
do with the state of the statute book but much to do with case 
preparation.   Responding to bad practice or procedural failure by 
moving the goalposts to accommodate such lapses, whether by 
changing the rules themselves or exercising a discretion to excuse the 
lapse by reference to some greater good, does nothing to encourage 
good practice.   On the contrary, it fosters a culture of non-
compliance, which panders to the lowest common denominator, and 
 
 
48 R. v. Swansson;  R. v. Henry (n.46), [99], [100]. 
49 A paper delivered at Yale University in 1955 by Sir Owen Dixon, „Concerning Judicial 
Method‟, Jesting Pilate and other papers and addresses (Melbourne, Law Book Co. 1965). 
50 G.K. Chesterton, Orthodoxy (Dover Publications Inc. 2004). 
51 R. v. Swansson;  R. v. Henry (n.46), [103]. 
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in which there is little or no reward for professional excellence.   The 
risk is that the most able professionals will ply their trade elsewhere, 
that failures of procedure will multiply, and that the response will yet 
again be to relax the rules. 
 
The value of procedure 
Attaching value to procedure is to promote excellence in practice.   
Llewellyn was uncompromising in his view that procedural 
regulations should be marked off for the “most intensive” separate 
study “because they are of such transcendent importance as to need 
special emphasis.  ...  For what substantive law says should be means 
nothing except in terms of what procedure says that you can make 
real.”52 
The New Zealand legislature must now decide whether it wishes 
to pursue this legislation in the face of widespread concern.   It must 
also decide whether the English and Welsh precedent is really the one 
that they wish to follow, given that the English criminal procedure 
reforms had their roots in civil reforms that many perceive to have 
failed in their attempt to address excessive cost, delay and complexity.   
Bearing in mind that these were the exact complaints listed by Simon 
Power about criminal procedure in New Zealand when he introduced 
the bill, should not the experience in England and Wales give the 
New Zealand Parliament pause for thought?   Rather than heed the 
enthusiastic endorsement of the case management culture by the 
senior English judiciary, it is suggested that the New Zealand 
legislators should heed the concerns of their own most senior 
judiciary, and consider ploughing their own furrow in recognition of 
the dictum of the distinguished American jurist, Frankfurter J., when 
he said that “the history of American freedom is in no small measure, 
the history of procedure.”53 
 
 
52 Karl Llewellyn (n.2), 11. 
53 Malinski v. New York 324 U.S. 401 (1945), [27]. 
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I. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS:  HARMONIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, 
TERRORISM AND ORGANISED CRIME 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This article focuses on three important recent trends in the 
development of the criminal law in Australia:  first, the 
harmonisation and federalisation of criminal law;  secondly, the 
enactment of sometimes controversial terrorism offences in the wake 
of the “war on terror”;  and thirdly, the making of new laws to 
deal with organised crime.   The last two decades in particular, 
have seen a move towards greater harmonisation and the creation 
of new federal offences, particularly in the areas of terrorism, 
serious and organised crime, and cybercrime.   This article 
discusses both the domestic and international impact of these 
developments.   In order to understand the way criminal law 
operates, and has developed, in Australia, it is important first to 
summarise Australia‟s particular federal constitutional 
framework. 
 
 
A.   Criminal law in Australia‟s federal framework 
Australia is a federal system and consists of nine jurisdictions – six 
states, two territories and the Commonwealth of Australia.   The 
Australian model of “cooperative” federalism leaves the power to 
legislate in several areas to the states and territories.1   The general 
criminal law and the laws of criminal procedure are areas of prime 
responsibility for the states and territories.2   The power of the states 
 
 
* Research Fellow, ARC Centre of Excellence in Policing and Security,  
Griffith University. 
1 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Imp.), Ch. V, s.108, read in 
conjunction with s.51. 
2 Note that only Australian states have sovereignty under Ch. V, s.108 of the 
Constitution, while the two territories (Northern Territory and Australian Capital 
Territory) are more dependent on the federal state.   However, the territories also 
have their separate jurisdiction, police and criminal legislation.   In relation to the 
particular role of the territories, the Commonwealth ceased to be a major influence 
on local policing issues in the Australian Capital Territory (Australian Capital Territory 
(Self-Government) Act 1988 (Cth)) and the Northern Territory (Northern Territory (Self-
Government) Act 1978 (Cth)) when these achieved self-government status in 1988 and 
1978, respectively.   However, unlike in its relation to the states, the Australian 
Parliament has a power to override laws in the territories.   The Federal Parliament‟s 
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and territories to enforce their laws and the autonomy in making 
these laws - within the limits of section 51 (Powers of Parliament) of 
the Australian Constitution - stems from section 108 of the Australian 
Constitution.3   However, the Commonwealth can legislate in the field 
of criminal law in a range of areas where it has constitutional 
responsibility, with the effect that these laws are directly applicable to 
the states and territories.   These powers are not merely limited to 
enacting regulatory offences, but extend to serious crimes such as 
terrorism and national security offences. 
Territoriality in Australia is therefore in some ways even more 
complicated than in other federal systems.   Rather than having 
distinct federal, state and territory substantive and procedural criminal 
laws, the competences in Australia overlap.4   Because of the 
expansion of Australian federal criminal law in recent years and, in 
particular, in relation to terrorism since 2001 and organised crime 
since 2010, jurisdictional overlap has grown significantly.5   Unless the 
federal law has expressly preserved the operation of state law, under 
the Constitution, in cases of conflict, state and territory law is deemed 
invalid to the extent of inconsistency with federal law (s.109).6  
This constitutional framework means that the states and territories 
must negotiate the division of their powers on a bilateral and 
multilateral basis or give up competences to the federal government 
to enhance efficient cross-border police and criminal justice 
cooperation.   As the giving up of competences is a rare occurrence in 
the Australian context, strategies had to be developed to create 
greater uniformity, while preserving state sovereignty in the field of 
criminal law. 
 
Overleaf:  Australian criminal court system (diagram) 
 
                                                                                                             
power to legislate directly for the territories was exercised most recently to override 
controversial voluntary euthanasia laws in the Northern Territory:  Rights of the 
Terminally Ill Act 1995 (N.T.), repealed by the Euthanasia Laws Act 1997 (Cth), Sched. 1. 
3 The Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Imp.) states in Ch. V, s.108 that: 
“Every law in force in a Colony which has become or becomes a State, and relating 
to any matter within the powers of the Parliament of the Commonwealth, shall, 
subject to this Constitution, continue in force in the State;  and, until provision is 
made in that behalf by the Parliament of the Commonwealth, the Parliament of the 
State shall have such powers of alteration and of repeal in respect of any such law 
as the Parliament of the Colony had until the Colony became a State.” 
4 Simon Bronitt and Bernadette McSherry, Principles of Criminal Law (3rd edn, 
Thomson Reuters 2010), 91. 
5 Crimes Legislation Amendment (Serious and Organised Crime) Act 2010 (Cth);  ibid., 91. 
6 Section 109 states:  “„When a law of a State is inconsistent with a law of the 
Commonwealth, the latter shall prevail, and the former shall, to the extent of the 
inconsistency, be invalid.” 
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B.   Harmonisation 
Harmonisation occurs in one of two ways.   First, it occurs through 
linking the powers to legislate on criminal law and procedure to heads 
of Commonwealth power in the constitution;  thus there are federal 
offences related to taxation, customs and environmental protection.7   
The link can be fairly tenuous, so for example, the power to deal with 
drug trafficking stems from two sources:  the customs power of the 
Commonwealth to regulate imports and exports (narcotics are a form 
of prohibited import or export), and the external affairs power to 
implement treaties including various international treaties aimed at 
narcotics control, discussed further below.   The alternative model to 
using a federal head of power is to enact mirror legislation in each of 
the states and territories – a noteworthy example is the uniform 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) adopted throughout the Australian 
jurisdictions. 
Historically, the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) contained the most serious 
offences against the Commonwealth.   This has largely been replaced 
by the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth)8 which abolished common law 
offences and codified the relevant statutory and common law 
governing the principles of responsibility and defences in the field of 
Commonwealth criminal law.   The most significant Commonwealth 
criminal offences were modernised and redrafted in order to comply 
with the principles of responsibility and, in many cases, relocated 
from the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) to the Commonwealth Criminal Code.9   
Since its enactment, a number of new provisions were added in the 
areas of terrorism and organised crime.10   However, not all federal 
offences are to be found in the code, and many regulatory offences 
and penalties are to be found scattered across the federal statute 
books. 
A considerable body of harmonised legislation exists in the field of 
criminal law in Australia.   The extension of federal jurisdiction in 
several areas, in particular in relation to war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, genocide and terrorism, has been directly influenced, 
indeed required, by Australia‟s obligations under international law.   
The relevant provisions in relation to war crimes, crimes against 
humanity and genocide were inserted into Division 268 of the 
Commonwealth Criminal Code after Australia implemented the Rome 
 
 
7 Simon Bronitt and Bernadette McSherry (n.4), 91-93. 
8 Henceforth also “Commonwealth Criminal Code” or simply “Criminal Code”. 
9 See, in relation to the establishment of the Criminal Code, Bernadette McSherry, 
„Terrorism Offences in the Criminal Code:  Broadening the Boundaries of Australian 
Criminal Laws‟ (2004) 27 University of New South Wales Law Journal 354, 355-356. 
10 See, in relation to terrorism offences, ibid.;  and see, in relation to organised crime, 
Crimes Legislation Amendment (Serious and Organised Crime) Act 2010 (Cth), and Simon 
Bronitt and Bernadette McSherry (n.4). 
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Statute of the International Criminal Court in 2002.11   Another field where 
international law had a considerable influence on Australian federal 
legislation was illicit substances.   In response to the 1961 Single 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs,12 the Narcotic Drugs Act 1967 (Cth) was 
enacted, widening the range of prohibited substances falling under 
Commonwealth jurisdiction.   Similarly, the introduction of the United 
Nations Convention on Psychotropic Substances13 in 1971 triggered the 
creation of the Psychotropic Substances Act (Cth) in 1976.   It follows that 
global developments and international concern about particular forms 
of serious crime have had an impact on the creation of harmonised 
legislation in Australia. 
 
C.   Harmonisation of drug laws 
The federal offences that are perceived as presenting most difficulty 
for law enforcement in the Australian context include offences 
dealing with drugs, interference with telecommunication systems, 
terrorism and the protection of Commonwealth officials.14   Drug 
offences constitute the single most challenging area of law in this 
regard;  federal competence applies in relation to importation and 
exportation (under the customs power) as well as manufacture and 
cultivation (as mandated by the relevant international treaties).   
However, state and territory drug laws continue to apply to 
possession, supply and use.   Here, the overlap between 
Commonwealth, and state and territory jurisdictions becomes 
particularly apparent.    In many cases the Australian Federal Police, 
as well as the different state and territory police, may be competent to 
investigate and prosecute, sometimes triggering joint investigations, 
though also a struggle over jurisdictional competence.15 
The overlapping nature of jurisdictions in relation to drug law and 
law enforcement is exemplified in the High Court landmark decision 
of Ridgeway v. R.16   The accused was convicted of possession of a 
quantity of illegally imported heroin.   He had contacted a man whom 
he had met in an Australian prison to propose a heroin smuggling 
operation.   That contact had become a police informant, who alerted 
the authorities.   A controlled delivery of the drugs was organised, 
with the effect that the drugs sold to the accused were imported with 
 
 
11 Gillian Triggs, „Implementation of the Rome Statute for the International Criminal 
Court:  A Quiet Revolution in Australian Law‟ (2003) 23 Sydney Law Review 507, 
507-508. 
12 Signed March 30, 1961, 520 UNTS 115 (entered into force December 13, 1964). 
13 Signed February 21, 1971, 1019 UNTS 175 (entered into force August 16, 1976). 
14 Information based on interviews with law enforcement officials conducted in the 
course of the author‟s Ph.D. research (2007-2010). 
15 ibid. 
16 [1995] HCA 66, (1995) 129 A.L.R. 41. 
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the cooperation and assistance of the federal police and Australian 
Customs, a police informant and a Malaysian police officer.   The 
defendant‟s conviction was overturned by the High Court on the 
ground that, at that time, the police operation had involved serious 
illegality on the part of the law enforcement officials (the federal 
police were knowingly involved in the unlawful importation of 
heroin), and that this had constituted a key element of the offence.   
Although the conviction was quashed, the High Court noted that the 
evidence based on the unlawful operation should have been excluded 
and all the charges against the accused should have been stayed 
permanently.   The accused could have been prosecuted for a range 
of offences against the law of South Australia, in which proof of an 
unlawful importation was not an element.   As the majority of the 
High Court noted: 
“[T]he appellant‟s possession of the heroin at the time he was 
apprehended constituted any one of a variety of offences 
against the law of South Australia of which illegal importation 
was not an element and which range from knowing 
possession of a prohibited substance or drug of dependence 
(maximum penalty:  $2,000 and two years‟ imprisonment) to 
possession of more than the prescribed quantity of a 
prohibited substance or drug of dependence for the purpose 
of sale or supply (maximum penalty:  $500,000 and life 
imprisonment).   That being so, the effect of a stay of the 
prosecution of the appellant for offences against the 
Commonwealth Act would be that the appellant remained liable 
to be prosecuted under state law.”17 
Clearly then, there is no exclusive federal jurisdiction in relation to 
drug offences – in other words, the Commonwealth does not 
“occupy the field”.   There is no simple rule related to the quantity or 
type of drugs found that triggers federal jurisdiction.   Competences 
are therefore negotiated between the different jurisdictions, in 
particular with regards to imported narcotics.18   The inter-agency 
negotiation of respective competences solves the problem in practice, 
but it creates challenges at the macro level, as there may be significant 
differences in penalties for the offence of possession under state and 
territory laws and for drug importation offences under federal law:  
for example, in Ridgeway v. R. the penalty for involvement in 
importing heroin was a maximum of life imprisonment, while the 
South Australian possession of this type of prohibited substance or 
drug of dependence carried only two years‟ imprisonment (though 
possession for the purpose of sale or supply carried life 
imprisonment).   The significant inter-jurisdictional discretion to 
 
 
17 ibid., [36] per Mason C.J., Deane and Dawson JJ. 
18 See Pt 9 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth). 
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negotiate competence over charges accordingly has the potential to 
lead to forum shopping by law enforcement officials and unjust 
outcomes for offenders. 
The reason for enacting federal offences is to highlight at the 
national level the seriousness of offences that have a trans-border or 
international dimension, as well as to empower an overarching federal 
law enforcement agency (Australian Federal Police or Customs) with 
jurisdiction.   However, as the above case shows, the advent of 
federal legislation has, in many instances, gone too far, complicating 
rather than enabling cross-jurisdictional law enforcement practice and 
creating jurisdictional discrepancies for offenders.   An alternative 
solution would be to seek harmonisation through requiring 
consistency of offence definitions and penalties across all Australian 
jurisdictions.   The Model Criminal Code project promotes this 
desirable objective, though progress has been painfully slow, and 
many scholars doubt whether the goal of even broad consistency of 
criminal laws in Australia is feasible.19 
 
D.   Terrorism law:  Australia‟s approach to the “War on Terror” 
This part of the article gives an overview of controversial offences 
enacted in Australia after the terrorist events of September 11, 2001, 
in the United States.   An examination of specific terrorism offences, 
the extraterritorial reach of these laws and a selection of the leading 
cases decided so far provide an insight into Australia‟s approach to 
the “War on Terror”. 
More than 100 new laws were enacted in Australia as a response 
to the September 11, 2001 attacks.   Human rights scholars and 
activists have voiced concerns not only in relation to the rushed 
process of their adoption, but also in relation to resulting substantive 
and procedural laws.   There has been strong objection to the 
criminalisation of both “status” and mere “association” with 
members of terrorist groups.   The objection typically relates to the 
criminalisation of behaviour that is remote to any terrorist act.   These 
new offences have been supplemented by a wide range of coercive 
powers for intelligence agencies that limit traditional fair trial rights, 
such as the right to silence,20 and, by allowing for preventive 
detention, the right not to be held without charge.21 
 
 
19 Simon Bronitt and Bernadette McSherry (n.4), 105. 
20 Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979;  Australian Crime Commission Act 
2002, Pt 2, Division 2. 
21 See for example Simon Bronitt and Bernadette McSherry (n.4), 973;  Russell Hogg, 
„Executive Proscription of Terrorist Organisations in Australia:  Exploring the 
Shifting Border between Crime and Politics‟ in Miriam Gani and Penelope Matthews 
(eds), Fresh Perspectives in the „War on Terror‟‟ (ANU E-Press 2008), 297-323;  Saskia 
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To avoid doubt about the constitutional validity of the federal 
offences and powers, Australian states and territories referred 
legislative powers for terrorism matters to the Commonwealth under 
section 51(xxxvii) of the Constitution in 2003.22   The Common-
wealth Parliament could therefore enact legislation applicable to the 
states.   However, as terrorism is governed by federal law, all states 
and territories can use Commonwealth legislation in state courts to 
prosecute terrorism offences. 
The first wave of terrorism offences introduced into the Criminal 
Code Act 1995 (Cth) in 2002 and amended in 2003, drew heavy 
criticism.23   The concerns expressed by the Senate Legal and 
Constitutional Committee related primarily to the proscription regime 
(the procedure leading up to the declaration of an organisation as 
“terrorist”).24   When the Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 
2002 was incorporated into the Commonwealth Criminal Code, the 
Attorney-General‟s power to proscribe organisations by declaration 
was therefore reduced to a power to make a regulation specifying an 
organisation, which, in requiring Parliamentary approval, added an 
additional safeguard before proscription.25   The grounds for 
proscription were restricted by linking them to United Nations 
Security Council decisions and resolutions.26 
However, in 2003 the link to United Nations Security Council 
decisions and resolutions was dropped, as this restriction was claimed 
to inhibit effective response to threats specific to Australia.   The 
purported safeguard provided by the link to the Security Council was 
removed and the broad listing power of proscription by the Attorney-
General restored.27 
The criteria for listing an organisation were consequently linked to 
the concept of a “terrorist act”.   “Terrorist act” is defined as an 
action or threat of action where the action (s.100.1(2)): 
(i) causes serious harm that is physical harm to a person; 
(ii) causes serious damage to property; 
(iii) causes a person‟s death; 
                                                                                                             
Hufnagel, „German Perspectives on the Right to Life and Human Dignity in the „War 
on Terror‟‟ (2008) Criminal Law Journal 101. 
22 Criminal Code Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2003;  see Simon Bronitt and Bernadette 
McSherry (n.4), 991. 
23 Russell Hogg (n.21), 299-301. 
24 Senate Legal and Constitutional Committee, Parliament of Australia, Consideration of 
Legislation Referred to Committee:  Security Legislation (Terrorism) Bill 2002 [No. 2];  
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism Bill 2002;  Criminal Code Amendment (Suppression of 
Terrorist Bombings) Bill 2002;  Border Security Legislation Amendment Bill 2002 (2002), 
[2.155], [3.107]-[3.109]. 
25 See Criminal Code Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2003. 
26 See for example Russell Hogg (n.21), 299. 
27 See Criminal Code Amendment (Terrorist Organisations) Act 2004. 
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(iv) endangers a person‟s life, other than the life of the person 
taking the action; 
(v) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a 
section of the public, or 
(vi) seriously interferes with, seriously disrupts, or destroys, an 
electronic system. 
The action or threat has to be made with the intent of advancing a 
political, religious or ideological cause and coercing or intimidating 
the public or a section of the public (s100.1(1)).   This definition is 
basically copied from the United Kingdom Terrorism Act 2000 and is 
subject to similar criticisms.28   In particular, the wide range of 
actions or threat of actions included and the vagueness of the 
provision were a target for criticism.  
Whether or not a group is a terrorist organisation is determined by 
executive proscription or, if there is proof of the connection to a 
“terrorist act”, a judicial determination on facts presented to the court 
at trial (s102.1(1)(a)).   No prosecutions have taken place in Australia 
against any member or supporter of the proscribed organisations on 
the list.29   This is not surprising as none of the listed organisations 
are active in Australia.30   However, the list is relevant in relation to 
the gathering of intelligence and has effects on particular immigrant 
communities in Australia through specific police targeting. 
Further impacts on refugee and immigration laws are apparent.   
Under Australian law31 an applicant for refugee status, despite having 
exercised political violence against a regime overseas, can have a 
legitimate claim before the Australian refugee tribunals.   Such a 
person, who may be a victim of persecution in his home country (as 
happened in the 2005 case of a Turkish Kurd who was a member of 
the PKK)32, may therefore be a member of an organisation that 
appears on the list of proscribed organisations.   This raises the 
prospect of such a person giving evidence in immigration proceedings 
as to political violence he has engaged in when a member of a 
proscribed organisation, and that evidence later being used against 
him in a prosecution for a terrorism offence. 
The listing process is summarised in sections 102.1 and 102.1A.   
The legislation states that the Attorney-General receives a statement 
of reasons from the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation for 
a particular listing, following which, if satisfied with the reasons 
provided, he may make a regulation and initiate further formalities.   
 
 
28 Simon Bronitt and Bernadette McSherry (n.4), 988-989. 
29 Russell Hogg (n.21), 315. 
30 ibid. 
31 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Singh (2002) 209 C.L.R. 533;   
T. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [1996] A.C. 742 (House of Lords). 
32 N04/49229 decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal Bulletin 2/2005, 12. 
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The Attorney-General then approaches Parliament‟s Joint Committee 
on Intelligence and Security in conjunction with the leader of the 
opposition and the leaders of the states and territories, to state the 
reasons for the listing.   The regulation is subject to disallowance by 
Parliament.   An important point about the listing procedure is that 
human rights debates and the balancing of security concerns versus 
human rights often take place in disputes between Parliament and the 
executive in listing debates. 
Offences relating to engagement with proscribed organisations are 
enumerated in sections 102.2-8 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth).   
They include the direction of the activities of a terrorist organisation, 
recruiting for and funding of a terrorist organisation, and the support 
of a terrorist organisation.   These activities are punishable by a 
minimum of 15 and a maximum of 25 years‟ imprisonment.   
Training or being trained by a terrorist organisation is punishable by a 
25-year jail term, while membership incurs only 10 years‟ and 
“association” offences only three years‟ imprisonment.   The 
“association” offences, in particular, represent a fundamental 
departure from general Australian criminal law concepts, as they 
attach severe penalties to proof merely of relevant status.   
Furthermore, terms like “member” and “support” are left undefined 
and do not require a link to a prohibited activity.33  
The first wave of terrorism offences were enacted in 2002 and 
2003 to comply with United Nations Security Council Resolutions.   
Many of these were offences that could potentially affect 
humanitarian involvement,34 including provisions criminalising the 
financing of terrorism and the collection of funds to finance acts of 
terrorism, which were introduced in 2001 to comply with Security 
Council Resolution 1373.35   Similarly, Security Council Resolution 
1267 impacted on Australian legislation relating to the listing of 
terrorist organisations and the freezing of assets.    
One of the more controversial reforms in Australia was the 
criminalisation of “advocacy” under section 102.1(1A), which makes 
it an offence for an organisation even to praise terrorism.   This has 
been claimed to infringe the right to free speech, raising concerns 
about its “chilling effect” on public debate and the rise of 
 
 
33 See, for further detail, M. Gani and G. Urbas, „Alert or Alarmed? Recent Legislative 
Reforms Directed at Terrorist Organisations and Persons Supporting or Assisting 
Terrorist Acts‟ (2004) 8 Newcastle Law Review 19;  B. McSherry, „Expanding the 
Boundaries of Inchoate Crimes:  The Growing Reliance on Preparatory Offences‟ in 
B. McSherry, A. Norrie and S. Bronitt (eds), Regulating Deviance:  The Redirection of 
Criminalisation and the Futures of Criminal Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing 2009). 
34 See Criminal Code Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2003.  
35 See Andrew Lynch, Nicola McGarrity and George Williams, „The Proscription of 
Terrorist Organisations in Australia‟ (2009) Federal Law Review 5. 
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censorship.36   This threat to human rights is particularly acute in the 
Australian context, since there is no national human rights bill or 
charter.   Two jurisdictions have adopted local human rights 
legislation (modelled on the United Kingdom Human Rights Act 1998), 
though these laws cannot limit federal terrorism laws or the powers 
of the federal police.37   Also, in the absence of implementing 
legislation, binding international human rights treaties which Australia 
has ratified are not directly enforceable in the courts, so human rights 
provisions contained in such treaties can only be raised in domestic 
proceedings to guide the development of the common law or to 
interpret legislation in cases of ambiguity.   This explains why so far, 
only a limited number of human rights issues relating to the new 
terrorism offences have reached the courts. 
Australian terrorism offences have furthermore an international 
impact, for example in relation to international humanitarian 
intervention and more specifically humanitarian access and assistance 
under sections 102.6-8.   Section 102.8(4)(c) contains an exemption 
for humanitarian aid, but this exemption is only applicable for the 
broad “association” offence.   Support of and the provision of funds 
to terrorist organisations, which might become necessary to further 
humanitarian aid in conflict zones, are not exempt.   These offences 
are subject to 15 to 25 year sentences. 
An example of the international impact of terrorism offences is 
the recent Victorian Supreme Court decision in R. v. 
Vinayagamoorthy.38   The evidential basis for this decision was provided 
by an investigation conducted by the Australian Federal Police in Sri 
Lanka against Australian citizens.39   The suspects, three Tamil 
 
 
36 The “advocacy” provision (s.102.1(1A)) is a more recent addition to the Act and 
particularly contested as the definition of “advocates” creates possibilities of invasion 
of open, pluralistic, democratic discourse concerning events of international 
significance (free speech): 
“(1A) In this Division, an organisation advocates the doing of a terrorist act if:   
(a)  the organisation directly or indirectly counsels or urges the doing of a 
terrorist act;  or  
(b) the organisation directly or indirectly provides instruction on the doing of a 
terrorist act;  or  
(c)  the organisation directly praises the doing of a terrorist act in circumstances 
where there is a substantial risk that such praise might have the effect of 
leading a person (regardless of his or her age or any mental impairment that 
the person might suffer) to engage in a terrorist act.” 
See also Simon Bronitt and Bernadette McSherry (n.4), 1008-1009. 
37 Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT);  Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 
(Vic.). 
38 [2010] VSC 148. 
39 See for summary of the facts Brian Walters, „Tormenting the Tamils with Our 
Terror Laws‟, ABC News, 31 March 2010 at 
<http://www.abc.net.au/unleashed/33354.html>, accessed  May 12, 2011. 
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Australians, were suspected of providing funds to the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).40   The police investigation had been 
initiated by the Sri Lankan government and the evidence gathered was 
subject to review by the Sri Lankan Deputy Solicitor-General, who 
also reserved the right to “advise” witnesses.41   These events not only 
had a potential adverse affect on humanitarian aid for people living in 
the LTTE-governed territory of Sri Lanka, but severely infringed the 
suspects‟ fair trial rights in Australia.42 
The three Tamil Australians were convicted of providing 
resources to the LTTE on March 31, 2010.   As charges under 
Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) had not been possible (since the LTTE 
is not a proscribed terrorist organisation under Australian legislation), 
the defendants were charged and convicted under an offence 
contained in the Charter of the United Nations Act 1945 (Cth).   Despite 
the court agreeing that the funds were not provided for a terrorist 
purpose, the provision of funds to a terrorist organisation was here 
penalised, independently of a terrorist act.43   However, although the 
offence of “providing funds to a listed organisation”, under the 
Charter of the United Nations Act 1945 (Cth), attracts sentences of up to 
five years‟ imprisonment, the defendants avoided immediate jail 
terms.44   This decision, and the previously outlined terrorism 
offences, do highlight, however, moves towards a restrictive regime 
for suspects and increasing powers for the state.   This trend in 
recently-enacted federal legislation can be further highlighted in the 
area of organised crime. 
A further international impact is given by the introduction of 
extraterritorial effects of Australian terrorism laws.   Sections 102.10 
and 103.3 provide for extended geographical jurisdiction for offences 
under section 15.4: 
“Extended geographical jurisdiction – category D  
If a law of the Commonwealth provides that this section 
applies to a particular offence, the offence applies:   
(a) whether or not the conduct constituting the alleged 
offence occurs in Australia;  and  
(b) whether or not a result of the conduct constituting the 
alleged offence occurs in Australia.”    
 
 
40 See for a comment on the decision Victoria Sentas, „Terrorist Organisation 
Offences and the LTTE:  R v Vinayagamoorthy‟, Current Issues on Criminal Justice 
22(1) (2010) 159-169. 
41 McKenzie N and Baker R, „Raising hackles‟, The Age, March 31, 2010 
<http://www.theage.com.au/national/raising-hackles-20100330-rbit.html>, 
accessed May 12, 2011. 
42 Victoria Sentas (n.40), 165. 
43 ibid. 
44 ibid. 
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Even though no threat against Australian security is evident, a person 
can be severely punished for being a “member” of a “terrorist 
organisation” in a country involved in a violent political conflict far 
removed from Australia.   As was noted by Russell Hogg, “an offence 
may be committed by a foreigner against a foreigner in a foreign 
country remote geographically from and of no particular interest to 
Australia”.45   This is one of the rare examples of an Australian 
offence with universal jurisdiction.    
Furthermore, extraterritorial effects can occur when Australian 
citizens or residents are murdered (s.115.1) even on foreign territory.   
Punishment is life imprisonment.   This offence of “Harming 
Australians Overseas” was introduced after the Bali bombings on 
October 12, 2002, where 88 Australians were killed.   Not only is the 
offence extra-territorial in operation, but it also has retrospective 
application.   This law was enacted notwithstanding the fact these acts 
were serious criminal offences committed on Indonesian territory and 
the Bali bombers were tried and convicted, and some ultimately 
sentenced to death, in Indonesia.46 
 
E.   Organised crime 
New laws on organised crime were triggered in Australia by several 
incidents in recent years involving outlaw motorcycle gangs.   One of 
these incidents occurred in March, 2009, when during a brawl 
between members of the Comanchero and Hells Angels motorcycle 
clubs at Sydney Airport a person was killed, which elevated the 
problem to a national level.   As a result of the Sydney incident, 
greater focus was put on legal harmonization and cooperative law 
enforcement efforts in Australia in relation to serious and organised 
crime.   In his first National Security Statement in December, 2008, 
the then Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, had already highlighted the 
growing complexity of organised crime as a security challenge which, 
in combination with several motorcycle gang incidents, triggered the 
changes to legislation outlined below.47 
As a first response, the Commonwealth Organised Crime Strategic 
Framework was launched in November, 2009.48   It was, for example, 
agreed that the federal Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis 
Centre (AUSTRAC) should receive more support to ensure more 
effective counter-measures to serious and organised crime.   In the 
context of serious and organised crime, the centre targets revenue 
 
 
45 Russell Hogg (n.21) (quoting Bell J. in R. v. Ul-Haque, unreported, NSWSC, 
February 18, 2006), 302. 
46 Simon Bronitt and Bernadette McSherry (n.4), 975-976. 
47 ibid., 1037. 
48 ibid.  
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evasion and financial fraud in Australia but is predominantly a centre 
of information exchange rather than having enforcement powers.    
Furthermore, in 2009, the Standing Committee of Attorneys-
General agreed to develop a comprehensive national approach 
ensuring a coordinated national effort to prevent, investigate and 
prosecute organised criminal activities, as well as target the proceeds 
of organised criminal groups and combat organised and gang-related 
crime.49   In February, 2010, the Crimes Legislation Amendment (Serious 
and Organised Crime) Act 2010 (Cth) was introduced as a model law.   
The legislation contained new offences to deal with organised crime, 
enhance law enforcement powers, strengthen the legislation providing 
for the confiscation of criminal assets and prevent money laundering.   
In some jurisdictions, including South Australia and New South 
Wales, the legislatures have enacted control orders, which have the 
effect of prohibiting contact between persons of declared 
organisations.   However, as the states and territories had not referred 
powers to the Commonwealth in the field of organised crime, the 
Federal Parliament was unable to enact “control orders”.   This 
limitation on federal competence may be contrasted with the referral 
of powers that occurred in relation to measures to prevent acts of 
terrorism (which include control orders and preventive detention) 
under the Commonwealth Criminal Code.50 
However, the Act significantly altered the Commonwealth Criminal 
Code and created the new Part 9.9:  “Criminal associations and 
organisations”.   The new offences created include:   
 associating in support of serious organised criminal activity 
(s.390.3); 
 providing support for a criminal organisation (s.390.4);  
 committing an offence for the benefit of, or at the direction 
of, a criminal organisation (s. 390.5);  
 directing activities of a criminal organisation (s.390.6).  
These new Australian provisions are highly controversial and have 
been criticised as being neither particularly practical nor inclusive.51   
 
 
49 See Standing Committee of Attorneys-General, Current Projects and Achievements (July 
12, 2010), <http://www.scag.gov.au/lawlink/scag/ll_scag.nsf/pages/scag_ 
achievements>, accessed May 12, 2011. 
50 Kylie Weston-Scheuber, „Case and Comment:  Totani v South Australia - Organised 
Crime Laws Under Fire‟, (2009) 33 Criminal Law Journal 357. 
51 For a submission on the federal legislation which provides a detailed analysis of the 
new offences, see Andreas Schloenhardt, „Submission to the Inquiry into the Crimes 
Legislation Amendment (Serious and Organised Crime) Bill (No 2) 2009‟, (October 7, 2009),  
<http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/legcon_ctte/organised_crime_two/sub
missions.htm> and Rod Broadhurst and Julie Ayling, Submission to the Inquiry into the 
Crimes Legislation Amendment (Serious and Organised Crime) Bill (No 2) 2009 (October 12, 
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In a recent case before the High Court of Australia, South Australia v. 
Totani, it was held that parts of the Serious and Organised Crime (Conduct) 
Act 2008 (S.A.), and in particular provisions relating to declared 
organisations triggering the applicability of control orders, were 
unconstitutional.52   Some of the reasons were that the determination 
of whether an organisation is a criminal-declared organisation is made 
by the executive, based upon criminal intelligence that is not disclosed 
to the courts.53   Furthermore, as the court pointed out, criminal 
liability should be conduct based, as determined by the courts, not 
class or group based, as determined by the executive.54   Therefore, in 
the case of control orders under the South Australian legislation, the 
determination of being a “member” of a declared group, made by the 
executive, would force the court to follow the executive‟s application 
to issue a control order and would thereby render the court an 
extended arm of the executive.55   The separation of powers would 
thereby be undermined and courts could no longer be considered 
independent or impartial, which are fundamental attributes of the rule 
of law concept.56   Any decision made by the courts would not follow 
an individual or personal assessment of the person subject to the 
order, but be based on his or her group membership irrespective of 
achieving the purpose of protecting society from this person‟s 
possible future criminal conduct.57 
These are just some of the criticisms in relation to the new 
organised crime laws in Australia and joining the chorus of concern 
expressed by judges, are academics, lawyers and other commentators.   
Similar to the new terrorism laws, the new approach to serious and 
organised crime in Australia and in particular the connection of the 
membership of a declared group to criminal offences and procedural 
measures has the potential to infringe civil liberties and ultimately the 
rule of law. 
 
F.   Conclusion 
It is apparent that there has been a significant expansion of federal 
power in Australia in the criminal justice sphere.   This has occurred 
through imaginative use of federal competence to legislate 
(particularly international treaties), through states being prepared to 
negotiate a referral of powers and through the promotion of uniform 
                                                                                                             
2009).   <http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/legcon_ctte/organised_crime_ 
two/submissions.htm>. 
52 [2010] HCA 39. 
53 ibid., [70] and [82], per French C.J. 
54 ibid., [35], per French C.J. 
55 ibid., [218], [226], [229] and [230], per Hayne J., and [436] per Crennan and Bell JJ. 
56 ibid., [436], per Crennan and Bell JJ. 
57 ibid., [478], per Kiefel J. 
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legislation across the states and territories.   This process of 
harmonisation is particularly apparent in relation to new terrorism 
and organised crime offences.   The lack of state and territory 
legislation in these areas makes a coordinated federal approach a 
logical step, reflecting the seriousness, and cross-border and 
international dimensions of these offences.   However, it could 
equally be argued that many of these crimes may be sufficiently dealt 
with under conventional criminal laws available at state and territory 
level. 
In relation to both terrorism and drugs offences, reforms were 
“rushed” through the parliamentary process, being kneejerk 
responses to incidents that attracted considerable political and media 
attention.   The question whether these reforms are compatible with 
human rights and in particular the fair trial rights of the accused, will 
ultimately be answered by the courts.   The cases outlined show that 
constitutional safeguards can be infringed through such legislation. 
The Totani decision in relation to South Australian organised crime 
offences provides evidence of a robust and independent judicial 
system seeking to uphold the rule of law.   However, there are limits 
to the power of the courts to remedy legislatively-authorised injustice, 
especially in a system without a national bill of rights or charter.    
The potential for human rights infringements becomes apparent 
with some of the trends in terrorism and organised crime legislation, 
such as criminalising mere association and membership status.   Apart 
from the evidential problems of proving this “status”, in particular in 
relation to terrorist groups, the focus of criminal liability is remote 
from any harmful criminal act.   Moreover, these criminal acts, as 
exemplified in the federal organised crime legislation, can be proven 
outside the courtroom.   The courts are left merely to decide the link 
between the individual and the group and not any individual 
responsibility.   This is similar in terrorism and organised crime 
legislation.   Neither require any link to a concrete illegal activity 
related to the offender. 
The impact of this type of status-based criminal legislation 
becomes particularly apparent in R. v. Vinayagamoorthy.58   Not only 
does the stigmatisation of particular groups give rise to political 
intrusions into the investigation phase, but it can further have a 
substantive impact on wider international relations and humanitarian 
assistance, whether or not the laws have extraterritorial effect.   It has 
therefore to be hoped that the courts, in future decisions, uphold 
human rights and condemn improper political involvement and 
decisions in the investigative and pre-trial processes. 
 
 
 
58 See n.38. 
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II.   INFORMATION ABOUT OPPORTUNITIES FOR LAWYERS FROM 
OVERSEAS TO PRACTISE IN AUSTRALIA 
 
Like the criminal law in Australia, the practice of law is regulated in 
each of the states and territories individually.   To find out more 
about opportunities for legal practice, the practitioner should 
therefore refer to the specific requirements in each jurisdiction.59 
Admitting authorities in the different jurisdictions are:  for the 
Australian Capital Territory, the Northern Territory, Queensland and 
Western Australia, “The Legal Practitioners Admission Board”;  for 
Victoria, the “Board of Examiners”;  for Tasmania, the “Board of 
Legal Education”;  for New South Wales, the “Legal Profession 
Admission Board” and for South Australia, the “Board of 
Examiners”.   These bodies can be contacted individually to give 
advice relating to the particular circumstances of non-Australian 
trained lawyers. 
The Law Admissions Consultative Committee (comprising 
representatives of the admitting authority in each Australian 
jurisdiction, the Committee of Australian Law Deans, the 
Australasian Professional Legal Education Council and the Law 
Council of Australia) issued “Uniform Principles for Assessing 
Qualifications of Overseas Applicants for Admission to the 
Australian Legal Profession” in October, 2010.   This document 
contains general guidelines, and the practitioner is therefore warned 
that additional requirements may apply in the different Australian 
jurisdictions.   It is therefore recommended to consult with the bodies 
enumerated above first, before relying on the “uniform principles”.   
The uniform principles state that an applicant must usually have: 
(i) completed a tertiary course leading to legal practice in the 
applicant‟s home jurisdiction, which is substantially 
equivalent to a three-year full-time law course that leads to 
admission to the legal profession in Australia ;  and 
(ii) successfully completed subjects, either as part of that course 
or otherwise, which are substantially equivalent to the areas 
of study which Australian applicants must successfully 
complete before being admitted to the legal profession in 
Australia;  and 
(iii) acquired and demonstrated an appropriate understanding of, 
and competence in, certain skills, practice areas and values, 
which are substantially equivalent to the skills, practice areas 
and values which Australian applicants must acquire and 
 
 
59 See for an informative overview the website of the Law Council of Australia which 
is a federal body responsible for practitioner concerns 
<http://www.lawcouncil.asn.au/lacc.cfm>. 
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demonstrate an understanding of and competence in, before 
being admitted to the legal profession in Australia;  and 
(iv) undertaken, or been exempted from, the International 
English Language Testing System Academic Module test 
within two years before seeking admission, and obtained 
minimum scores of 8.0 for writing, 7.5 for speaking and 7.0 
for reading and listening, in the components of that test. 
Each of these listed requirements is subject to certain exemptions 
and the requirements do not apply to legal practitioners from New 
Zealand, whose qualifications are more easily recognised.   Overseas 
applicants must furthermore have comparable academic qualifications 
leading up to the admission to practice.   Higher degrees completed in 
Australia, such as masters and doctoral studies, are not considered 
relevant in the application process.   An exception are Graduate 
Diplomas in Law undertaken in either England, Wales or Northern 
Ireland.   Furthermore, applicants to the Australian legal profession 
can choose to sit the Common Professional Examination, which 
enables them to practise in Australian jurisdictions. 
Generally, applicants from the United States, England, Wales or 
Northern Ireland, are subject to a number of exceptions, which make 
it easier to be admitted in Australia.   Admission is generally easier for 
lawyers who have completed similar academic qualifications enabling 
them to be admitted to the bar and chances are increased if they have 
been admitted to the bar of their home jurisdiction.   As a general 
rule, the more experienced the practitioner, the easier becomes the 
admission process, provided the required English language 
proficiency has been obtained. 
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THE PRIVY COUNCIL AND JAMAICA 
Campbell v. The Queen [2010] UKPC 26, [2011] 2 W.L.R. 983 
(November 3, 2010) 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council – Jurisdiction – Jamaica 
In Campbell, the Privy Council ruled that it could grant a defendant 
from Jamaica special leave to appeal to it against his conviction for 
murder, even though the Jamaican Court of Appeal had refused leave 
to appeal to that court on the merits. 
The case concerned the point-blank shooting of a policeman in a 
bar, and the prosecution‟s sole witness was another man who had 
been in the bar, who had known the defendant for many years.   The 
defendant claimed he had an alibi, and that either the witness was 
deliberately framing him because of “bad blood” between them (the 
defendant was alleged to have made the witness‟s underage grand-
daughter pregnant) or it was a case of mistaken identity (because the 
witness was a drunkard).   At the first trial, the jury were unable to 
reach a verdict, but the defendant was convicted at a retrial, at which 
point he applied for leave to appeal. 
During the initial application for leave to a single judge of the 
Court of Appeal, counsel for the prosecution had taken the stance 
that there was nothing that would provide a possible ground of 
appeal, and the judge agreed that the application was without merit.   
On a renewed application for leave to appeal, the Court of Appeal 
stated that the trial judge had dealt adequately with the issues and that 
there was no ground on which the jury‟s verdict could be faulted.   
Leave was refused. 
The Privy Council disagreed.   In the result, the board suggested 
that the case be remitted to the Court of Appeal with a direction to 
quash the jury‟s verdict and determine whether or not to order a 
(second) retrial.   On the substantive issues, the failure to give the 
defendant a good character direction to which he was entitled, in 
circumstances where the credibility and reliability of the witness‟s 
identification stood alone against his own credibility, deprived him of 
the benefit of such a direction in precisely the kind of case where it 
should be regarded as being of greatest potential significance. 
The absence of a good character direction was attributed to the 
incompetence of the defendant‟s trial lawyer (deceased by the time of 
the Privy Council judgment), not the judge, and, in the process of 
ruling the conviction unsafe the board made the point that it will not 
152 Journal of Commonwealth Criminal Law [2011] 
 
usually entertain a ground of appeal based upon allegations of 
incompetence that have not been raised at an earlier stage in the 
proceedings.   The exceptional circumstances of the case, however, 
which included “unfocused and disordered conduct by counsel”, 
“large numbers of impermissible questions as well as … inappropriate 
applications and submissions, leading to a number of judicial 
reproofs”, and a history of earlier disbarment from the Bar of 
England and Wales on charges of professional misconduct, racial 
bias, and intemperate and immoderate language, compelled the 
conclusion that the incompetence of counsel was the only plausible 
explanation for the failure. 
Both on the facts and the conduct of the proceedings, this was a 
remarkable case.  From a Commonwealth point of view, however, it 
is the way in which the board dealt with the issue of jurisdiction that 
is particularly interesting.   Delivering the unanimous opinion of the 
board, Lord Mance first recognised that local legislation may restrict 
the right to special leave expressly or by necessary implication.   He 
next considered section 110(3) of the Constitution of Jamaica, which 
states that “Nothing in this section shall affect any right of Her 
Majesty to grant special leave to appeal from decisions of the Court 
of Appeal to Her Majesty in Council in any … criminal matter”.   He 
noted that section 110(3) was intended to preserve (rather than grant) 
the right to seek special leave in circumstances where there had been 
a decision of the Jamaican Court of Appeal, but that the right was not 
limited to the provisions of section 110(3).   The language of section 
110 as a whole could not be said to “make clear an intention to 
exclude in other respects the right to seek special leave” contained in 
section 3 of the Judicial Committee Act 1833 and section 1 of the Judicial 
Committee Act 1844. 
Given the breadth of the prerogative power to grant special leave 
expressed in both sections of the Acts of 1833 and 1844, Lord Mance 
was in no doubt that these permitted the grant of special leave, even 
where the only decision of the domestic court had been to refuse to 
hear an appeal.  
The relationship between the Privy Council and the Caribbean 
Commonwealth states has been difficult for a number of years.   In 
1970, a Jamaican delegation at the Sixth Heads of Government 
Conference proposed the establishment of a Caribbean Court of 
Appeal in substitution for the judicial committee of the Privy Council.  
And it was the Jamaican case of Pratt and another v. Att.-Gen. for Jamaica 
and another1, in 1993, that is often seen as a major contributing factor 
both to the unpopularity of the Privy Council in the region, and to 
the eventual establishment of a Caribbean Court of Justice in 2001.   
 
 
1 [1994] 2 A.C. 1. 
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In that case, the Privy Council decided that offenders imprisoned on 
death row for more than five years should have their sentences 
commuted to life imprisonment, despite local opposition. 
On the one hand, as the website of the Caribbean Court of Justice 
itself admits, “Opinions are divided on the need for, or desirability of, 
the Caribbean Court of Justice.”2;  and, despite that court‟s 
jurisdiction as an appellate court of last resort for some states, the 
Privy Council remains the highest court of appeal for most Caribbean 
Commonwealth states, including Jamaica.    On the other, it must be 
open to question how long the sovereign states of the Caribbean will 
be prepared to countenance the intrusion of the Privy Council if it 
continues to make decisions that (rightly or wrongly) fly so obviously 
in the face of regional determination.   
“The fact that a domestic court of appeal has refused leave to 
appeal to it will,” said Lord Mance in Campbell, “always be a relevant, 
and often no doubt decisive, consideration for the Board to consider 
when deciding whether or not to grant special leave.”  Whether this 
will provide sufficient comfort for twenty-first century Jamaica, or for 
the rest of the Caribbean Commonwealth, remains to be seen. 
 
DEBORAH COLBRAN ESPADA.*    
 
 
 
COMPLAINANTS WHO STOP COMPLAINING: 
BEING PROSECUTED FOR WITHDRAWING AN ALLEGATION 
Dushkar Kanchan Singh v. The Queen [2010] NZSC 161 (December 17, 2010) 
Supreme Court of New Zealand 
R. v. A. [2010] EWCA Crim. 2913 (November 23, 2010) 
Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), United Kingdom 
Domestic abuse – Perverting the course of justice – Privilege 
Few complainants can be in a less enviable position than the woman 
who makes an allegation of physical or sexual violence against her 
partner.   Two recent cases, one from New Zealand and one from the 
United Kingdom, demonstrate how easily such a woman can become 
caught in a tug of war between her partner and the Crown.   The 
partner will illegitimately pressurise the complainant to drop her 
allegations, while the Crown, in the aim of securing a conviction, will 
 
 
2 <http://www.caribbeancourtofjustice.org/about2.htm> last accessed at May 16, 2011. 
* M.A. (Cantab.), Solicitor (non-practising). 
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do everything within its power to ensure that the woman pursues the 
charges and gives evidence.   The result is that the woman is straight-
jacketed into continuing with her allegations:  as the New Zealand 
case shows, the scope for pulling out once the train is in motion is 
limited;  and as the United Kingdom case illustrates, if the woman 
does drop her allegations, she is exposed to prosecution for 
perverting the course of justice.   This is an unsatisfactory state of 
affairs, as is being gradually acknowledged in the United Kingdom. 
In Dushkar Kanchan Singh v. The Queen [2010] NZSC 161 
(December 17, 2010), the New Zealand courts were faced with the 
question of whether a complainant in a domestic abuse case, who has 
changed her mind about wanting to see her partner prosecuted, can 
refuse to give evidence in court by claiming the privilege against self-
incrimination, on the basis that if she were to give evidence at trial, 
she would contradict earlier statements made by her, and would 
therefore be liable to prosecution for perjury, making a false 
complaint, wasting police time, or other similar offences. 
The defendant was a police officer, and met and became engaged 
to the victim, Ms D, in early 2006.   In that year, the Crown alleged 
that the appellant assaulted Ms D on 19 occasions.   Having initially 
given evidence against the defendant at a preliminary hearing, Ms D 
then changed course and attempted to derail the prosecution:  she 
swore an affidavit in May, 2007, seeking to be excused from giving 
evidence at trial, and she told the police in January, 2008, that she 
intended to leave the country (showing just how desperate 
complainants can become to stop prosecutions).   This proved to be 
counterproductive, because Ms D was arrested and compelled to give 
evidence. 
Ms D attempted to rely on the privilege against self-incrimination 
in order to avoid giving evidence against her partner.   This was 
rejected by the judge, who permitted her to be cross-examined by the 
Crown as a hostile witness.   The jury found the defendant guilty on 
five counts of violence, seemingly convicting him on those counts 
where there was independent evidence inculpating him, but acquitting 
him on those counts where the only evidence was what Ms D had 
said in her earlier depositions.   The jury also found that, by 
pressurising Ms D to drop her allegations, the defendant wilfully 
perverted the course of justice. 
The argument that Ms D was wrongly denied the right to claim 
privilege was raised by the defendant on his appeal against conviction, 
rather than by Ms D herself.   This in itself meant that the appeal 
could never succeed:  as noted by the court, it is only the witness who 
can rely on the privilege – it is a personal right that cannot be relied 
upon by any other party.   Fortunately for the exploration of this area 
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of the law, the court nevertheless went on to examine whether or not 
the decision to reject Ms D‟s claim to privilege was correct. 
The court held that the judge had been right to deny Ms D‟s claim 
for privilege against self-incrimination.   Ms D‟s first argument was 
that if she gave evidence at trial, she would repeat the inculpatory 
statements she made at the preliminary hearing, and, since she now 
claimed that these statements were false, would expose herself to 
prosecution for perjury.   This argument so lacked legal merit that it 
was not pursued by counsel:  the privilege against self-incrimination 
can only attach to past offending, and Ms D‟s argument, if right, 
would mean that any witness could avoid giving evidence by claiming 
that if he takes the witness stand, he will lie, commit perjury, and 
thereby risk prosecution. 
It was only open to Ms D to base her claim for privilege on her 
earlier statements, rather than what she might say at trial.   As Ms D 
had made statements both inculpatory and exculpatory of the 
defendant, she could theoretically be prosecuted whichever stance she 
took at trial.   If she gave evidence against the defendant, it would 
mean that the statements in which she denied her earlier allegations 
would be exposed as false, and this would amount to perverting the 
course of justice by withdrawing a true complaint.   If Ms D 
maintained, at trial, her position that the defendant was innocent, she 
would demonstrate herself to have been guilty of making false 
allegations. 
Despite the fact that the possibility of prosecution did, in theory, 
exist, the Supreme Court held that a prosecution was insufficiently 
likely so as to allow a claim for privilege against self-incrimination.   
Section 60(1)(b) of the Evidence Act 2006, which enshrines the 
privilege in statute, allows a person to claim it where giving evidence 
would be “likely to incriminate the person”.   The court stated that 
the use of the word “likely” showed that the legislature intended to 
confine the privilege to circumstances where the risk of a prosecution 
was “real and appreciable”, and not “merely imaginary and fanciful”.   
The likelihood of prosecution in this case was not sufficiently strong, 
because if Ms D gave exculpatory evidence at trial, the Crown would 
not prosecute her in respect of her initial, inculpatory statements, as 
the Crown‟s case was that those statements were true.   If, on the 
contrary, Ms D gave evidence tending to show the offender‟s guilt, 
the Crown would not mount a prosecution in respect of Ms D‟s 
earlier attempts to withdraw her allegations, because the Crown‟s 
stance was that those retractions were made under illegitimate 
pressure from the offender. 
The result, for Mr Singh, was that his convictions stood, and this 
is unobjectionable:  it would have been unacceptable for him to have 
won an appeal on the basis of an error made by the court in relation 
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to his victim.   But for Ms D, and women in her position, the result is 
exposure to prosecution – the court expressly noted that a 
prosecution was possible in respect of the exculpatory evidence given 
by Ms D at trial, on the basis that it was inconsistent with her initial, 
truthful allegations. 
In a recent case in England and Wales, R. v. A. ([2010] EWCA 
Crim. 2913), such a risk became reality.   The complainant had been 
with her husband for nine years, and married to him for five.   In 
November, 2009, she reported that she had been raped by him.   She 
was examined by a forensic medical examiner and interviewed, 
following which the husband was charged with six counts of rape, 
ranging from anal to vaginal and oral rape.   In January, 2010, she 
contacted the police and the prosecution to say that she wanted to 
retract her complaint, though she maintained that her allegations were 
true.   She was told that the prosecution would proceed, to which she 
responded by contacting the police and changing her position, now 
claiming that her allegations of rape were false.   The prosecution had 
no option but to offer no evidence against the defendant, and not 
guilty verdicts were accordingly entered against him.   In a discussion 
with the prosecution, the complainant admitted that she had falsely 
retracted her allegations:  she had been in a confused and emotional 
state, having been the victim of domestic abuse for years, and, having 
been told by an acquaintance that if he were convicted, the husband 
would be sentenced to 10 years‟ imprisonment, she had felt an 
immense sense of guilt at having pursued the allegations.   She 
wanted to arrange a family Christmas at which her children and her 
husband would be present, and she now felt that serving divorce 
papers on her husband would be enough.   Facing an indictment 
alleging that she perverted the course of justice, she pleaded guilty to 
falsely retracting her allegations, and was sentenced to eight months‟ 
imprisonment.   She appealed against that sentence to the Court of 
Appeal (Criminal Division).   Judgment was delivered by the Lord 
Chief Justice, Lord Judge, and constitutes an important re-appraisal of 
the propriety of prosecuting a woman in the appellant‟s position. 
The court noted that a complaint that an individual has been a 
victim of crime is not a purely private matter:  “Every crime engages 
the community at large.”  Since there is a “distinct public interest in 
the investigation”, the retraction of a truthful allegation can constitute 
a serious offence.   However, the court emphasised that it should “be 
guided by a broad measure of compassion for a woman who has 
already been victimised”, and recognised that women victims of 
domestic abuse are vulnerable and susceptible to pressure from their 
partners.   The court signalled that a prosecution in such 
circumstances should be exceptional, and reduced the appellant‟s 
sentence to a community sentence.   Within two months of the 
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decision, the Crown Prosecution Service (C.P.S.) responded to the 
Lord Chief Justice‟s signal, and issued interim guidance that drew 
specifically on his remarks.   The guidance states that a prosecution 
for retracting a truthful allegation is less likely to be in the public 
interest, and therefore less likely to be pursued, where, amongst other 
factors, (i) the person retracting the allegation has been threatened or 
pressurised into doing so by the suspect of the original allegation, his 
or her family, friends or other persons, and (ii) there is a history of 
abuse or domestic violence or intimidation. 
Over time, the criminal law has advanced considerably in its 
appreciation of violence in the domestic context.   A landmark step in 
this direction was the decision of the House of Lords in R. v. R. 
[1992] 1 AC 599, which ended the marital rape exemption that, based 
on the fiction that a woman‟s consent to intercourse with her 
husband could be implied from her being married to him, operated to 
protect husbands from prosecution for rape.   The cases above 
demonstrate just how far the scales have tipped the other way, with 
prosecutions not only of men who perpetrate violence on their 
partners, but of women who are pressurised into dropping their 
allegations.   The Lord Chief Justice‟s judgment in R. v. A. and the 
C.P.S.‟s subsequent guidance are signs that we may be finally arriving 
at a golden mean. 
 
ANDREW BERSHADSKI.*    
 
 
 
MERE MEMBERSHIP OF A BANNED ORGANISATION 
CANNOT CARRY CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
Arup Bhuyan v. State of Assam [2011] INSC 100 (February 3, 2011) 
Sri Indra Das v. State of Assam [2011] INSC 125 (February 10, 2011) 
Supreme Court of India 
Freedom of association – Freedom of speech – Guilt by association 
Both appellants were charged under section 3(5) of the Indian 
Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act 1987 (“the 1987 Act”), 
which made it an offence to be “a member of a terrorist gang or a 
terrorist organisation, which is involved in terrorist acts,” carrying a 
minimum sentence of five years‟ imprisonment (up to a maximum 
sentence of life imprisonment) and a fine.   This offence now forms 
 
 
* B.A. (Cantab.), Barrister (Inner Temple). 
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part of section 10 of the Indian Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 1967 
(“the 1967 Act”).   They were accused of membership of the United 
Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), declared to be a “terrorist 
organisation” under the 1967 Act, ss.3 and 35, and listed in the 
schedule thereto. 
In its judgments, the Supreme Court of India (coram:  Markandey 
Katju J., Gyan Sudha Misra J.) held that membership of a banned 
organisation, without more, cannot carry criminal sanction. 
 
The Facts 
Sri Indra Das was arrested in connection with the death of Anil 
Kumar Das, who disappeared in November 1991.   Although not 
mentioned in the first investigation report, Sri Indra Das later made a 
confession to the police, admitting the murder, and membership of a 
banned organisation, which confession he later withdrew.   The 
charge sheet was only filed nine years after the victim‟s death, and the 
charges framed over four years thereafter.   As there was no 
corroboration of the confession, Indian law precluded pursuit of a 
charge of murder (post).    The facts of the first case are not laid out in 
the Supreme Court‟s judgment. 
Both appellants were convicted of offences contrary to section 
3(5) of the 1987 Act.   Sri Indra Das was sentenced to five years‟ 
rigorous imprisonment (hard labour), and a fine of Rs.2000.   No 
information is given as to the sentence in the first case, but, as noted, 
the minimum sentence was five years‟ imprisonment.   Both appealed 
their convictions. 
 
Confessions and Terrorism Offences 
The charges were based solely on confessions made to police officers 
by the accused.   Confessions made to a police officer, or whilst in 
police custody, are not normally admissible, under sections 25 and 26 
of the Indian Evidence Act 1872.   However, by virtue of section 15 of 
the 1987 Act, such confessions were admissible for offences under 
that Act.  In Arup Bhuyan, however, the Supreme Court emphasised 
that confessions to the police, in India, are particularly unreliable 
evidence, stating that they are often extracted by means of torture – 
and “a person [...] under torture … will confess to almost any crime”.   
In both cases, the court held that convictions on the basis of 
unsupported confessions to the police are unsafe. 
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Rejecting “Guilt by Association” 
The Justices (Katju and Misra JJ.), building on their earlier judgment 
in State of Kerala v. Raneef [2011] 1 S.C.A.L.E. 8 (Supreme Court of 
India, January 3, 2011), ruled against “guilt by association”. 
Raneef was an appeal against the denial of bail to the defendant 
under section 43D(5) of the 1967 Act (“the accused shall not be 
released on bail if the Court, on perusal of the case diary … is of the 
opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the 
accusation … is prima facie true”:  Raneef, [7]).   The defendant was a 
dentist who sutured the wound on the back of a man allegedly 
involved in a violent attack.   Both Raneef and the injured man were 
members of the Popular Front of India (P.F.I.), a Muslim 
organisation, but not one designated under the 1967 Act.   Raneef 
was charged with conspiring to participate in the attack, allegedly 
founded on his membership of the P.F.I.   As the P.F.I. is not 
banned, the court held that Raneef could not be penalised merely for 
belonging to it.   However, the court further posited that, even if it 
were shown to be involved in unlawful activities, the fact that the 
defendant was a member of that organisation would not bring him 
within section 43D(5).   In so doing, it adopted Justice Douglas‟s 
judgment in the United States Supreme Court case of 
Elfbrandt v. Russell 384 U.S. 11 (1966): 
“A law which [criminalises] membership without the „specific 
intent‟ to further the illegal aims of the organisation infringes 
unnecessarily on protected freedoms.   It rests on the doctrine 
of „guilt by association‟ which has no place here.” 
In both Arup Bhuyan and Sri Indra Das, the court adopted this 
reasoning, and cited various other United States Supreme Court cases 
from the McCarthy era.   The court‟s analysis of Brandenburg v. State of 
Ohio 395 U.S. 444 (1969) in Arup Bhuyan is particularly clear: 
“[in this case,] the United States Supreme Court went further 
and held that mere „advocacy or teaching the duty, necessity, 
or propriety‟ of violence as a means of accomplishing political 
or industrial reform, or publishing or circulating or displaying 
any book or paper containing such advocacy, or justifying the 
commission of violent acts with intent to exemplify, spread or 
advocate the propriety of the doctrines of criminal 
syndicalism, or to voluntarily assemble with a group formed 
„to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism‟ is 
not per se illegal.   It will become illegal only if it incites to imminent 
lawless action.” [Emphasis mine.] 
The court then turned to statutory interpretation in light of the 
Indian Constitution.   It cited the approach it had previously adopted 
to the offence of sedition, in Kedar Nath v. State of Bihar [1962] S.C.R. 
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Supl. (2) 769, at 809:  where a provision may be read as compatible 
with the Indian Constitution, this reading must be adopted in 
preference to one which would be unconstitutional;  and sedition 
legislation was aimed “at rendering penal only such activities as would 
be intended, or have a tendency, to create disorder or disturbance of 
public peace by resort to violence” (Kedar Nath, [26], quoted in Sri 
Indra Das, [29]).   The court applied this reasoning to the 
criminalisation of membership of banned organisations, reading 
section 3(5) of the 1987 Act down such that “mere membership of a 
banned organisation will not make a person a criminal unless he 
resorts to violence or incites people to violence or creates public 
disorder by violence or incitement to violence” (Arup Bhuyan, [15]). 
 
A Principled Volte-Face 
Although not explicitly put, these cases represent a reversal of 
previous case-law on anti-terrorism legislation.   In Kartar Singh v. State 
of Punjab [1994] (3) S.C.C. 569, the Supreme Court had examined the 
1987 Act, among other anti-terrorist laws, including the 
“membership” offence at issue in the present cases (see [141]).   The 
court held these laws not to have been ultra vires (at [78]), and 
confirmed the constitutionality of the 1987 Act in its entirety (at 
[148]).   The judgment is suffused with a concern over terrorism‟s 
fundamental opposition to the state.   The court recognises (at [145]) 
that “the Act tends to be very harsh and drastic containing … 
stringent provisions … minimum punishments and … enhanced 
penalties”, but sees this “drastic change” as justified, given the 
manner in which “terrorists and disruptionists … create terror and a 
sense of insecurity in the minds of the people”. 
These new cases surely chart a better approach:  no matter how 
heinous the alleged crime, a defendant‟s fundamental rights must not 
be set aside, and no court must allow itself to be cowed into doing so 
because of the general fear that such defendants‟ alleged actions 
engender. 
 
A Brief Comparison with the “Membership” Offence in the United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom membership offence is found in the Terrorism 
Act 2000, s.11:  “A person commits an offence if he belongs or 
professes to belong to a proscribed organisation”, unless he can show 
that the organisation was not proscribed at the time of his joining, 
and he has not participated in its activities since its proscription.   In 
R. v. Ahmed (Rangzieb) [2011] EWCA Crim. 184 (February 25, 2011), 
the Court of Appeal court held that what amounts to “membership” 
is likely to depend upon the nature of the organisation in question:  
“Membership of a loose and unstructured organisation may not 
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require any formal steps … [and a] criminal association is inherently 
more likely to lack formality than an innocent one” (at [87]).   The 
court accepted (at [89]) that the “core elements” of membership 
under section 11 are “voluntary and knowing association with others 
with a view to furthering the aims of the proscribed organisation”;  
however, although participation in activities may be a clear indication 
of membership, “unilateral sympathy with the aims of an 
organisation, even coupled with acts designed to promote similar 
objectives, will, whilst being clear evidence of belonging, not always 
be sufficient” to found a charge under this provision. 
This analysis is helpful, but it does not address the fundamental 
underlying problem with membership offences.   The criminalisation 
of mere membership of an organisation – no matter how heinous its 
objects – without the specific intent to promote or incite immediate, 
unlawful action, is fundamentally illiberal, and mistaken.   The 
Supreme Court of India is to be commended on their courageous 
defence of the freedom of association, much as their American 
brothers held back the worst excesses of McCarthyism.    
 
ATLI STANNARD.*    
 
 
 
REDUCTION IN SENTENCE FOR A GUILTY PLEA:  THE NEW 
ZEALAND SUPREME COURT REJECTS A SLIDING-SCALE APPROACH 
Hessell v. R. [2011] 1 N.Z.L.R. 607 (November 16, 2010) 
Supreme Court of New Zealand 
Hessell v. R. [2010] 2 N.Z.L.R. 298 (October 2, 2009) 
Court of Appeal of New Zealand 
Guilty plea – Discount in sentence – Judicial discretion 
In the absence of a Sentencing Council in New Zealand,  
the Court of Appeal steps in 
In July 2007, the New Zealand Parliament enacted the Sentencing 
Council Act 2007, establishing a Sentencing Council to issue 
sentencing guidelines, modelled on the English Sentencing Guidelines 
Council (now the Sentencing Council for England and Wales – see 
the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, Pt 4, Chap. 1).   However, the new 
government elected in 2008 did not support the concept of a non-
judicial body fixing sentencing guidelines.   As no Sentencing Council 
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was forthcoming, New Zealand‟s second highest court, the Court of 
Appeal, took matters into its own hands.   A “suitable case” was 
selected for a guideline judgment on discounts for guilty pleas.   That 
case was Hessell v. R. [2010] 2 N.Z.L.R. 298, an appeal from a 
sentence (of two years and eight months) handed down by the High 
Court for sexual offences, in which the defendant had received a 10 
per cent discount for his guilty plea on the last working day before 
the first day of trial. 
The Court of Appeal explained that, as the Sentencing Act 2002 
insists on a highly structured approach to sentencing, there was a 
need to review the unfettered discretion traditionally accorded to 
sentencing judges in New Zealand in respect of discounts for guilty 
pleas.   Like the English Sentencing Guidelines Council, the Court of 
Appeal adopted a sliding scale for sentencing judges to apply.   A 
reduction of 33 per cent of the otherwise appropriate sentence was 
warranted if a willingness to plead guilty was communicated at the 
first reasonable opportunity;  20 per cent if this happened after the 
first reasonable opportunity and a status hearing for summary 
proceedings or at first call-over after committal in cases proceeding 
on indictment;  and 10 per cent if communicated three weeks before 
the commencement of the trial (see [15]).   A small reduction of less 
than 10 per cent could be warranted if a guilty plea was entered after 
the commencement of the trial ([18]).   The discount was to be 
applied as the last step of the sentencing exercise, making clear what 
the sentence would otherwise have been.  
Unlike the English model, remorse (apart from “exceptional” 
remorse) would not count as separate mitigating factor, because such 
a discount was, to some extent, automatically built in as part of the 
discount for a guilty plea (see [25]).   Also in contrast to the English 
model, there was to be no reduction in the discount given because the 
prosecution case was strong, as judging the strength of the 
prosecution case was difficult, and certainty was required, both for 
defence lawyers and their clients, and for busy judges ([38]). 
 
The sliding scale is rejected by the Supreme Court  
in favour of a discretion capped at 25 per cent 
The case was appealed to the Supreme Court, which gave judgment 
on November 16, 2010:  Hessell v. R. [2011] 1 N.Z.L.R. 607.   The 
Supreme Court noted (at [35]) that the 2002 Act contained, for the 
first time in a New Zealand statute, a comprehensive statement of 
sentencing purposes and principles;  but it did not agree that the Act 
required a departure from the approach that the application of 
punishment for offending remained an evaluative task for judges, 
balancing sentencing discretion with sentencing consistency (at [43], 
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[44]).   The Supreme Court‟s “difficulty of principle” with the Court 
of Appeal‟s sliding-scale approach was that it put aside factors of 
apparent relevance to the mitigating weight that should be given to a 
guilty plea (at [53]).   Allowance for a guilty plea, the court said, 
should be given after an evaluation of all the circumstances in which 
the plea was entered, not just when it was entered. 
Sitting as a mitigating factor in a non-exhaustive list with six other 
mitigating factors, section 9(2)(b) of the 2002 Act requires a 
sentencing judge to take into account, “whether and when the 
offender pleaded guilty”.   The policy behind section 9(2)(b), the 
Supreme Court said, reflected the benefits that a guilty plea delivers to 
the administration of justice and to those who must otherwise 
participate in the trial process.   A guilty plea avoids a trial, which 
produces benefits such as savings in public expenditure (costs 
associated with trials) and demands on state resources (reduction in 
the back-log of trials), and benefits for witnesses, particularly victims, 
who are spared the stress of giving evidence, and who may be assisted 
by the offender‟s acknowledgement of responsibility (see [45]).   
These benefits justified giving an incentive to plead guilty;  but a 
system that went too far and incentivised innocent people to plead 
guilty risked infringing human rights (see [46]).   The New Zealand Bill 
of Rights Act 1990 explicitly protected the rights of a person charged 
with an offence, (i) to be presumed innocent until proved guilty 
according to law (s.25(c)), (ii) not to be compelled to confess guilt 
(s.25(d)), and (iii) to a fair and public hearing by an independent and 
impartial court (s.25(a)). 
One of the factors that had been put aside by the Court of 
Appeal, in its sliding scale, was the strength of the prosecution case.   
But the strength of the case against a defendant is, said the Supreme 
Court, an important factor in evaluating the extent to which a plea 
involves acceptance of responsibility.   Further, an approach where 
the maximum discount must be given where a plea is given promptly, 
no matter the strength of the prosecution case, carried the 
unacceptable risk that an accused who was not guilty would plead 
guilty to the offence charged (see [60], [72]). 
Another factor that the Court of Appeal thought ought to be 
ignored was remorse, unless “exceptional”.   However, this was at 
odds with section 9(2)(f) of the 2002 Act, which identified remorse 
shown by the offender as a mandatory mitigating factor.   For the 
Supreme Court, remorse was not shown simply by a guilty plea.   
Where a proper and robust evaluation by the judge showed that the 
defendant was genuinely remorseful – not just, for example, feeling 
sorry for himself – then separate credit for this mitigating feature 
should be given (see [64]). 
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The Court of Appeal‟s approach required an accused, in order to 
get the maximum discount, to plead guilty even where he disagreed 
with the prosecution‟s summary of facts, leaving the disagreement to 
be resolved as part of the sentencing process, at a subsequent 
disputed facts hearing.   This, said the Supreme Court (at [61]), was 
too rigid.   And what about the situation where the defendant agrees 
to plead guilty to a lesser charge in return for the prosecution 
dropping a more serious one?   The accused has already received a 
benefit for his guilty plea;  a discount in sentence based purely on 
when it was entered may lead to him receiving a double benefit ([62]).   
Instead, sentencing judges should be required to evaluate all the 
variable circumstances of individual cases that are relevant to a guilty 
plea, and given the scope to award appropriate recognition based on 
the conclusion reached.  
While the Supreme Court thought that there were advantages in 
addressing a discount for a guilty plea once all other matters had been 
considered, and a provisional sentence decided upon, the allowance 
that could and should be given for a guilty plea had to reflect all the 
circumstances in which the plea was entered (see [73], [74]).   Because 
remorse was to be dealt with separately, the upper limit of the 
discount for a guilty plea was 25 per cent of the otherwise appropriate 
sentence ([75]).   Whether the accused pleaded guilty at the first 
reasonable opportunity was always relevant, but when that 
opportunity arose was a matter for particular inquiry.   A plea could 
reasonably be seen as “early” where the accused pleaded as soon as 
he had the opportunity to be informed of all implications of the plea 
(see [75]). 
The Court of Appeal had been persuaded by the reasoning of law 
reform agencies in the United Kingdom and in New Zealand, which 
had recommended moving to a more prescriptive and structured 
approach.   The Supreme Court, on the other hand, thought the 
Court of Appeal‟s approach inappropriate, as it restricted the capacity 
of judges to determine sentences that were considered to fit all the 
circumstances of the case, and was not mandated by the 2002 Act (at 
[67]).   But what of the “suitable case” that had made this debate 
possible?   Here, at least, was an aspect of the Court of Appeal‟s 
judgment with which the Supreme Court agreed.   Mr Hessell had 
received a 10 per cent discount for a very late plea, and this reduction 
was within the High Court judge‟s sentencing discretion ([78]).   His 
appeal, along with Court of Appeal‟s sliding scale, was dismissed. 
 
LINDA RICHARDSON.*    
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COMPENSATION FOR MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE 
R. (Adams) v. Secretary of State for Justice;  Re MacDermott‟s and McCartney‟s 
Applications [2011] UKSC 18, The Times, May 12, 2011 (May 11, 2011) 
Supreme Court of the United Kingdom  
Appeal – Compensation – Miscarriage of justice 
A.   Background 
Andrew Adams was convicted of murder in 1993 by a judge and jury 
sitting in the Crown Court, and was sentenced to life imprisonment.   
At trial, he had argued that the principal prosecution witness had 
colluded with two police officers to give false testimony against him.   
An appeal against conviction was refused in 1998, but in 2007 his 
conviction was quashed on a reference by the Criminal Cases Review 
Commission, as it was discovered that information that would have 
greatly assisted in cross-examination of the crucial witnesses had been 
missed by his defence team.   He applied for compensation from the 
Secretary of State for Justice but his application was refused.   He 
brought judicial review proceedings but was unsuccessful in the 
English High Court and Court of Appeal. 
Eamonn MacDermott and Raymond McCartney were convicted 
in 1979 by a judge sitting alone at the Belfast City Commission of 
various offences, including the murder of a police officer, and were 
both sentenced to life imprisonment.   They had argued at trial that 
admissions said to have been made by them in police interview were 
either concocted or the result of ill-treatment by officers.   Appeals 
against conviction were refused in 1982, but their convictions were 
quashed in 2007 on a reference by the Criminal Cases Review 
Commission, it having emerged that senior prosecution officials had 
accepted that the officers who had questioned them had assaulted 
another suspect in the same investigation.   They applied for 
compensation from the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, but 
their applications were refused.   They too brought judicial review 
proceedings, and were unsuccessful in the Northern Irish High Court 
and Court of Appeal. 
A nine-judge constitution of the Supreme Court of the United 
Kingdom (Lord Phillips P.S.C., Lord Judge C.J., Lord Hope D.P.S.C., 
Lord Rodger, Lord Walker, Lady Hale, Lord Brown, Lord Kerr and 
Lord Clarke JJ.S.C.) considered appeals in both these cases together. 
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B.   Legislation 
The provision in United Kingdom law under consideration was 
section 133 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, subsection (1) of which 
provides: 
“… when a person has been convicted of a criminal offence 
and when subsequently his conviction has been reversed or 
he has been pardoned on the ground that a new or newly 
discovered fact shows beyond reasonable doubt that there has 
been a miscarriage of justice, the Secretary of State shall pay 
compensation for the miscarriage of justice to the person who 
has suffered punishment as a result of such conviction ... 
unless the non-disclosure of the unknown fact was wholly or 
partly attributable to the person convicted.” 
This provision was enacted to give effect to the United Kingdom‟s 
obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
1966, Article 14(6) of which provides: 
“When a person has by a final decision been convicted of a 
criminal offence and when subsequently his conviction has 
been reversed or he has been pardoned on the ground that a 
new or newly discovered fact shows conclusively that there 
has been a miscarriage of justice, the person who has suffered 
punishment as a result of such conviction shall be 
compensated according to law, unless it is proved that the 
non-disclosure of the unknown fact in time is wholly or partly 
attributable to him.” 
Section 133 initially existed alongside an ex gratia payment scheme 
operated by the Home Secretary after the ratification of the covenant 
by the United Kingdom in 1976, but after the termination of this 
scheme in 2006 it has provided the only route by which 
compensation could be claimed following a miscarriage of justice.   It 
only applies in cases where a conviction has been quashed on an 
appeal out of time or on a reference by the Criminal Cases Review 
Commission, and not where a defendant has been acquitted at trial or 
where his conviction has been quashed on an appeal within time. 
 
C.   “Miscarriage of Justice” 
In considering what constituted a “miscarriage of justice”, the court 
examined various aids to interpretation, including the wording of 
Article 14(6) in both English and French, the travaux préparatoires, 
subsequent practice in countries that had ratified the covenant, the 
judgment of the British House of Lords in R. (Mullen) v. Secretary of 
State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 14, [2005] 1 A.C. 1, and 
statements made in Parliament in the debates leading to the 
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enactment of section 133.   It found none of these of much 
assistance, and held that a fresh approach was needed. 
In particular, it considered the four categories of potential 
miscarriages of justice set out by Dyson L.J. in the Court of Appeal 
judgment in Adams, viz.: 
(i) where fresh evidence shows clearly that a defendant is 
innocent of the crime of which he has been convicted; 
(ii) where fresh evidence is such that, had it been available at the 
time of the trial, no reasonable jury could properly have 
convicted the defendant; 
(iii) where fresh evidence renders the conviction unsafe in that, 
had it been available at the time of the trial, a reasonable jury 
might or might not have convicted the defendant;  and 
(iv) where something has gone seriously wrong in the 
investigation of the offence or the conduct of the trial, 
resulting in the conviction of someone who should not have 
been convicted (although some doubt was expressed as to 
whether this was a standalone category). 
By a majority of five to four (per Lords Phillips, Hope, Kerr and 
Clarke and Lady Hale), it was held that section 133 should not be 
restricted to category (i), but that it should not encompass categories 
(iii) and (iv).   However, it was not satisfied with the wording of 
category (ii), and instead adopted what Lord Phillips described as a 
“more robust” test:  “A new fact will show that a miscarriage of 
justice has occurred when it so undermines the evidence against the 
defendant that no conviction could possibly be based upon it.”   It 
held that this test was consistent with the presumption of innocence 
as guaranteed by Article 6(2) of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. 
The view of the minority (viz. Lords Judge, Rodger, Walker and 
Brown) was that section 133 should apply only to category (i), in 
particular on the basis that the new or newly discovered fact should 
demonstrate not only that the conviction was unsafe, or that the 
investigative or trial processes were defective, but that justice had 
surely miscarried, the ultimate hallmark of a miscarriage of justice 
being the conviction and incarceration of the truly innocent.   It was 
also seen as vitally important by several judges that compensation not 
be paid out to anyone who was in fact guilty. 
 
D.   “New or Newly Discovered Fact” 
As to what constituted a “new or newly discovered fact”, the court 
was more divided.   A minority (viz. Lords Phillips and Kerr and Lady 
Hale) adopted the definition of “newly-discovered fact” in section 
9(6) of the Irish Criminal Procedure Act 1993 (section 9 of that Act 
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giving effect to Article 14(6) in the Republic of Ireland), viz. “a fact 
which was discovered by him or came to his notice after the relevant 
appeal proceedings had been finally determined or a fact the 
significance of which was not appreciated by the convicted person or 
his advisers during the trial or appeal proceedings”. 
A larger minority (viz. Lords Judge, Rodger, Walker and Brown) 
adopted the same approach as applies in circumstances where a 
defendant seeks to deploy fresh evidence on appeal, i.e. the test under 
section 23 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968, which normally predicates 
that there should be a reasonable explanation for the earlier failure to 
adduce the evidence at trial. 
Lord Clarke held that the term could include facts known to the 
defendant or to his legal advisers at trial or on appeal, and that the 
relevant knowledge was that of the trial court, but did not decide 
upon a test to be applied.   Lord Hope, on the other hand, held that 
the term excluded facts which had been disclosed to the defence and 
which were therefore knowable, even if not in fact known. 
 
E.   Outcome 
All nine judges were agreed that the appeal in the case of Adams 
should be dismissed, but by a majority the appeal in MacDermott and 
McCartney was allowed (the majority finding that it fell within the 
“more robust” reworded category (ii) test put forward by Lord 
Phillips).   The minority would have remitted the latter case to the 
Secretary of State for further consideration. 
 
F.   Comment 
One of the issues considered by the court was whether an appeal 
court, when allowing an appeal, is obliged or entitled to declare that 
the defendant is in fact innocent.   Lord Phillips (at [45]) agreed with 
the opinion of Lloyd L.J. in the English Court of Appeal in R. v. 
McIlkenny, (1991) 93 Cr.App.R. 287, that the court was not so entitled, 
and cited with approval the policy justification for this rule put 
forward by the Court of Appeal for Ontario in R. v. Mullins-Johnson 
[2007] ONCA 720, (2007) 87 O.R. (3d) 425, viz. that there should 
not, in effect, be introduced a third verdict in addition to “guilty” and 
“not guilty” of “factually innocent”, as it would degrade the acquittals 
of those against whom the charges had simply not been proved, and 
would effectively create two classes of acquitted defendants:  those 
found to be factually innocent and those who had benefitted from the 
presumption of innocence.   However, the question was not firmly 
decided:  of the other judges, only Lords Kerr and Judge expressed 
clear opinions, the former (at [172]) agreeing with Lord Phillips and 
the latter (at [251]) coming to the opposite view. 
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In considering that question, Lords Phillips and Kerr (at [47] and 
[173] respectively) examined the position in New Zealand, and cited 
the New Zealand Law Commission‟s 1998 report “Compensating the 
Wrongly Convicted”, which proposed that proof of innocence be 
required before compensation was paid out, and recommended that a 
tribunal be set up to determine this issue.   In fact, the New Zealand 
Government has now implemented guidelines providing for ex gratia 
payments, those guidelines requiring proof of innocence not beyond 
reasonable doubt but on the balance of probabilities.   Lord Kerr (at 
[173]) also considered the situation in Canada, where, similarly, there 
are guidelines providing for ex gratia payments, those guidelines again 
requiring proof of innocence, and noted that Canada had been found 
in breach of the Covenant by the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee for failing to establish a procedure for determining 
whether an applicant was indeed innocent. 
The situation in Australia, not referred to by the court, where all 
jurisdictions (save the Australian Capital Territory, where a statutory 
scheme exists) may make ex gratia payments, but where no standards 
or guidelines have been published, was addressed by the Australian 
Institute of Criminology‟s 2008 paper “Compensation for wrongful 
convictions”, which recommended the implementation of similar 
legislation or guidelines, and which appears to have operated on the 
assumption that a “wrongful conviction” is one where a person who 
is factually innocent has been convicted.   Accordingly, as a result of 
this judgment, the United Kingdom would seem to have instituted a 
more generous scheme than several other Commonwealth 
jurisdictions. 
As to the decision itself, it is unfortunate, particularly given the 
problems the court encountered in analysing Mullen (in which the 
House of Lords came to a practical decision on the facts of the case 
but failed to set out any clear or agreed principles to be applied in 
future cases), that it failed to come to agreement on some of the 
central aspects of this case.   Although there was unanimous 
agreement that the appeal in Adams should be dismissed, there was no 
majority as to the basis of that dismissal (four judges holding that it 
should be dismissed because it did not fall within the reworded 
category (ii), another four because it did not fall within category (i), 
and Lord Hope because the material on the basis of which the 
conviction had been quashed was not a “new or newly discovered 
fact”).   Furthermore, there was no majority at all on the meaning of 
“new or newly discovered fact”, with two groups of three and four 
judges each adopting two different but similar statutory tests, Lord 
Clarke essentially failing to decide upon any test and Lord Hope 
going down a route all of his own.   It must be doubtful whether  
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this judgment will constitute the last word on section 133, with the 
likelihood being that the court will sooner or later find itself revisiting 
the issues it failed to decide. 
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A TRIO OF CASES, A TRIO OF OPINIONS:   
THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL  
IN CANADA‟S POLICE STATIONS 
R. v. Sinclair, 2010 SCC 35, 259 C.C.C. (3d) 443 
R. v. McCrimmon, 2010 SCC 36, 259 C.C.C. (3d) 515 
R. v. Willier, 2010 SCC 37, 259 C.C.C. (3d) 536 
(October 8, 2010) 
Supreme Court of Canada 
Right to silence – Right to instruct and retain counsel – Police interviews 
When the police obtain a confession from a suspect in interview, the 
prosecution will be anxious to get it in front of the court.   Legal 
argument over whether such a confession is admissible will often be 
crucial in deciding the outcome of the case, and competent defence 
counsel will examine the minutiae of the interactions between the 
defendant and police officers to see whether there is any basis for 
having the confession excluded.   On May 12, 2009, the Supreme 
Court of Canada heard three cases, all of which turned on the issue of 
whether, where the defendant requested access to a lawyer but was 
denied it, his subsequent confession should have been excluded.   The 
judgments, and manifold dissenting reasons, were all delivered on 
October 8, 2010, and demonstrate a highly divergent range of 
opinions in Canada‟s highest court as to the meaning of section 10(b) 
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (“the Charter”) - 
“Everyone has the right on arrest or detention ... to retain and 
instruct counsel without delay and to be informed of that right.”   
Three distinct positions were adopted by members of the court.   
Using the author‟s own labels, these will be referred to as the 
“restrictive position”, the “intermediate position” and the “expansive 
position”.   Sinclair contains the fullest expression of these views, and 
is therefore the case on which this note is based. 
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The facts 
Mr Sinclair was charged with second-degree murder.   Upon being 
arrested, he was told that he had the right to remain silent (enshrined 
in section 7 of the Charter), that he could instruct any lawyer he wanted 
without delay, and that a legal aid lawyer could be made available to 
him.   Before being interviewed, Sinclair spoke, on two occasions, by 
telephone and for three minutes each time, to a lawyer whom he had 
previously instructed on an unrelated charge.   When the interview 
began, Sinclair was reminded of his right to silence, and informed that 
the interview would be recorded and could be used in court.   During 
the course of the interview, he made numerous further requests to speak 
to his lawyer.   These were all denied, with Sinclair being told by his inter-
viewer that as the police understood it, the law did not give Sinclair 
the right to further legal assistance in the circumstances.   In time, he 
confessed to the killing.   Furthermore, he participated in a re-enactment 
of the killing, and then revealed again, to an undercover officer who 
had been planted in his cell, that he had carried out the killing.   At 
trial, the admissibility of the confessions and the re-enactment was 
challenged, unsuccessfully, by the defence.   The Court of Appeal for 
British Columbia dismissed an appeal, as did the Supreme Court. 
 
The “restrictive position”:  initial access and access in change of circumstances 
The majority position was set out in reasons given by the Chief 
Justice (McClachlin C.J.), and Charron J.   Another three justices 
(Deschamps, Rothstein, Cromwell JJ.) concurred.   The “restrictive 
position” is that section 10(b) obliges the police to inform the suspect 
of his right of consultation at the time of detention or shortly 
thereafter and to allow him that right in practice, and that it requires 
the police to afford the suspect a further opportunity to consult with 
counsel where a “change of circumstances” makes this necessary 
([53]).   Those circumstances must be objectively observable at the 
time of interview, and not merely asserted when legal arguments as to 
admissibility arise ([55]). 
There are three broad categories of case, which are not closed 
([54]), in which it is recognised that the right to further consultation 
arises.   The first is where the suspect is asked to, or required to, 
participate in a non-routine procedure such as a line-up or a 
polygraph test, which counsel will not (or may not) have anticipated 
when giving initial advice ([50]).   The second category is “change in 
jeopardy”, where the accused faces new and more serious allegations 
which were not disclosed to him before his initial consultation ([51]).   
The final category is where the police become aware that the detainee 
may not have understood his right to silence, or where the police 
themselves undermine the legal advice the detainee has received ([52]). 
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The majority view of the ambit of the section 10(b) right was 
based on their position that the purpose of that right is merely to 
support the detainee‟s right, under section 7 of the Charter, to choose 
whether or not to co-operate with the police investigation ([47]).   
Thus, as long as it appears to the police that the detainee knows that 
he has the right to remain silent, no further communication with 
counsel is required. 
 
The “intermediate position”:  initial access and access as the case unfolds 
Similarly to the majority, Binnie J. recognised that the section 10(b) 
right is triggered upon initial arrest or detention, and that it is 
triggered again by some form of change of circumstance in the 
interview room.   The difference between the majority‟s “restrictive” 
and Binnie J.‟s “intermediate” positions is as to what constitutes a 
change of circumstance sufficient to trigger the right.   For Binnie J., 
ordinary developments during the course of an interview, such as the 
presentation or assertion of the existence of new evidence, are 
sufficient.   This is because, rather than looking to enumerate an 
objective set of categories to determine whether there has been a 
change of circumstances, Binnie J. was concerned with what effect 
developments in the interview room have on the defendant.   Thus, 
on the facts of Sinclair, Binnie J. found that the revelation by the 
police of new information to the accused, some of it true and some 
false, and the description by the police of the case against him as 
“overwhelming”, meant that Sinclair had a renewed right to consult 
counsel ([83]):  “the appellant was clearly concerned (manifested by 
his five separate requests to contact his lawyer again) whether the 
lawyer‟s initial advice (whatever it was) remained valid.” 
Binnie J. arrived at a less restrictive position than the majority 
because he conceived the purpose of the right to counsel as being 
wider than enforcing the right to silence.   He accepted the 
submission of the Ontario Criminal Lawyers‟ Association that if the 
purpose of defence counsel was purely to ensure that an accused was 
aware of his right to silence, that task could be accomplished by a 
recorded message: “You have reached counsel;  keep your mouth 
shut;  press one to repeat this message” ([86]).   In fact, if the role of 
defence counsel at the interview stage were restricted to reminding 
the defendant of his right to remain silent, the result could be the 
giving of “terrible advice”.   Binnie J. gives the example of a 
defendant who, when being interrogated about the date and time of 
an offence, fails to disclose a genuine alibi, because he is blindly 
following the advice to keep quiet.   It is submitted that this reasoning 
applies equally to any situation where the defendant fails to disclose 
the existence of a legitimate defence. 
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Under the “intermediate position”, the actual purpose of the right 
to counsel is to render meaningful legal assistance to the accused as 
the case against him unfolds.   However, it is expressly stated that the 
right to consult counsel is not unfettered:  it is only available for the 
purpose of giving legal assistance, and not simply to delay or distract 
from the interrogation.   The accused does not have a unilateral 
power to bring a halt to the interrogation ([112]). 
 
The “expansive position”:  access throughout 
At the other end of the scale to the majority, were the dissenting 
reasons given by LeBel and Fish JJ. (with whom Abella J. concurred) 
(the “expansive” position).   Their reasons fail to disclose any 
coherent test for when the accused will have a right to access counsel, 
but it appears that the right is unfettered.    For LeBel and Fish JJ., 
the right to instruct and retain counsel exists not merely as a corollary 
to the right to silence, but as a constitutional principle in its own 
right, and also as a manifestation of the presumption of innocence 
and the privilege against self-incrimination ([128], [156]).       As the 
police have no corresponding right to force the accused to speak to 
them, any custodial interrogation must be subject to the right of the 
suspect to consult counsel at any time ([129]).   While recognising that 
Binnie J.‟s position would expand the ambit of section 10(b), LeBel 
and Fish JJ. were unable to accept that, under Binnie J.‟s proposals, it 
would still be ultimately up to the police to decide whether the 
defendant requires meaningful legal assistance to deal with the case 
unfolding against him. 
 
Reasons for the divergence of approaches 
In addition to disagreeing over the purpose of the right to retain and 
instruct counsel, members of the court displayed widely differing 
feelings as to the effect of interrogation in custody upon detainees.   
The majority concentrated little on this, beyond asserting that the 
public interest required custodial interrogations to take place.   Binnie 
J., however, noted that there has been a host of known miscarriages 
of justice in Canada, and that “innocent people are induced to make 
false confessions more frequently than those unacquainted with the 
phenomenon might expect” ([90]).   His reasons describe interviews 
in custody as an “endurance contest” ([92]).   Similarly, the minority 
describe interrogating officers as undertaking “relentless and skilful 
efforts to obtain a confession”.   It is submitted that the facts of the 
three cases before the court, in which the detainees were questioned 
for hours and denied access to counsel, themselves demonstrate the 
accuracy of the dissentients‟ views of police interrogations. 
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The members of the court were split as to their assessments of the 
practicalities of expanding a detainee‟s right to access counsel.   The 
majority state that Binnie J.‟s position would usher in a test that “is so 
vague that it is impractical” ([59]), and which would leave in its wake a 
trail of Charter motions, appeals and second trials.   Binnie J. accepted 
this argument head on, thereby demonstrating its weakness: “The 
criminal justice system might well work most smoothly and efficiently 
from the crime-stopper‟s perspective if we had no Charter... .   If it 
takes time to work out its proper amplitude, so be it.” ([107]).   The 
court also disagreed over the practical effect, at the police station, of 
recognising a wider right of access to counsel.   On the face of it, none 
of the justices advocated the adoption of the American system under 
which, since Miranda v. Arizona, 348 U.S. 436 (1966), detainees can 
insist on the presence of lawyers in interrogations.   However, the 
proponents of the “expansive view” drew attention to the fact that the 
frequency of confessions has not been significantly affected by the 
1966 decision, while the majority relied on the fact that Miranda may 
have had a detrimental effect on law enforcement, and also that most 
suspects waive their Miranda rights (though this fact, by suggesting that 
the costs of a Miranda regime would not be excessive, could easily be 
used to argue in favour of the adoption of a Miranda regime). 
 
Comment 
It is submitted that since the right to instruct counsel exists to protect 
the defendant, whether in order to buttress his right to silence or to 
safeguard his wider constitutional rights, it is the effect of an 
interrogation on the defendant that must form the starting position 
when deciding when the right is available.   Binnie J.‟s position stands 
alone in approaching the availability of the right from this point of 
view.   The categories of “change of circumstances” proposed by the 
majority fail to reflect the fact that actions of the police that do not 
specifically fit into such a category can have a much greater impact on 
the will of the detainee than actions that do.   At the other end of the 
spectrum, the unfettered right of access seemingly adopted by the 
“expansive position” minority could not be appropriately recognised 
judicially.   It would require wide consideration of policy and econo-
mics, which is more appropriately undertaken by Parliament rather than 
the courts.   Binnie J.‟s position is thus the most coherent and practical.   
However, being the only position that was unsupported by any other 
member of the court, it is unlikely to become law in the near future. 
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consideration of the law or practice of a jurisdiction not so listed  
(e.g. the Republic of Ireland or the United States of America)  
is permissible. 
 
Longer articles, which examine some general common law 
principle, or undertake a comparison of various authorities’ 
approaches to a particular question of law, should be between 10,000 
and 12,000 words in length (including footnotes), and shorter articles, 
which examine a particular approach to a problem shared by different 
common law jurisdictions, or undertake a simple comparison of two 
jurisdictions’ approaches to such a question, should be between 5,000 
and 6,000 words.   An abstract of no more than 150 words, clearly 
summarising the arguments, should be submitted with the article.   
The preferred length for case comments is 2,000 to 4,000 words. 
 
All contributors will receive a free copy of the journal issue and an 
electronic copy of their published piece.   Please be aware that your 
contribution will, if considered suitable for publication, be blind 
refereed. 
 
Full submission instructions and a style guide can be found at 
www.acclawyers.org/journal. 

